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Abstract 
 
Introduction 
 
There is now compelling evidence that a significant minority of patients suffer 
preventable iatrogenic harm during their interactions with health care, including 
in UK general practice. While our understanding of the extent of the problem 
and the contributing factors continues to increase, it remains incomplete. 
Further patient safety research is therefore urgently required, particularly to 
develop, test and successfully implement effective improvement strategies, 
methods and tools. Of the main approaches currently available for improving 
patient safety, the general practice Trigger Review Method (TRM) is of particular 
interest and the main focus of this study. 
 
The TRM is, quite simply, a structured way to rapidly screen samples of random 
electronic patient records for undetected patient safety incidents (PSIs). It is 
essentially an adaptation of clinical record review, with the same underlying 
principles of learning from error and improving care. Development of the TRM 
commenced in 2007 in Scottish general practice, with subsequent testing in The 
Health Foundation-funded Safety and Improvement in Primary Care (SIPC) 
programme. In 2013, the TRM was included as one of the three core components 
of the Scottish Government’s Patient Safety Programme for Primary Care (SPSP-
PC). Scottish general practices were also financially incentivised through the 
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) to routinely apply the TRM and report 
their findings.  
 
However, despite the increasing and national interest in the TRM, many 
unanswered questions remained: what is its potential value, how acceptable and 
feasible is it and to what extent (if any) will, or should, it become part of 
routine general practice? The aims of this study were therefore to: (i)  describe 
the patient safety perceptions of general practice clinicians and staff; (ii) 
determine the usefulness of the TRM; (iii) explain how the TRM worked; and (iv) 
identify the main factors that facilitated or hindered its implementation.  
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Methods 
 
This study has a mixed-methods design. It was undertaken in the West of 
Scotland region in two NHS Health Boards: Greater Glasgow and Clyde (GGC) and 
Ayrshire and Arran (A&A). Convenience samples of 12 general practice teams and 
25 GP Specialty Trainees (GPST) were recruited. Data were collected through: 
semi-structured interviews (n=62) with a range of general practice clinicians and 
staff; and cross-sectional trigger reviews of selected electronic patient records.  
 
Normalisation Process Theory (NPT) underpinned all stages of the research. NPT 
is a socio-technical, middle-range theory about the ‘work’ people do collectively 
and as individuals to implement and sustain complex health care interventions 
such as the TRM. The majority of the qualitative data were analyzed 
thematically and a NPT framework was applied to the remaining data. 
Quantitative data were analysed using recognised statistical tests. 
 
Results 
 
A total of 47 primary care clinicians reviewed 1659 electronic patient records 
and detected 216 PSIs. A substantial minority of these were considered to have 
led to moderate or more substantial harm (29.2%), while the majority (54.8%) 
were rated as being preventable or potentially preventable. The most common 
type of PSI related to ‘medication’ (40.7%) and the most commonly implicated 
drug was Warfarin. The participants reported considering or undertaking specific 
improvement actions during and after approximately two thirds of trigger 
reviews. The most common action was ‘feedback to colleagues’. More specific 
actions included: undertaking significant event analyses (SEAs) and clinical 
audits, designing or redesigning practice protocols and including their findings in 
their appraisal documentation. 
 
The vast majority of participants identified four main factors as being 
particularly important for the successful implementation of the TRM, and by 
extension its potential normalisation. The first and most important factor was 
provision of adequate resources and protected time to conduct trigger reviews. 
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The second factor was whether senior leaders in the practice teams, the 
government and professional bodies practically demonstrated their support for 
the TRM through, for example, contextually integrating it into existing general 
practice processes. The third and fourth factors related to the characteristics of 
participants. Successful implementation required knowledgeable clinicians to 
remain engaged with the TRM, and to perceive it as useful, acceptable and 
feasible – which the vast majority of participants were, and did.  
 
Discussion 
 
This study is the first known attempt to investigate how the TRM is implemented 
and perceived from the perspective of general practice clinicians and staff. The 
main findings are that most participants experienced the method as acceptable, 
feasible and useful. It is clear that the TRM is uncovering important patient 
safety concerns and also driving improvements in related care systems and 
processes at the individual practice level. The implication is that this is making 
significant and demonstrable differences to patient care, while impacting 
positively on local safety culture. On the evidence presented, normalisation of 
the TRM in general practice can therefore be recommended.   
 
However, while the usefulness of an intervention is an important factor in 
determining whether it is normalised or not, the study findings also clearly 
indicate – consistent with the international literature – that there are other 
factors that are at least equally important for normalisation. At the time of 
writing, there are no formal mandates or financial incentives for general 
practice clinicians or teams to perform regular trigger reviews. It therefore 
seems likely that normalisation of the TRM in Scottish general practice will be 
gradual and piecemeal, if it happens at all. Nevertheless, the lessons learnt from 
this study can be incorporated in the ongoing efforts to further improve the 
safety of care in general medical practice. In particular, researchers and policy 
makers should pro-actively identify and address the main factors that are known 
to facilitate or hinder the implementation of improvement initiatives; the 
existing knowledge and ‘engagement’ of clinicians should be recognised and 
harnessed; and the lessons learnt from PSIs should be more widely disseminated.  
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Definitions 
 
Term Definition 
  
Electronic 
medical 
record 
Comprises the electronic patient record sections relating to: 
clinical encounter entries, repeat and acutely prescribed 
medication, correspondence with secondary care and other 
relevant organizations, clinical investigations (such as blood test 
results) and clinical codes for diseases and allergies. 
Error The result of choosing the wrong plan to achieve an aim, or not 
initiating or completing the right plan as intended (1). There 
are at least three different types of errors: slips (incorrectly 
executed plans), lapses (a plan or part of plan is not executed) 
and mistakes (choosing or executing the wrong plan). Not all 
errors will lead to harm, just as not all harms are caused by 
error.  However, there is an association between error and harm 
(2).  Errors are unintentional and should not be confused with 
violations, negligence or recklessness. 
Harm Impairment of structure or function of the body and/or any 
deleterious effect arising there from (3). A pragmatic 
interpretation is ‘anything’ that you would not want to happen 
to you or your relatives while receiving care. Although some 
incidents of harm are preventable, others are recognised 
complications of care. The severity of harm ranges from 
transient inconvenience and self-limiting symptoms, through 
prolonged admissions, disabling injuries, permanent functional 
impairment and even death. 
Inappropriate 
medication 
prescribing 
The prescription(s) that introduce a significant risk of an 
adverse drug related event when there is evidence for an 
equally or more effective alternative medication (4).  
Near miss An incident which did not reach the patient (3). It is also 
sometimes referred to as a ‘close call’ or ‘free lesson’ 
Normalisation 
Process 
A middle-range theory about the required work a complex 
health care intervention’s intended users have to do to 
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Theory implement, embed, integrate and normalise it as part of routine 
practice (5).  
Patient safety The reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associated with 
healthcare to an acceptable minimum (3).  
Patient safety 
incident 
An event or circumstance which could have resulted, or did 
result, in unnecessary harm to a patient (3). It has become the 
preferred term when discussing adverse events, near misses and 
significant events. 
Positive 
deviance 
The ability of some health care staff and teams to deliver 
exceptional performance by overcoming common problems 
through uncommon or different behaviours and using only 
existing resources within their communities (6). 
Safety 
learning 
system (SLS) 
A method of monitoring the occurrence of incidents and 
developing improvement strategies to address the cause of the 
incidents (7). 
Significant 
event 
Any event thought by anyone in the team to be significant in 
the care of patients or the conduct of the organization (8). 
Violations Deliberate deviation from an operating procedure, standard or 
rule (3). They are inconsistent with rules or recommended 
practice familiar to a health care worker. Violations are 
sometimes adaptive behaviour in response to complex, 
challenging or demanding situations. It has been argued that 
violations cannot be eliminated, but that they can be managed 
(9). 
Work Purposive social action that involves the investment of personal 
and group resources to achieve goals (5). 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The mantra ‘first, do no harm’ has been a fundamental principle of health care 
for hundreds, if not thousands of years. It succinctly describes the duty of 
clinicians to fulfil the reasonable desire of any patient to receive care that is 
safe. However, around the turn of the century a series of landmark studies in 
the United states of America (USA) (10, 11), Australian secondary (12) and 
primary care settings (13) and the United Kingdom (UK) (14) provided irrefutable 
evidence that a significant minority of patients suffer preventable iatrogenic 
harm during their interactions with health care systems.  
 
This finding has since been replicated by a large number of studies in these 
countries (15-22) and worldwide (23, 24).  The importance of this research has 
been emphasized further by influential reports such as ‘To Err is Human’ (25) 
‘Crossing the Quality Chasm’ (26) and ‘An Organisation with a Memory’ (27) by 
leading institutions and government departments which sounded a clarion call to 
national governments and everyone else involved in health care to address the 
patient safety problem. The key messages from the reports are still relevant 
fifteen years later: health care should learn lessons from adverse events, take 
preventative action and that formal patient safety improvement initiatives are 
necessary. 
 
The other key driver of the patient safety movement has been – and continues to 
be - the media. The in-depth and sustained reporting of selected examples of 
iatrogenic harm through multiple media sources increases the profile of certain 
patient safety incidents (PSIs) and raises public and patient awareness of this 
issue. Unfortunately there are many potential examples that could be provided. 
In the context of the UK National Health Service (NHS) the two most widely 
publicised examples are arguably the ‘scandals’ of the Bristol Royal Infirmary 
paediatric cardiac surgery service (28) and Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation 
Trust (29). In both instances endemic and systemic failures in care resulted in 
preventable harm and death. At other times, the poignant story of one patient 
who suffered a catastrophic error has had the power to capture public and 
professional attention alike and galvanize improvement efforts. An example that 
reverberated through UK general practice was the preventable death of Mr. 
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David Gray from an inadvertent administration of a lethal dose of Diamorphine 
during what should have been a routine out-of-hours consultation (30). 
 
The responses from national governments, health care organisations, regulatory 
bodies and health care professionals, managers and staff to the reported 
deficiencies in quality and safety of health care vary widely. Some acknowledge 
the problem but perceive it as relatively insignificant or as an intractable, 
intrinsic and unavoidable element of health care.  On the other hand, some 
national governments and regulatory bodies and many health care organisations, 
units, teams and individuals acknowledge and prioritise the problem and are 
taking steps to ensure they deliver care of a consistently high standard.  As the 
focus on patient safety began to grow in modern health care systems 
internationally, it became an increasingly acceptable area for research and has 
duly been prioritised in some institutions and at a national policy level. As a 
result our knowledge and understanding of patient safety continue to increase 
rapidly.   
 
Literature review 
 
Chapters two to four provide the background and rationale for this study. They 
also introduce and define key concepts through a narrative review of the 
international patient safety literature. The literature that is presented was 
initially identified through a systematic search of English language papers that 
was conducted in November 2011. The only limits were ‘human’ studies and 
‘English’ language. The search terms and how they were combined are 
summarised in Box 1.1 on page 19 and the databases and periods of time that 
were included are listed in Box 1.2, page 20.  
 
The initial search identified approximately 3500 articles. The abstracts of all 
studies identified during the search were screened for relevance. When 
abstracts were deemed relevant, full texts were obtained. A ‘snowballing’ 
technique was used to scan the references of the most relevant articles 
identified in the search to identify other potential useful papers and reports not 
identified by the formal search process.  
 
Box 1.1. Literature search strategy: search terms  
 
Patient safety AND 
General practice 
OR 
Family medicine 
OR 
Primary care 
AND 
Adverse event$ 
OR 
Adverse drug event$ 
OR 
Significant event$ 
OR 
Harm 
OR 
Error$ 
OR 
Patient safety incident$ 
AND Trigger tool$ 
 
  
Box 1.2. Literature search strategy: databases 
 
Medline (1996+) 
Embase (1996+) 
British Nursing Index (1994+) 
Psychinfo (2002+) 
Health Management improvement Consortium (HMIC)* 
Maternity and Infant Care (MIDIRS)* 
EBM reviews (all)*  
*No date limits were selected for these databases 
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At the time of the initial literature search, there was considerably less evidence 
about patient safety in primary care settings compared with six years later, 
when this study formally concluded. In 2006 Charles Vincent wrote in the first 
edition of Patient Safety that ‘primary care is more or less virgin territory in 
patient safety terms’ (31). Three years later, in ‘Health Care Error and Patient 
Safety’ the authors dedicated five lines in 288 pages specifically to the general 
practice setting (32).  
 
Since then, there has been a substantial increase in the number of patient 
safety-related studies conducted in primary care, with several recent attempts 
to synthesize the rapidly expanding evidence through literature ‘scans’ and 
other review methods (22, 33-35). Given the sheer volume of the available 
literature the potential risks of selection bias and oversimplifying or omitting key 
patient safety principles or findings in this study therefore have to be 
acknowledged. These risks were at least partly addressed through three 
strategies.   
 
The first strategy was to apply the procedure proposed by Whitlock et al, 
whereby the potential relevance of literature reviews (where available) are 
determined by considering whether they are ‘on topic’ and of sufficient quality 
to provide confidence in the conclusions (36). The second strategy was to search 
for ‘pivotal’ studies that had been conducted after the reviews and consider 
whether they provided significantly different or new insights (37). The third 
strategy was to continually update the selected literature for this study through: 
my practical experience of working in this discipline for the last ten years; the 
invaluable feedback and suggestions from colleagues, study participants and 
stakeholders during this time; and through regular electronic notifications of 
selected publications from the Patient Safety Network (38). 
 
1.1. The Trigger Review Method 
 
The focus of this thesis is the implementation of the Trigger Review Method 
(TRM) in general medical practice. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 2; 
however, a brief summary of its development, testing and implementation is 
outlined here, by means of an introduction. 
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The terms ‘trigger review method’ or ‘trigger tool’ are often used 
interchangeably and may be new or unfamiliar to some, but the underlying 
principle and approach of learning from error and improving care are not new. It 
is essentially an adaptation of clinical record review or ‘case note audit’ which 
should be familiar to most primary care clinicians. The TRM is, quite simply, a 
structured way to rapidly screen samples of random electronic patient records 
for undetected patient safety incidents (PSIs) (39).  
 
1.1.1. Development and testing of the TRM 
 
The TRM was adapted from the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s (IHI) 
Global Trigger Tool for secondary care in 2007 and subsequently further 
developed and validated in Scottish general practices. The aim at that time was 
to determine whether the TRM had value as a metric to quantify harm in general 
practice. In the pilot study trained clinicians reviewed a one year period in a 
random selection of 500 patient records.  They detected an overall harm rate of 
9.4%, although this included some incidents that had originated in secondary 
care settings and not all incidents were judged to have been preventable (40). 
However, the study provided evidence that the trigger tool approach was 
transferable to the general practice setting, and that it may potentially detect 
more and different types of harm than any other available method.  
 
The TRM was subsequently tested as part of The Health Foundation-funded 
Safety and Improvement in Primary Care (SIPC) programme in around 70 general 
practices in seven territorial Health Boards in Scotland over a two year period, 
commencing in May 2010. The SIPC programme evaluation suggested that the 
TRM had important educational and improvement value by enabling previously 
undetected threats to patients to be uncovered in clinical records, thereby 
providing the general practice team with a new perspective and opportunity to 
make patient care safer (41). However, it also found that some reviewers were 
uncomfortable with the term ‘harm’ or (rightly) pointed out that it unnecessarily 
restrained their findings. For example, by focusing on harm, potential 
opportunities for improvement suggested by errors, ‘near misses’ or ‘acts of 
omission’ were not recorded.   
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As a result, the TRM was modified so that its main aim became the detection of 
PSIs. In addition, the aim of the TRM was expanded. The detection of PSIs was 
no longer the only outcome of interest.  Rather, detecting and recording PSIs 
should explicitly be considered by clinician reviewers and their practice teams as 
opportunities to identify potential learning needs and act as ‘prompts’ to 
implement the necessary corrective changes and improvements to care 
processes when judged appropriate.   
 
1.1.2. Implementation of the TRM 
 
In 2013, at the same time this study was nearing the end of its second year, two 
developments occurred that dramatically influenced the implementation, 
adoption and potential value of the TRM. The first of these was that the TRM 
was included as one of the three core components of the Scottish Government’s 
Patient Safety Programme for Primary Care (SPSP-PC) that launched in March 
2013 (42). The other was that all Scottish general practices were financially 
incentivised through the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) to routinely 
apply the TRM and report their findings (43). As a result, the TRM was 
implemented across most general practices in Scotland, even though the findings 
of this study in relation to its acceptability, feasibility and potential usefulness 
had not yet been confirmed or shared. 
  
Despite the increasing and national interest in the TRM, many unanswered 
questions therefore remained: what is its potential value, how acceptable and 
feasible is it and to what extent (if any) will, or should, it become part of 
routine general practice? It is also important to acknowledge the assumption 
underlying much of the aforementioned initiatives, e.g. that all clinicians 
possess the requisite knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to routinely apply 
safety improvement interventions, including the TRM.  And that in doing this 
they are able to apply the technique correctly, produce robust data, evaluate 
their findings and then plan and implement meaningful and sustainable 
improvements. A further assumption is that healthcare and educational 
authorities are able to up-skill the GP workforce in the use of the TRM on the 
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scale necessary to support the proposed implementation of this approach on a 
national basis.   
 
The main aims of this study are to test these assumptions and thereby provide 
evidence with which to answer these questions. The study aims are formally 
stated and discussed in Chapter 4, page 105, but are summarised for now in Box 
1.3, page 25.  
 
1.1.3. Complex Healthcare Interventions 
 
The vast majority of quality improvement interventions in health care are 
described as ‘complex’, and the TRM is no exception. Complex health care 
interventions are defined as ‘deliberately initiated attempts to introduce new 
or modify existing patterns of collective action in health care’ (44). The words 
‘deliberate initiation’ are important and imply that the intervention is: 
institutionally sanctioned; formally or informally defined; consciously planned; 
and intended to lead to a change in outcomes (44). Complex interventions are 
characterised by emergent activities, multi-layered hierarchies and adaptive 
capacity which occurs within complex environments and are affected by internal 
and external feedback (45).  
 
Complex health care interventions consist of three interlinked components: (i) 
‘actors’, e.g. the people implementing and using the intervention; (ii) ‘objects’, 
e.g. the intervention and the materials it relates to; and (iii) ‘contexts’ in which 
they are implemented (46). All three of these components will be considered in 
detail. In particular: Chapter 6 will describe the ‘contexts’ within which the TRM 
was implemented; Chapter 7 will provide information about the ‘actors’ who 
implemented and interacted with the TRM; and Chapters 8 and 9 will examine 
the ‘object’ component further by considering how the TRM works and the 
barriers and facilitators to its implementation.   
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Box 1.3. Summary of the main study aims 
 
 To describe the perceptions and understanding of general practice 
clinicians and staff of patient safety (Chapter 6) 
 To determine the usefulness of the TRM by describing the outcomes from 
its implementation (Chapter 7)  
 To explain how the TRM works (Chapter 8) 
 To identify and describe the main factors that facilitated or hindered the 
implementation of the TRM in general practice (Chapter 9)  
 
  
26 
The effectiveness of complex health care interventions such as the TRM are 
determined not only by their utility, but also by the unique and dynamic 
‘contexts’ within which they are implemented, and the characteristics and 
knowledge of the ‘actors’ who are responsible for using them. So, while the TRM 
proposes a potential solution to help address the patient safety problem, it 
should be acknowledged that an intervention by itself has limited value, unless 
it can be successfully implemented in practice. 
 
The rest of this Chapter will provide an overview of the study and contents of 
this thesis. Figure 1.1 provides a graphical summary of the timeline of this study, 
the history of patient safety in Scotland and the Trigger Review Method (TRM). 
 
1.2. General practice and patient safety (Chapter 2) 
 
The patient safety literature can be classified into one of three interlinked 
groups, depending on what type of knowledge they generate (47). The first 
group of studies increases our understanding of the ‘problems’ associated with 
patient safety and includes knowledge about the epidemiology and nature of 
patient safety incidents (PSIs). This group of knowledge will be discussed in 
Chapter two. A chronological summary of sentinel events, reports and national 
patient safety improvement initiatives that have been implemented in the UK, 
and particularly in Scottish general practice will be provided and the concept of 
safety culture will be introduced.  
 
1.3. The Trigger Review Method (Chapter 3) 
 
The second of the three groups of studies are those concerned with developing 
and testing complex health care interventions, including different improvement 
methods and tools. These studies produce evidence that increases our 
understanding about potential ‘solutions’ to patient safety problems. Chapter 
three will describe the strengths and limitations of five different types of 
patient safety improvement methods that are currently available for use in the 
general practice setting. One of these, the Trigger Review Method (TRM), is the 
main focus of this study.  
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Figure 1.1. A timeline of this study, the history of patient safety in Scotland and the Trigger Review Method (TRM) 
 
P1 – P11 are listed as Appendix 10 (page 304) 
1.4. Implementation science and Normalisation Process Theory (Chapter 4) 
 
Building on the knowledge of the previous two groups, we need to understand 
and evaluate how complex health care interventions – e.g. the potential 
‘solutions’ to problems such as suboptimal healthcare safety - are implemented 
and why they are effective (or not). This group of literature also includes 
knowledge about the factors that hinder or facilitate implementation and 
normalisation processes. The narrative in Chapter four will therefore be about 
the science of implementation and the many different theories that are 
currently available for describing and explaining implementation processes and 
phenomena, some of which are summarised. Of these, Normalisation Process 
Theory (NPT) was selected to be the theoretical underpinning for much of this 
study.  
 
NPT was developed in and for the UK primary care setting, which makes it 
eminently suitable for the purpose of this study. As a middle-range social theory, 
NPT enables researchers to describe the work participants do individually and as 
teams to implement, integrate and embed an intervention, which is the main 
focus of this study. Chapter four concludes with a dedicated section about the 
NPT framework and a description of the main study aims.  
 
1.5. Methods (Chapter 5) 
 
Chapter 5 describes the mixed-methods study design, sampling and recruitment 
strategies. The different methods that were used to collect and analyse the 
qualitative and quantitative data are then described. Finally, specific ethical 
considerations are discussed.  
 
1.6. The study participants’ perceptions of patient safety (Chapter 6) 
 
The main study findings are described in chapters 6 to 9. In each chapter the 
findings are compared with the international patient safety literature where 
relevant, some of the important practical implications are described and the 
main points are summarised.  
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The first of the results chapters (Chapter 6) describes the perceptions of a range 
of general practice staff about the concept ‘patient safety’.  In particular, 
participants considered safety to be an important and integral part of the care 
they routinely deliver. However, most participants perceived a proportion of PSIs 
as inevitable, and therefore not preventable. Despite this, they unanimously 
agreed that many high-risk processes and systems are amenable to improvement 
efforts.  
 
The other sections of the chapter describe the factors participants perceived as 
most important in relation to PSIs; the wide range of formal and informal 
improvement methods that participants were aware of or already using; and the 
importance of the prevailing safety culture at the time of the study. 
 
1.7. Main outcomes from implementing the TRM (Chapter 7) 
 
The concept of ‘complex health care interventions’ and their three main 
components: ‘actors’, ‘objects’ and ‘contexts’ has already been introduced 
(Page 24). Chapter 7 focuses mainly on the third component – the ‘object’ – 
which in this study is the TRM. In general terms the chapter describes how the 
TRM was enacted and the outcomes that resulted from this. From a NPT 
perspective, the main work that is considered is that of ‘collective action’ and in 
particular its component of ‘interactional workability’. In other words, how did 
the clinician reviewers apply the TRM, were they able to detect triggers and 
patient safety incidents (PSIs) and what actions (if any) did they subsequently 
take?  
 
Throughout the chapter the main findings are discussed when they are reported 
in order to raise a number of directly relevant issues, and they are compared 
with the patient safety evidence-base where applicable. In addition, the main 
findings are compared with the aggregated data from the general practices in 
three Scottish NHS Health Boards who implemented the TRM subsequent to this 
study as a Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) requirement for the financial 
year April 2013 to March 2014 (48). These data are referred to as the ‘QOF 
study’ and provide additional context for interpreting and discussing the main 
findings of this study.  
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1.8. How the TRM worked (Chapter 8) 
 
Chapter 8 explains how the TRM worked. In essence, trained clinicians 
performed structured trigger reviews of samples of patient records with a 
patient safety ‘mindset’, ideally as a single uninterrupted activity during 
protected time allocated specifically for this purpose. The importance of 
detecting PSIs was that it created potential ‘learning moments’ (49). The value 
of learning moments was in turn determined by clinicians consciously or 
unconsciously choosing to either accept ‘ownership’ of PSIs or not. This pivotal 
decision was crucial to the eventual outcomes of the TRM. The potential 
outcomes from detecting PSIs and accepting ownership for them are described 
and include: clinicians and teams taking specific actions to help reduce similar 
PSIs in the future; increased vigilance and awareness of potential safety threats; 
and identifying learning needs and points. 
 
1.9. Factors that facilitated or hindered the implementation of the TRM 
(Chapter 9) 
 
This chapter describes the factors that facilitated or hindered the 
implementation of the TRM in general practice.  The results are presented 
according to the four main constructs of the Normalisation Process Theory (NPT) 
framework, which are: understanding (coherence); the work required (collective 
action); engagement of key actors (cognitive participation); and monitoring and 
appraisal (reflexive monitoring).  The chapter also considers the potential 
implications of the barriers and facilitators that were identified and compare 
and contrast them where relevant with the international literature.  
 
1.10. Discussion (Chapter 10) 
 
In the final chapter, four questions in relation to the study are considered. The 
first two questions are directly relevant to the study aims: ‘Should the TRM be 
normalised and What is the likelihood of it being normalised in general practice 
in Scotland? In answering these questions, the potential implications of the main 
study findings will also be described.  
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The third question is: What are the strengths and limitations of this study? In 
answering this question, the implications of selecting NPT as a theoretical 
framework will be considered as a separate subsection. The relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the TRM will also be described. The fourth question is: Can 
recommendations be made as a result of this study? The short answer is ‘yes’ – a 
number of specific recommendations will be made in relation to implementation 
processes and improvement interventions; the TRM; and current and future 
research priorities. 
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Chapter 2. Patient safety and general practice 
 
The aim of this chapter is to distil the literature and practical experiences of the 
last two decades and provide a short yet cohesive summary of the state of 
patient safety in UK general practice. The chapter begins with the terminology 
of patient safety and defines common terms in this study, including ‘error’, 
‘harm’ and ‘patient safety incident’ (PSI). Next, the incidence of error and harm 
in general practice is considered.  
 
Current estimates of preventable harm vary widely and are dependent on study 
designs and methods, but provide compelling evidence of room for 
improvement. The two high-priority areas in general practice which are 
implicated in the vast majority of PSIs are identified and discussed, e.g. 
medication and diagnoses-related processes. Two other types of patient safety 
incidents (PSIs) are also considered: ordering and processing of investigations 
and communication, clinical handover and care transitions. The chapter then 
summarises influential UK patient safety programmes and initiatives, reports and 
sentinel events in chronological order before discussing those most relevant to 
this study, including: the Safety Improvement in Primary Care programme (SIPC); 
the Scottish Patient Safety Programme (SPSP) and the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF). The chapter concludes by explaining the importance of safety 
culture and how it affects all improvement efforts and initiatives.   
 
2.1. The terminology of patient safety  
 
Patient safety has its own vocabulary, just as any other scientific discipline. 
However, because it is a relatively new field of research, the same terms often 
have different definitions and different words are used interchangeably. New 
terms are regularly being added and the meanings of words evolve. As an 
example, a review of ‘medication safety’ in 2005 found 25 different terms 
relating to the same concept, with 119 different definitions for these terms (50). 
Even everyday terms that may seem self-explanatory and simple can be 
challenging to definitively define as demonstrated by a qualitative survey of 
general practitioners (GPs) who provided 25 different definitions of the common 
word ‘error’. The lack of consensus was attributed to them considering the term 
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from different perspectives relating to three sets of factors: process vs. outcome 
errors, rare vs. common occurrences and system vs. individual responsibility for 
errors (51). The different perspectives of participants in this study will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
This ambiguity can be frustrating for researchers who feel patient safety terms 
are ‘difficult to pin down’ and also give the wrong impression that we are 
investigating and dealing with unbounded ‘relative concepts’ (52).  Semantic 
differences in terms and lack of coherence around their functional meanings 
make direct comparison between studies difficult and reduce the potential of 
evidence to be generalized wider than its initial setting (53). Developing and 
validating an international, standardized patient safety vocabulary was 
therefore recognised as an essential requirement for effective patient safety 
research and improvement (54).  
 
In response, the World Health Organisation (WHO) developed and published an 
International Classification for Patient Safety (ICPS) in 2009 (3). The definitions 
of common patient safety terms that are used throughout this thesis are taken 
from the ICPS and they are listed on page 13. The four terms that are most 
relevant to this study are defined and discussed below. They are: ‘patient 
safety’, the discipline within which this study was conducted; ‘patient safety 
incidents’, one of the study’s main outcome measures; ‘harm’ and more 
specifically avoidable harm; and ‘error’ because, despite its strong correlation 
with harm, important differences between the two terms should be explicitly 
distinguished.   
   
Patient safety: The reduction of the risk of unnecessary harm associated with 
healthcare to an acceptable minimum (3). A short, practical explanation is that 
when things go right, nothing bad happens.  
 
Patient safety incident (PSI): An event or circumstance which could have 
resulted, or did result, in unnecessary harm to a patient (3). This broad 
definition includes a large number of related terms such as: adverse events, 
adverse drug events, adverse incidents, near misses, error, harm event and 
significant events. 
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Harm is defined as the impairment of structure or function of the body and/or 
any deleterious effect arising there from (3). It can be considered to have 
occurred if a patient’s health or quality of life is negatively affected by any 
aspect of their interaction with health care.  A pragmatic interpretation of harm 
is that it is anything that you would not want to happen to you or your relatives 
while receiving care. The severity of harm ranges from transient inconvenience 
and self-limiting symptoms, through prolonged admissions, disabling injuries, 
permanent functional impairment and even death. It is also crucial to distinguish 
between preventable harm and harm as a recognised complication of evidence-
based care. In practice it is often challenging to make these subjective 
distinctions between different degrees of harm severity and whether harm was 
avoidable or not. This is further complicated by the lack of a validated and 
reliable classification system or definitions of either concept (55).  
 
Error is the failure to carry out a planned action as intended or application of an 
incorrect plan. Errors are always unintentional and therefore differentiated 
from violations, negligence or recklessness. These terms are not included or 
implied in the following chapters unless expressly indicated otherwise. Three 
main types of errors have been described: slips (incorrectly executed plans), 
lapses (a plan or part of plan is not executed) and mistakes (choosing or 
executing the wrong plan) (1).  
 
Observation studies in high-risk medical specialties such as anaesthesia and 
cardiac surgery have shown that health care errors are common, but that most 
errors are recognised and ameliorated before harm occurs (56). However, the 
same errors may go undetected on a different day and then result in harm to 
varying degrees. The current consensus is therefore that error and harm are 
clearly associated, but the type of error and the severity of harm are usually 
not; only some errors lead to harm; and harm does not necessarily imply an error 
(57). A practical example is the study of the association between the severity of 
intercepted medication errors in an accident and emergency setting and the 
probability of patient harm. 82% of errors were rated as ‘significant’ or ‘serious’ 
yet the probability of harm was considered ‘medium’ (17%) or ‘high’ (1%) for a 
minority only (58). 
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2.2. The incidence of error and harm in general practice 
 
Until recently, there have been no large-scale epidemiological studies to reliably 
quantify the harm rate in primary care, although a number of these studies are 
now being planned or have just been concluded (21, 22, 59, 60). Our knowledge 
of patient safety in the general practice setting were therefore about specific 
care processes and systems or types of error and harm and were derived from 
small studies. Consequently, the task of identifying how big an issue safety really 
is has been described as being akin to ‘looking at mountains in the clouds – it is 
hard to tell where one thing begins and another ends’ (61). Just as it can be 
difficult to separate mountains and clouds, there are significant methodological, 
cultural and practical challenges in understanding and differentiating between, 
for example: contributing factors, causative factors and chance; preventable 
and non-preventable harm and perceptions; and intentions and objective 
outcome measures. The challenges include: a historic perception that general 
practice is low-risk and by implication not a research priority; a lack of validated 
methods that can feasibly and reliably detect all or most PSIs; procuring and 
allocating the required time and resources to undertake the necessary research; 
and reaching consensus about what the research priorities should be in general, 
and as described above reliably differentiating between ‘harm’ and ‘preventable 
harm’.   
 
Irrespective of these and other challenges, the importance of assessing and 
improving patient safety in general practice is increasingly being recognised and 
understood.  There are at least three reasons for this. The first reason is that 
the vast majority of all health care is delivered in this setting. There were more 
than 300 million face-to-face consultations in general practice in the UK in 2009, 
which is approximately 90% of all patient encounters in the NHS (62). Since then, 
there has been a substantial increase in consultation rates, with average 
consultation duration and total clinical workloads recently described as 
‘reaching saturation point’ in English general practice (63). The same pattern of 
year on year increases in workload can be observed in NHS Scotland’s general 
practices, with more than 24 million face-to-face consultations in 2012 alone 
(64). Primary care clinicians and their representative bodies are arguing strongly 
that the significant increases in workload have not been matched with 
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commensurate increases in the workforce or resources and in some instances 
have declined (65). This argument strongly influenced the context and findings 
of this study and will be examined in detail in chapters 6, 9 and 10. 
 
The second reason why patient safety in general practice is important is because 
of significant changes over the past 20 years or so in the way health care is 
delivered, which in turn have increased the risk for PSIs to occur in this setting 
(66). For example, patients are discharged from hospitals earlier than in the 
past; GPs increasingly prescribe and monitor high-risk medications; time 
pressures in consultations are increasing with complexity relating to an ageing 
population, multimorbidity and polypharmacy; and services and continuity of 
care are fragmenting (63, 67-70). The third reason relates to the nature of 
general practice as a discipline concerned with ‘incremental longitudinal 
processes’ that is ‘founded on decisions concerned with managing uncertainty 
and marginalizing risk’ (52).  
 
There has been a substantial increase in the last five to ten years in the number 
and quality of studies about the incidence and nature of safety threats and 
deficiencies in general practice. As a result, it is now widely accepted that 
healthcare errors are relatively common in primary care settings worldwide and 
that a substantial minority result in preventable harm to patients (20). We also 
know that the majority of harm incidents are minor or moderate in severity, but 
that some have serious consequences, including hospital admissions and even 
death. (17) Five examples are provided below as further evidence in relation to 
these general findings. The first two studies were selected because they 
provided the first known estimates of error rates in UK primary care, the third 
example was selected because it suggested that the patient safety problem in 
primary care was much more serious than previously suggested, and the fourth 
and fifth example was selected because of its relevance to this study.    
 
The first example is the literature review by Sandars and Esmail who aimed to 
describe the frequency and nature of medical error in primary care in 2003 (71). 
Their study was the first known review of its kind, and they found only 12 
suitable studies for inclusion. The estimated rate of error was between 5 and 80 
per 100 000 consultations and the authors described how different methods and 
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terminology made it challenging to understand the state of patient safety at that 
time. The outcomes or potential preventability of the errors were not described. 
The authors acknowledged that this rate was likely an underestimation of the 
true error rate as most of the studies had used voluntary incident reporting by 
clinicians. This was confirmed in that same year when Rubin et al (example two) 
reported their findings of an error rate almost 100 times higher (75.6 errors per 
1000 consultations) in UK primary care. This rate was derived from a voluntary 
incident reporting system they had implemented in UK primary care (72). These 
early studies highlighted the need for further research, rigorous methodology 
and reliable metrics.  
 
The third example is the controversial study by Woods et al who reviewed the 
discharge documentation of patients in the USA in order to detect the number of 
preventable adverse events originating in ambulatory care and the severity of 
their outcomes (73). They estimated that these preventable adverse events 
resulted annually in as many as 75 000 hospital admissions and 2 587 deaths in 
the USA. While this study has been widely cited since, it is important to 
acknowledge its potential limitations and assumptions. The authors reviewed a 
large sample of 14 700 hospital discharge records and detected 587 adverse 
events. However, only 31 of these events were judged to be preventable and 
originating from ambulatory care, which they defined as ‘outpatient settings’ 
and included family practice, internal and emergency medicine. It was from this 
small number of cases that they generalized and calculated rates for the wider 
USA context. It has since been argued that ‘implausible estimates of deaths due 
to medical error will do more to erode the cause of patient safety than 
headline-friendly figures will do to help it’ (74). 
 
The fourth example is the study by de Wet and Bowie who performed a trigger 
review of a sample (n=500) of electronic patient records from Scottish practices 
in 2008 (40). They found that harm occurred on average at a rate of one event 
per 48 consultations. Of these, 42% of adverse events were judged to potentially 
be avoidable. While the estimated harm rate of 9.4% in general practice was 
comparable to that in hospitals, it was derived from a small sample of records, 
with no attempt to calculate inter-rater reliability or verify the adverse events. 
In addition, some of the detected incidents had originated in secondary care.j 
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The fifth and final example is the systematic review (n = 109 studies) undertaken 
in 2016 by Panesar et al in order to answer the question: ‘how safe is primary 
care (22)?’ They found rates of from <1 to 24 PSIs per 100 consultations, of 
which a small minority were associated with severe harm. 
 
2.3. Common types of PSIs 
 
Most PSIs in general practice belong to one of the following four category types: 
(i) medication and medication-related issues; (ii) diagnoses and diagnostics; (iii) 
organisational, which includes systems, procedures and managing investigations; 
and (iv) communication, which includes clinical handover and patients’ care 
transitions between different health care providers and agencies (75). In many 
instances more than one category may be relevant as demonstrated through the 
summarised example in Box 2.1 of a PSI that was submitted to NHS Education for 
Scotland (NES) as a significant event analysis (SEA) report. Each of the four 
patient safety areas are discussed below and illustrated further through a small 
selection of studies. Whenever possible, systematic reviews or ‘pivotal’ studies 
were selected. However, some examples are included because of their particular 
interest or relevance to this study. In all instances however, the selected studies 
are comparable to the wider literature about that topic. 
 
2.3.1. Medication errors 
 
Adverse drug events (ADE) are estimated to affect up to 20% of patients 
worldwide in primary care settings (19, 76-78). The majority of prescribing 
errors cause only minor or moderate harm (79), but the small proportion that 
results in more serious harm, including hospital admissions, is still considerable, 
given the sheer volume of many millions of prescriptions issued (80). 
Unfortunately, the true incidence of avoidable medication-related PSIs is not yet 
clear. Depending on the study design, definition of ADE and specific patient 
population investigated, the proportions of these events that are potentially 
avoidable have been reported from as low as 10% to as much as 50%.  
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Box 2.1. Example of a PSI with multiple categories 
 
A patient presented with progressive shortness of breath to her general 
practitioner and was admitted to hospital with presumed acute exacerbation 
of her known heart failure. After extensive investigations she was diagnosed 
with ‘nitrofurantoin lung’, a rare pulmonary complication of the antibiotic 
(nitrofurantoin) she had been prescribed as prophylaxis against urinary tract 
infections.  The hospital discharge summary did not contain this information 
or the results of the investigations they had conducted, the patient was 
unaware of the cause of her deterioration and the medication was not 
discontinued in general practice.  As a result, her symptoms returned and she 
was readmitted to hospital. The patient’s experience and this admittedly rare 
complication demonstrate medication-related, diagnostic, organisational and 
communication deficiencies. 
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While the exact number of medication-related errors or the proportions of 
avoidable ADEs may not yet be known, we do have high quality evidence about 
the causes and contributing factors to ADEs. Garfield et al were the first to map 
out the whole UK primary care medicines management system and to 
systematically review the evidence of cumulative medication errors in it (81).  
 
They found that ADEs are usually caused by complex and multifaceted errors 
that commonly occur in all stages of the medication systems, including  
prescribing, dispensing, administration and monitoring. According to them the 
implication is that only a minority of patients (4 to 21%) achieved optimum 
benefit from their medication. They recommended routine monitoring of 
adherence, clinical effectiveness and related hospital admissions as the first 
steps to improve the quality of the medication system. 
 
This may seem like a daunting task – and it is. However, a useful starting point 
may be the handful of high-risk medications that are associated with the 
majority of all ADEs (82). These are the cardiovascular drugs, non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) and anticoagulants (83). Other groups of drugs that 
are also commonly associated with ADEs include the anti-infective agents, drugs 
used for the treatment of diabetes mellitus and analgesia (84-86). Conversely, 
some drugs such as anti-anginals and asthma preventers may cause preventable 
hospital admissions if they are not prescribed. An alternative starting point may 
be to consider the specific risk factors that increase the likelihood of suffering 
ADEs. These are: increasing age; female gender; very young age (< 4years old); 
polypharmacy (e.g. multiple prescription items); number of daily doses; 
multimorbidity; and high consultation rates (78, 79, 83, 84, 86-89). 
 
The risk factors of medication-related PSIs may be well known but there is still a 
paucity of validated interventions to reliably and cost-effectively reduce them. 
Zermansky et al conducted a randomized controlled trial in English general 
practice more than fifteen years ago to determine the potential impact of an 
experienced pharmacist conducting clinical medication reviews of elderly 
patients with repeat items. Adverse drug events were not measured but there 
was no significant impact on mortality, hospital admissions or number of 
consultations (90). A subsequent systematic review and meta-analysis found 
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‘weak’ evidence to indicate that pharmacist-led medication reviews may be 
effective in reducing hospital admissions but this benefit was not demonstrated 
when analyses were restricted to RCTs only (91). More recent systematic reviews 
were conducted in 2013 (92) and again in 2015 (93). They found that some 
information technology (IT) interventions were able to successfully reduce 
medication errors in two specific instances: (i) when pharmacists effectively 
collaborate with prescribers about unsafe prescribing; and (ii) when clinical 
decision support (CDS) systems (informed by prescribing-safety indicators) target 
only a limited number of clearly defined medications and specific patient 
groups. They also found that at least half of IT interventions were unsuccessful 
or paradoxically associated with e-iatrogenesis (94).  
 
2.3.2. Diagnostic errors 
 
Despite the relative frequency and potentially devastating consequences of 
diagnostic errors for patients and clinicians alike they remain underreported by 
doctors and have only recently been acknowledged by the wider patient safety 
research community as an important area of study (95, 96). Current estimates of 
diagnostic error rates are highly dependent on the study design and methods. 
Trigger reviews of medical records detected rates ranging from 5% (97) to 16% 
(98) of primary care consultations while patients have reported errors in up to 
30% of their and their families’ diagnoses (99).  Diagnostic errors are the most 
common reason for medico-legal claims against GPs in modern health care 
systems, including the UK (100).  
 
A review of 25 years’ worth of settled primary care medico-legal claims in the 
USA found that only a small minority were due to negligence (15) and no single 
clinical condition accounted for more than 5% of the claims. However, some 
conditions were associated with a disproportionately higher risk of generating a 
complaint compared with the relative frequency with which they occur in 
general practice. For example, a missed diagnosis of appendicitis was 25 times 
more likely to generate a claim than a delayed diagnosis of breast cancer (101). 
It is unclear why this is the case, but may be due to patient and public 
perceptions that some diagnoses are ‘easier’ to make than others. Studies of 
medico-legal claims also tend to focus only on delayed or wrong diagnoses.  
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While these are important subtypes of diagnostic error, the potential harm from 
over-diagnoses are increasingly being recognised (102, 103). 
 
Incomplete history taking and clinical examinations contribute to the majority of 
diagnostic errors (98). Unfortunately, while some of the contributing factors may 
seem simple and apparent – especially in retrospect - diagnostic errors are even 
more challenging to understand and reduce compared with medication, 
organisational and communication related issues (104, 105).   
 
There are at least three reasons for this (106). The first reason is that diagnostic 
errors are not condition specific. They only appear that way because certain 
conditions such as cancers, myocardial infarctions and meningitis (100) are more 
memorable or lead to litigation more often than others. The second reason is 
that various patient and condition-specific characteristics combine in infinitely 
unique clinical scenarios. Some of the more important factors are atypical and 
non-specific presentations; very low prevalence of some diseases; 
multimorbidity; polypharmacy; and physiological variation (107).  The third 
reason is the inherent susceptibility of all clinicians to err. The more obvious and 
better known reasons include: availability bias (108); physical and psychological 
limitations to human performance; cognitive errors (109); and lack of knowledge 
(110). However, another crucial reason is that the very same cognitive processes 
and adaptive behaviours that enable them to provide efficient care most of the 
time, occasionally and paradoxically predispose them to err.  
 
It is worth examining this final challenge to reducing diagnostic error in a little 
more detail because of its relevance to this study and as an example of the 
practical implication of the influential principle of Efficiency-Thoroughness-
Tradeoffs (ETTOs) in patient safety. The ETTO principle provides an important 
perspective to understand the causes and contributing factors of PSIs and will be 
described in detail in Chapter 6. For now, it is considered from the perspective 
of clinicians and diagnostic errors.  
 
The ‘right’ diagnosis is mainly the product of clinicians’ conscious and 
unconscious cognitive processes. Many different processes have been identified 
and described. Two of these are sufficient to help illustrate the ETTO principle, 
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namely ‘hypothesis generation’ and ‘pattern matching’ (also known as 
‘satisficing’). When clinicians use ‘hypothesis generation’ they list a wide range 
of possible diagnoses and then systematically consider and investigate each one 
in turn to either confirm or reject it. It is a time-consuming and resource-
intensive strategy but the benefit is that it helps to reduce diagnostic errors.  On 
the other hand, when clinicians choose to ‘pattern match’ they will accept the 
first diagnosis that satisfactorily explains the majority of the available clinical 
information at that point in time. Pattern matching is time and resource 
efficient but associated with a higher diagnostic error rate compared with the 
hypothesis generation approach. The ETTO principle recognises that neither 
approach is essentially ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ and both may be needed in different 
clinical scenarios. It is only once a diagnostic error had been made and resulted 
in harm that the need for greater thoroughness becomes apparent in retrospect. 
In these instances, it is true that the conscious or unconscious decision to select 
one approach over the other lies with the clinician. Also, contextual, cultural 
and organisational factors are more often the crucial drivers of clinicians’ 
choices and strongly incentivise efficiency (pattern matching) over thoroughness 
(hypothesis generation). However, consciously slowing down and reflecting on 
every case will not necessarily eliminate diagnostic error either (111).  
 
From this perspective, it may therefore be more accurate and helpful to 
conceptualize and refer to diagnostic errors as ‘missed opportunities in 
diagnoses’ (112). For the purpose of this study the more conventional term 
‘diagnostic error’ will still be used but include this expanded definition, unless 
stated otherwise.  
 
2.3.3. Investigation-related errors 
 
Laboratory tests and imaging are common and essential tools in modern primary 
health care and help clinicians to diagnose, monitor and screen a very wide 
range of treatments, symptoms and conditions. Unfortunately, some 
recommended tests for monitoring chronic conditions and medications are not 
requested (113) or, once requested, significant results are lost, missed or not 
followed-up (114). Three examples are provided to help illustrate this safety 
problem. The first is Casalino et al who reviewed more than 5000 primary care 
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records and found 7.1% of clinically significant outpatient test results had either 
not been relayed to patients or if they had been discussed, this had not been 
documented (115).  
 
The second example is Elder et al who used a multi-method approach to 
intensively study the management of test results in family medicine.  They also 
found that patients had not been notified about the results of a proportion of 
tests (0 to 13%). However, in their study only 28 to 55% of abnormal results had 
been followed-up (116). According to them the likelihood of investigations being 
managed appropriately were associated with two main factors: safety awareness 
(leadership, communication, teamwork and having policies and procedures in 
place) and technological adoption (electronic health records and connections 
between the practice and testing facilities, forcing functions in the software and 
facilitation of communication with patients through technology).  
 
The third example is Walsh et al’s survey of primary care clinicians in which 37% 
reported consulting with at least one patient in the two week study period who 
either had a missing test result, or whose treatment in response to a test result 
had been delayed (117).  
 
From these three examples it might seem that the most common error – or at 
least the most easily identifiable error – is failing to follow up on significant 
results. However, this is only one process in the larger system of managing 
investigations. Other processes include: ordering tests; implementing tests (e.g. 
taking the right samples at the right time); reporting results to clinicians; 
clinicians responding to results; notifying patients of results; and general 
administration (e.g. coding and filing results).  Errors have been detected in 
every single process and are associated with specific system hazards (118, 119). 
Bowie et al identified four hazard types that are particularly relevant in UK 
primary care: system variations and weaknesses (e.g., lack of a tracking 
process); unclear communication between clinicians and administrators; 
administrators informing patients of test results; and challenges in maintaining 
patient confidentiality (120).  The most error-prone processes were 
‘implementing’ tests (one third of errors), reporting test results to clinicians 
(one quarter of errors) and administrative errors such as misfiling (one fifth of 
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errors). This is why laboratory testing in general practice has recently been 
referred to as the ‘blind spot’ (121) of patient safety and why it is a priority to 
standardize and enhance the ordering, tracking, patient notification and follow-
up processes to help reduce avoidable investigation-related errors (114). 
Important progress has been made in this regard with the development and 
recent publication of a safe laboratory testing ‘good practice guidance’ by the 
pan-European LINNAEUS collaboration. It contains 77 statements relating to 10 
safety domains and provides a practical starting point for primary care teams 
who wish to implement safe systems and processes for ordering tests and 
managing results (122). 
 
2.3.4. Interface and transition-of-care errors 
 
The peri-discharge period has been shown to be a particularly high-risk time for 
PSIs to occur, of which many are potentially ameliorable or preventable (123, 
124). They include: adverse drug reactions, drug omissions and inconsistencies, 
unjustified medications and drug discrepancies when discharge items are 
compared with those prescribed before admission or with what was intended by 
the hospital clinicians (125). Errors and harm relating to procedures and the 
results of investigations being lost or not followed-up have also been reported, 
but the most common type of errors are related to medication management and 
incomplete documentation (126).  
 
There is some evidence that medication discrepancies can be reduced 
significantly if primary care providers communicate with patients within 24 
hours of their discharge from hospital (127). However, a recent systematic 
review found most unintentional medication discrepancies had ‘no clinical 
significance’ and medication reconciliation did not reduce hospital use within 
the first 30 days post-discharge (128), although significant reductions in 
readmissions and emergency department visits were found during longer post-
discharge follow-up periods (129). 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of consensus about medication reconciliation’s 
usefulness, primary care clinicians still require accurate and timely information 
about individual patients when they are discharged from hospital settings to 
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ensure care continues and is safe. The discharge documentation should therefore 
be legible, adequate and include medication lists, relevant investigation results 
and information about follow-up arrangements (130). It has been argued that 
effective clinical handover requires not only such standardized information 
exchanges but that there should also be direct interaction between clinicians 
(131). Ideally, this would occur with every transition and actively involve 
patients and their families/carers (132, 133). If we are to achieve this care 
aspiration there is still much to do as even basic notifications do not reliably 
happen for every patient. For example, Bell et al found in their multi-centre 
trial in the USA that only 42% of primary care clinicians had received discharge 
documentation within a fortnight of their patient being discharged and 
concluded that there was ‘much room for improvement’ in communication 
between hospitals and GPs (134). 
 
The intuitive association between improving hospital-GP communication and 
improved patient safety outcomes including mortality, hospital readmission and 
emergency department visits has also not been demonstrated (134). In a recent, 
large study Oduyebo et al reviewed more than 6000 hospitalizations. Direct 
communication between inpatient and outpatient providers was reported for 
36.7% of patients but again not associated with decreased 30-day readmission 
rates (135). In fact, Coller et al reports that improving communication may 
paradoxically have increased readmission rates in a cohort of paediatric patients 
(136). 
 
In addition to secondary care, patients from general practices also interface 
with and transition to and from out-of-hours (OOH) services. It is well known 
that errors and harm do occur in this setting, and it is an important area of 
research (137, 138).  However, for the purposes of this study, interface and 
transition-of-care errors are arguably less important than the other three error 
types that were described. This is because, from a general practice perspective, 
they are usually not preventable. Also, most studies about interface-errors have 
focused on hospital-GP communication, rather than GP-hospital communication. 
A recent review (n=20 studies) aimed to address this issue and found no 
association between the quality of GP communications with hospitals when 
admitting patients and the subsequent 30-day admission rates (139).  
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2.4. Patient safety improvement programmes and initiatives 
 
The patient safety literature that have been described so far indicate the need 
for health care organisations to better identify and act on PSIs. In recognition of 
this need, there have been several organised attempts in the last decade to 
develop structured programmes of patient safety in the UK. The key programmes 
and initiatives will now be discussed.  
 
Table 2.1 chronologically lists improvement programmes and initiatives, reports 
and sentinel events relating to patient safety in the UK and especially NHS 
Scotland and Scottish general practice. The initiatives or programmes that are 
most relevant to this study are then described in more detail. They are: the 
Health Foundation’s Safer Patients Initiative (SPI) and Network (SPN); the 
Scottish Safety Improvement in Primary Care (SIPC) programme; the Scottish 
Patient Safety Programme (SPSP); and the Scottish Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) for general practice. 
 
2.4.1. The Safer Patients Initiative  
 
The Safer Patients Initiative (SPI) was the first large-scale, complex 
improvement programme aiming to improve patient safety in the UK. It was 
commissioned by the Health Foundation and focused on reducing preventable 
harm in secondary care.  Twenty four hospital sites participated during two 
consecutive phases that ran from 2004 until 2008. The aim of phase one (n=4 
hospitals) was to reduce the number of adverse events in the pilot hospital sites 
by 50%. The initial four sites were to achieve this aim through a ‘change 
package’ designed by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI). This 
included three core components: (i) implementation of evidence-based 
interventions in specific clinical areas that are known to be high-risk for PSIs, 
e.g. critical and peri-operative care and medicines management; (ii) training 
staff in quality and safety improvement methodologies; and (iii) establishing 
specific roles for the Chief Executives and senior executive teams in relation to 
patient safety. The aims of phase two (n=20 hospitals) were to reduce the  
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Table 2.1. A timeline of the recent history of patient safety in the UK 
 
Year Patient safety improvement programmes, initiatives, reports and 
sentinel events 
1998 – 
2001 
The public inquiry into the Bristol Royal Infirmary paediatric cardiac 
surgery services led by Prof Ian Kennedy QC makes 200 
recommendations for improving patient care and condemns the 
prevailing ‘club culture’ which contributed to iatrogenic harm at that 
time (140)  
2000 The Department of Health (DOH) publishes ‘An Organisation with a 
Memory’ in England. The key theme of the report is that health care 
organisations and staff should identify and learn from PSIs. (27)  
2001 The DOH publishes ‘Building a safer NHS for patients’ which describes 
the practical steps to improve care safety. The report identifies 
specific, high-priority safety threats, proposes the first steps to 
implement a formal incident reporting system and acknowledges the 
importance of patient safety research. (141)  
2001 – 
present 
The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) is established and tasked 
with improving patient safety in the NHS in England and Wales. In 
2012 the NPSA’s key functions were transferred to the NHS 
Commissioning Board Special Health Authority. Patient safety related 
work was transferred again in April 2016 to NHS Improvement. 
2001 – 
2009 
The DOH launches the Patient Safety Research Portfolio (PSRP), a 
national program that funds research (n=36 studies) about healthcare 
error, including how it can be measured and prevented in secondary 
and primary care settings in England (142).  
2003 – 
present 
NHS Quality Improvement Scotland (NHS QIS) is established with the 
formal remit to improve the quality and safety of healthcare in 
Scotland. QIS was renamed in April 2011 to NHS Healthcare 
Improvement Scotland (HIS) 
2003 The Scottish Executive Health department publishes ‘Learning from 
Experience: How to Improve Safety for Patients in Scotland’. The 
report recommends raising awareness of iatrogenic error and harm 
and building a positive, blame-free safety culture. (143) 
2004 The NPSA publishes ‘Seven steps to patient safety’. They are: 1. Build 
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a safety culture; 2. Lead and support your staff; 3. Integrate your risk 
management activity; 4. Promote reporting; 5. Involve and 
communicate with patients and the public; 6. Learn and share safety 
lessons; 7. Implement solutions to prevent harm (144). 
2004 – 
2008 
The Health Foundation implements the ‘Safer Patients Initiative’ 
(145).  
2005 The House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts publishes ‘A 
Safer Place for Patients: Learning to improve patient safety’. It 
concludes that some progress had been made in learning from PSIs and 
building a safety culture, but that there is much room for further 
improvement (146). 
2006 NHS QIS publishes ‘Safe Today, Safer Tomorrow’. It recognises the 
need for co-ordinated senior organisational leadership, additional 
resources and the active involvement of patients and clinicians in 
improvement initiatives (147). 
2008 – 
present 
The Scottish Patient Safety Programme (SPSP) is introduced in 
selected hospital specialties. It is subsequently expanded into other 
settings which are described in more detail below (148).   
2008 Mr. David Gray dies after an inadvertent administration of a lethal 
dose of Diamorphine during a routine out-of-hours consultation (30).   
2009 – 
2011 
The Health Foundation establishes the ‘Safer Patients Network’ (149). 
2010 – 
2012 
The Health Foundation funded Safety Improvement in Primary Care 
(SIPC) programme is implemented in Scotland (41). 
2010 – 
2013 
The public inquiry into the Mid Staffordshire NHS Education Trust care 
failings led by Robert Francis QC makes 290 recommendations (29). 
2013 – 
present 
The Scottish Patient Safety Programme in Primary Care (SPSP-PC) is 
launched with a focus on general practice. In 2014 it is extended 
further to include pharmacy and dentistry (42).  
2013 – 
2016 
The Scottish Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) specify ‘quality 
and safety’ as one of its four domains. General practices are 
financially incentivised to comply with specific patient-safety related 
indicators including the Trigger Review Method (TRM) (43, 150). 
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mortality rate by 15% and adverse events by 30% over a twenty month period 
from 2006 to 2008 (145). 
 
The internal evaluation found evidence that the SPI had an overall positive 
influence on patient care.  The initial four sites measurably improved on a range 
of processes. As a result, the rates of ventilator associated pneumonia, central 
line catheter bloodstream infections and surgical site infections all reduced. The 
twenty sites in the second phase all demonstrated improvements in at least 
some process and outcomes measures but with substantial inter-site variation. 
 
The external evaluation found evidence that the organisational climate had 
improved but concluded that there had been no significant reduction in  
mortality or morbidity and that the quality of prescribing remained unchanged 
during the study period compared with the control group (145). They 
acknowledged this might be due to the relatively short study period and because 
interventions were implemented in individual units while the main outcomes 
were measured at the organisational level.  
 
Despite the lack of quantitative evidence that the SPI significantly improved 
patient safety, it remains an important and influential programme that provided 
valuable experience and lessons about complex health care interventions and 
implementing change at an organisational level in the UK. The evaluation 
identified important factors that hinder or facilitate successful implementation. 
Of these, the most important factor is arguably allocating adequate and 
appropriate resources. This issue will be considered again in Chapters 9 and 10.  
 
The evaluation also identified important learning points, including:  
 It is essential to raise awareness of the patient safety problem amongst 
staff before implementing improvement programmes, i.e. assess the 
readiness of an organisation for change and ensure clinicians’ 
engagement;  
 The majority of health care workers will likely require additional training 
before they are able to contribute effectively to quality improvement 
initiatives, i.e. it is necessary to build capacity and capability;  
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 It is important for researchers and policy makers to understand the unique 
contexts and environments within which they implement their initiatives 
and accordingly adapt their improvement methods;  
 The right data need to be collected reliably to evaluate the impact of an 
intervention and this may require developing or adapting existing 
reporting systems. The SPI used the Global Trigger Tool (GTT) for this 
purpose and this method will be discussed further in Chapter 3.  
 
2.4.2. The Safer Patients Network  
 
The Health Foundation envisaged an organic network of likeminded individuals 
and organisations who would independently and collectively continue to build on 
the work of the SPI and share their experiences and learning.  They therefore 
launched the Safer Patients Network (SPN) in June 2009. The vision for the 
network was to create a self-sustaining, member-driven community that would 
spread improvement throughout their organisations and further afield. One of 
the key findings of the in-depth evaluation of the SPN is that this vision was 
unfortunately not adequately promoted and potential members therefore did 
not understand the value of joining or remaining in the network. The launch of 
the network also coincided with a number of other national and regional 
initiatives which created competing priorities for organisations. In addition, 
inadequate resources were provided for maintaining the network and members 
were dissatisfied with the seemingly unstructured nature of the network 
compared with the clear plan and processes of the SPI. Consequently, there was 
a gradual attrition of sites after the SPI concluded. Eighteen of the original 24 
sites joined the network. Of these, 10 participated in ‘pass it on’ collaboratives 
and only four took part in Innovation projects. The SPN experience is a powerful 
example of the many challenges inherent in sustaining complex health care 
interventions for a sufficient period of time to allow their integration and 
embedding into routine care.  This important issue will be considered further in 
chapters 9 and 10 (149). 
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2.4.3. The Scottish Patient Safety Programme (SPSP)  
 
The SPSP was launched in 2008 with the ambitious aims to reduce secondary 
care mortality and harm by 15% and 30% over a five year period. The secondary 
aims were to reduce healthcare associated infections, adverse surgical incidents 
and adverse drug events, improve critical care outcomes and build a strong and 
positive safety culture. The internal evaluation found a reduction in the Hospital 
Standardised Mortality Ratio (HSMR) of 16.5% between 2007 and 2016. There was 
also evidence of harm reduction relating to specific conditions or processes. One 
example is the number of cardiac arrests during hospital admissions that were 
reduced by 19% (n=11 hospitals) between 2012 and 2015 (148). 
 
The programme design was a collaborative approach with regular regional and 
local events for staff to learn about quality improvement and share their 
experiences. For the first few years the programme was supported by the 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) and much of their methodology were 
incorporated in the SPSP, including the global Trigger Tool and PDSA method. 
Other important partners were NHS Scotland, NHS Quality Improvement Scotland 
(now NHS Healthcare Improvement Scotland); NHS Education for Scotland (NES); 
and the Health Foundation. The initial focus of the programme was acute 
hospitals in Scotland. However, as the programme became more established it 
was expanded into primary care (SPSP-PC). The SPSP-PC is described in its 
chronological place below.  
 
2.4.4. Safety in Primary Care (SIPC) programme 
 
The Health Foundation-funded Safety in Primary Care (SIPC) programme was 
launched in May 2010 and concluded in June 2012. In the first phase (year one) 
twenty general practice teams in three regional health authorities in Scotland 
participated. The second phase commenced in May 2011 with the recruitment of 
a further four health boards and another 50 practices.  One of the main aims of 
the programme was to test and evaluate a number of potential quality and 
safety improvement methods and tools in a general practice context.  The four 
main methods and tools were: (i) a proto-type version of the Trigger Review 
Method (TRM); (ii) GP-SafeQuest, a validated instrument enabling serial 
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measurements of perceptions of safety culture; (iii) the plan-do-study-act (PDSA) 
method; and (iv) a care bundle approach to improve the reliability of chronic 
disease management (41). 
 
The SIPC programme was positively received by the majority of participants who 
gained new theoretical and experiential safety knowledge and reported 
improvements in practice safety systems, team working and communication with 
colleagues and patients. However, while the evaluation found anecdotal 
examples of benefits there was no quantifiable evidence of significant 
improvements in patient safety (41). Many participants also reported a 
significant mismatch between their multiple competing workload priorities, the 
larger than expected amount of time and resources that was required to 
participate in the programme and the comparatively inadequate levels of 
backfill funding for staff participation. As a result, three practices disengaged 
from the programme citing lack of time and increased staff stress due to 
unmanageable workloads. For them, participation in the programme 
paradoxically and unacceptably compromised their time to deliver a clinical 
service. Other practices expressed doubts about future participation in similar 
initiatives unless their resource concerns were addressed. 
 
2.4.5. Scottish Patient Safety Programme in Primary Care (SPSP-PC) 
 
The Scottish Patient Safety Programme in Primary Care (SPSP-PC) was developed 
from the SIPC programme by using, and adapting, the same collaborative 
approach, tools and methods.  It was implemented in March 2013 with the aim 
to measurably improve the quality and safety of care in those general practices 
who volunteered to participate. At that time SPSP-PC had three core 
components: (i) detecting, learning from and reducing PSIs by applying the 
Trigger Review Method (TRM) to samples of patient records; (ii) measuring and 
building a strong and positive safety culture; and (iii) improving chronic disease 
and medication management by using a care bundle approach. The TRM 
component was subsequently removed from the SPSP-PC because Scottish 
practices were financially incentivised to implement the TRM through the QOF 
which meant duplication of effort. This will be discussed in more detail below 
(35). 
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An internal evaluation found that the vast majority of general practices are now 
involved to some degree in the SPSP-PC and have started implementing the 
different methods (42). There is emerging evidence that medication 
management may be improving but it is still too early for a definitive assessment 
of the programme’s overall utility. The intention is to expand the SPSP-PC to 
dentistry, community pharmacy, district nursing and care homes from late 2016 
and to optometry in 2017. 
 
2.4.6. GP Quality and Outcomes Framework  
 
The Quality & Outcomes Framework (QOF) was a major component of the 
General Medical Services (GMS) contract between UK general practices and the 
NHS. It was introduced in April 2004 to help address longstanding variation in the 
quality of primary care provision (151). The QOF was the most ambitious, 
comprehensive and largest pay-for-performance scheme in international 
healthcare and one of the most important, influential but also controversial 
initiatives ever to be implemented in UK general practice. The QOF was 
essentially a pay-for-performance scheme that financially incentivised practices 
to reliably provide standardized, high-quality care. The QOF measured 
participating practices’ performances annually against a range of evidence-
based or pre-agreed ‘point-in-time’ indicators. Practices ‘earned’ points 
according to their level of achievement for each indicator, with payment 
starting at a minimum threshold (usually 40%) rising to a maximum (usually 90%). 
Points were weighted according to the practice list size and were worth from 
tens to hundreds of pounds each. From 2004 until 2013 practices could achieve a 
maximum of 1000 points a year. In the 2013/14 financial year the maximum 
number of points was reduced to 923 points. In the 2014/15 and 2015/16 
financial years the number of points were reduced further to a maximum of 659. 
(43, 150) 
 
Although the QOF has been studied extensively, there is still no consensus about 
its overall utility, its effect on clinical outcomes or whether it had a significant 
and positive impact on patient safety (152). Only ‘small and inconsistent’ 
associations have been found between QOF indicators, all-cause mortality and 
55 
emergency admissions (153). On the other hand, there is evidence of improved 
quality of care for patients with specific chronic diseases and a trend towards 
improvement in some processes and outcomes which can at least partly be 
attributed to QOF (154-156). However, there is no evidence of any discernible 
effect on hypertension-related outcomes (157) and depression indicators failed 
to improve disease detection or treatment (158). Overall, however, the QOF was 
‘likely’ a cost-effective use of resources (159).  
 
Participation in the QOF was voluntary but in reality most practices would not 
have been viable business concerns if they had opted out.  As a result essentially 
all Scottish general practices participated in the QOF as it was one of their main 
potential sources of income. However, following increasing dissatisfaction with 
the contract and its impact on workload, it was decommissioned in Scotland in 
2016 (160).  From April 2016 the financial investments previously associated with 
QOF were transferred into Scottish general practices’ core funding.  
Performance data will still be extracted to support the new peer led GP Cluster 
Continuous Quality Improvement process as part of the latest GMS contract 
agreement but will not be used for payment purposes. The other UK home 
countries are currently considering its future viability. From the perspective of 
this study only the Scottish QOF will therefore be considered. 
 
The QOF indicators changed considerably over time. In the 2013-14 financial 
year a ‘quality and safety’ domain was created with specific indicators 
financially incentivizing practices to improve this aspect of their service (43, 
150). In particular, they were tasked with: reviewing outpatient referrals, 
reducing avoidable emergency hospital admissions, creating anticipatory care 
plans for high-risk patients and implementing specific safety-related tools and 
methods (see Table 2.2, page 56). One of the new quality and safety indicators - 
Indicator ‘QI001(S)’ - is of particular importance to this study. Practices who 
complied with this indicator could earn a maximum of six points. In 2014-15 the 
indicator was renamed ‘QS007’ but the requirements remained the same. The 
‘validated tool’ the description refers to was the Trigger Review Method (TRM). 
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Table 2.2. QOF Quality and Safety indicators for 2013-14  
 
Indicator Description Points 
QI001(S) The practice conducts two case note reviews, using a 
validated tool, to detect patient safety incidents, meets to 
discuss the results, and shares a reflective report on 
actions and themes that arise from this with the NHS Board 
6 
QP001(S)* Review data on secondary care outpatient referral 5 
QP002(S)* Participates in an external peer review... to compare its 
secondary care outpatient referral data with that of the 
other contractors 
5 
QP003(S)* ...follows 3 agreed care pathways...to avoid inappropriate 
outpatient referrals 
11 
QP004(S)* Review data on emergency admissions 7 
QP005(S)* Participates in an external peer review...to compare its 
data on emergency admissions and to share the learning 
from at least 25 per cent of the Anticipatory Care Plans 
(ACPs)  
17 
QP006(S)* Produces a list of 5% of patients in the practice, who are 
predicted to be at significant risk of emergency admission 
or unscheduled care  
5 
QP007(S)* ...Creates Anticipatory Care Plans  30 
QP008(S)* Holds at least 4 meetings during the year to review the 
needs of the relevant patients in the practice ACP cohort 
10 
QP009(S)* Produces and submits a report to the Board on internal 
practice and wider Board system changes that may benefit 
patients with ACPs 
10 
QS002(S) The practice conducts a safety climate survey with all staff, 
clinical and non-clinical, using a validated tool, meets to 
discuss the results, and shares a reflective report on actions 
that arise from this with the NHS Board. 
5 
*Abridged  
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The QOF was initially received with great enthusiasm by general practices but 
with time there were increasing concerns about the validity of some of the 
additional and modified indicators that were added annually and the perceived 
incessant tightening of targets by policy makers. Other concerns were that it 
created a de-personalising ‘box ticking culture’; that it was vulnerable to data 
distortion and potential gaming; that it accelerated a transition to nurse-led 
primary care; there were tensions between the different QOF roles as quality 
improvement tool, regulatory framework or remuneration mechanism; and that 
the Framework promoted simplicity over complexity and measurability over 
meaningfulness (161-163). The concerns and perceptions of general practice 
staff about the QOF are important because they could influence their 
understanding about new quality initiatives and whether and to what degree 
new indicators such as ‘QS007’ are ‘enacted’ in practice. This has important 
implications for this study and will be considered in detail in Chapter 9.  
 
2.5. Safety culture 
 
There is strong agreement that safety culture is a highly important concept, not 
least because it is such a decisive factor in many organisational performance and 
safety failures (164). Safety culture is important because organisations with a 
positive safety culture are more likely to learn openly and effectively from 
failure and adapt their working practices appropriately (165). The converse is 
true for a weak safety culture, which has been implicated as a causal factor in 
many catastrophic organisational incidents, for example the Piper Alpha oil-
platform explosion, the space shuttle Challenger disaster, and the Zeebrugge 
ferry incident (164).  Comparable NHS incidents where a poorly developed safety 
culture was cited as a contributory factor would include the failings highlighted 
in Stafford hospital (high mortality rates from emergency admissions) (29), 
Bristol Royal Infirmary (high infant surgical mortality rates) in England (28) and 
the Vale of Leven hospital (potentially avoidable deaths associated with 
Clostridium difficile) in Scotland (166).  
 
What the aforementioned major incidents have shown us is the influence of high 
level organisational factors on safety performance and related failures, rather 
than much of the previous (simplistic) focus in decades past which was often on 
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improving local systems or technical designs or eradicating frontline human error 
issues (164). It is really only in the past decade that we have begun to look 
seriously at how we can assess safety culture in healthcare settings to identify 
related issues of critical importance (such as the strength and effectiveness of 
team working, communication, leadership, and commitment to safety 
improvement and so on) and consider their implications in relation to practice 
systems, performance and safer care.  
 
Safety culture can be defined as ‘the sub-facet of organisational culture that is 
thought to affect members’ attitudes and behaviour in relation to an 
organisation’s ongoing health and safety performance’ (165).  The concept is 
organic in that culture evolves over time and is influenced by many factors, 
including the working environment, health & safety policies and practices, the 
workforce and management as well as leadership characteristics (164).  The 
measurable ‘surface’ components of safety culture are collectively referred to 
as the safety climate – ‘the individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions 
and patterns of behaviour that determine how seriously safety management is 
taken in the workplace’ (167).   
 
Assessing the perceptions of the workforce about patient safety can provide a 
‘snapshot’ of the prevailing culture at a given moment in time and is now a 
widely used and accepted approach amongst many diverse high risk industries, 
including nuclear power, aviation and healthcare (167). Safety climate 
instruments are used to measure the values, attitudes, norms, behaviours and 
perceptions of individual members of a workforce. In this way, the implicit and 
shared understandings about ‘the way we do things around here’ can be 
rendered visible to the team in the first instance, but also potentially to others 
such as safety managers and clinical leaders in the organisation.  Three 
examples of validated instruments that are commonly used are: (i) the 
Manchester Patient Safety and Assessment Framework (MaPSaF) in English 
primary care (168); (ii) the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) which has been 
translated and applied in many international secondary care settings (169); and 
(iii) SafeQuest, a survey with 30 questions (170).  
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SafeQuest was developed and tested in Scottish general practices, underwent 
further testing in the SIPC programme (41) and is now one of two key 
components of the SPSP-PC (42). All participating Scottish general practice 
teams periodically complete the surveys, meet in groups to discuss and act upon 
the survey findings, and then submit a summary report of the improvement 
outcomes to the local health authority. 
 
The issue of safety culture will be considered again in more detail in chapters 6 
and 10. For now, the important implication is that the prevailing safety culture 
(or conversely the lack of a safety culture) influences clinicians and staff to 
choose behaviours that enhance - or compromise - safety practices and thinking 
(171). Consequently, safety culture is not only an important contributing factor 
to PSIs but also to successful improvement efforts, interventions and initiatives. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A thought-provoking editorial by Dr Wachter asked the following, pithy question 
just over a decade ago now: ‘Is ambulatory patient safety just like hospital 
safety, only without the “stat” (172)?’ The answer to this question is an 
emphatic ‘no’. There are many important differences, including: the nature and 
incidence of errors; patient-clinician relationships; organisational structures and 
resources; the types of activities and outcome measures that are regulated and 
rewarded; and the capacity and potential for change. While we can learn much 
from the patient safety research and improvement initiatives in secondary care 
settings, it is therefore important to remain mindful that general practice is in 
some ways a ‘whole different world’ (172). The aim of this chapter, consistent 
with this perspective, was to provide an introduction to key patient safety 
concepts in relation to general medical practice in the UK only, rather than the 
whole discipline.  
 
The first half of this chapter summarised the epidemiology of patient safety in 
general practice. More specifically, four common patient safety terms that were 
particularly relevant to this study were defined. Next, the incidence of error and 
harm in this setting were reported and the most common types of PSIs were 
described. The key messages from this section were the wide variation in the 
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available estimates of preventable harm and the absence of effective 
interventions to reduce well-known safety risks. However, while there may be 
reliability concerns about some of the studies’ results, there are also 
incontrovertible evidence of unacceptable levels of preventable, iatrogenic 
harm in general practice.  
 
The second half of the chapter summarised the patient safety improvement 
programmes, initiatives, reports and sentinel events in the UK. Selected 
initiatives or programmes were described in more detail because of their 
relevance to and strong influence on this study, including: the SIPC program; the 
SPSP and SPSP-PC; and the Scottish QOF. This section also introduced the 
concept and importance of safety culture. Safety culture is a core component or 
outcome measure of many safety improvement programs and is thought to be 
one of the essential success factors when implementing complex health care 
interventions.  The key message from this section was that the safety of health 
care, including in the general practice setting, has been and remains a national 
priority in Scotland. However, despite considerable investment and effort, there 
has been no reliable evidence so far that care is becoming significantly safer. 
 
Overall then, this chapter described the current state of patient safety in UK 
general practice and formulated it as a discrete ‘problem’ of sufficient 
importance to justify increased efforts and additional research to improve care 
standards. However, it is unclear how this may be achieved in a cost-effective 
and feasible manner, or which methods are effective and acceptable for this 
purpose. The next chapter will therefore continue the narrative by considering 
the second of three main groups of knowledge we can derive from patient safety 
research, which are potentially reliable metrics and effective improvement tools 
and methods with which to address the patient safety problem.  
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Chapter 3. The Trigger Review Method  
 
Chapter 2 began the narrative summary of the patient safety literature from the 
perspective of UK general practice. Common patient safety terms were defined, 
estimates of the incidence of error and harm were provided and the main types 
of patient safety incidents (PSI) were described. A chronological summary of 
sentinel events, reports and influential improvement initiatives and programmes 
in the UK were provided and the concept of safety culture was introduced.  
 
The main message of chapter 2 was that there is irrefutable evidence of 
avoidable iatrogenic harm in general practice affecting a substantial proportion 
of patients. Our understanding of the extent of the problem and potential 
contributing factors continues to increase but remains incomplete and there is a 
need for further research in this discipline. Until recently, the aim of the 
majority of patient safety research has been to produce epidemiological 
knowledge and increase our understanding of why PSIs occur. This is an 
appropriate focus for initial research in health care, because effective 
interventions are derived from agreement, understanding and prioritising of a 
problem. However, while large-scale epidemiological studies are important 
there is now arguably an even greater need for research to develop effective 
improvement strategies, methods and tools to measurably improve safety or 
mitigate error in all health care settings.  
 
This chapter continues the narrative by considering the second main group of 
patient safety knowledge, which is about the specific methods and tools that are 
available for measuring and improving health care in general practice. There are 
four main sections. The first section describes the practical application, relative 
strengths and weaknesses and intended utility of five main approaches of 
measuring and improving patient safety. They are: (i) safety learning systems 
with the examples of Incident Reporting Systems (IRS), Significant Event Analysis 
(SEA) and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA); (ii) Patient safety checklists; 
(iii) Cyclical improvement methods, e.g. clinical audit, care bundles and the 
plan-do-study-act (PDSA) method; (iv) mortality data and medico-legal claims 
analyses; and (v) clinical record review, including Trigger Tools and the Trigger 
Review Method (TRM).  
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Of these methods, the TRM is the main focus of this study and the rest of the 
chapter. Section two explains the practical application of the TRM and describes 
its three sequential steps and minimum implementation requirements. Section 
three describes the potential value of the TRM and how its main purpose was 
intentionally conceptualized as improvement rather than measurement of health 
care performance. This shift in emphasis was strongly supported by original 
research that formed a part of this study and is therefore described in some 
detail in the fourth and final section.  
 
3.1. Methods for measuring and improving patient safety in general practice 
 
3.1.1. Safety learning systems  
 
A safety learning system is a method of monitoring the occurrence of PSIs and 
developing improvement strategies to address the contributing factors (7).  
Safety learning systems include different types of incident reporting systems, 
but also methods that allow analyses and learning from adverse events. The two 
examples of analyses-type methods that will be considered are significant event 
analysis (SEA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), but first a brief 
overview of incident reporting systems (IRS).  
 
Voluntary IRS have been a popular patient safety research method for many 
years (173). They harness the unique and personal perspectives of many 
different health care staff groups but also patients about the care they deliver 
and receive. IRS are also comparatively cheaper to implement and maintain than 
some of the other quality improvement methods such as clinical record review. 
However, they do have a number of well-recognised limitations which include: 
selective disclosure of incidents (49); variable and poor clinician engagement 
(21); a perceived disconnect between the reporting, learning and improvement 
aspects of IRS (174, 175); and the estimated harm rates lack reliability and 
validity. This will be illustrated further by one secondary care and two primary 
care examples. 
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The secondary care example is the mixed-method study by Olsen et al who 
compared the number of adverse events detected through incident report, 
pharmacist surveillance and ‘real-time’ record review of 288 hospital admissions 
(176). The IRS received 11 reports. None caused significant harm and only one 
was reported by a doctor. Pharmacists identified 30 potential adverse events in 
the same cohort of patients while the record review method detected 26 
adverse events and 40 potential adverse events. There was very little overlap 
between the three methods; each method mainly detected different PSIs, but 
the record review method detected the most incidents, the widest range of 
issues and provided the most detail about contributing factors.  
 
The second example is a mixed methods study to identify adverse events in 4095 
patients who visited their general practices during a five month period in the 
Netherlands (177). General practitioners reported 20 events or approximately 
one adverse event for every 200 patients who visited their practices.  
Pharmacists reported six adverse events. There were four adverse events 
associated with the 28 deaths during the study period. Finally, a retrospective 
assessment of 150 medical records by external reviewers found 11 adverse 
events which is approximately one adverse event for every 15 patients who 
visited the GPs. Again, there was little or no overlap between the detected 
adverse events but the record review method detected significantly more 
incidents.  
 
The third example is the implementation of a general practice safety learning 
system in Alberta, Canada (7). Participating practices (n=19) submitted an 
average of 1.4 reports per month, with the number of reports decreasing over 
the study period. Unlike secondary care, the majority of reports were submitted 
by doctors, and 50% of incidents were associated with patient harm. The authors 
concluded that IRS provided only a ‘glimpse of the scope of the [patient safety] 
problem’ and was not an effective method to determine the types and 
frequency of PSIs in general practice. They also identified a number of important 
barriers and several reasons for the ‘low reporting rates’, including: lack of time 
to submit reports; clinicians not recognising or interpreting incidents as 
reportable; practice teams not understanding the value of reporting; and the 
prevailing practice culture not being conducive to reporting.  
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3.1.1.1. Significant event analysis 
 
Significant event analysis (SEA) is well established as a safety improvement 
intervention in general practice in Scotland, where its importance to the patient 
safety agenda cannot be overstated (8).  Documentary evidence of participation 
was a contractual requirement of the Scottish Quality and Outcomes Framework; 
it remains a key element of the GP specialty training curriculum; and it is a core 
element of professional appraisal and medical revalidation (178). SEA has also 
been successfully introduced in other countries. A recent, notable example 
would be the inclusion of SEA as one of the core components of the RCGP 
patient safety toolkit (179, 180).  
 
The SEA method is applied by clinicians and care teams to investigate and learn 
from sub-optimal care or any other issues of ‘significance’ that are highlighted 
for attention, but in reality the great majority of significant events are patient 
safety incidents (181). The process requires care teams to hold structured 
meetings to analyse significant events and helps them to identify learning needs 
and plan effective remedial action together. When undertaken constructively, 
these meetings provide a forum for meaningful reflection, discussion and 
analysis in what should be a non-threatening and empathic environment. If done 
well, SEA can enhance team working and morale, and improve communication 
and understanding between team members, all of which helps to build a more 
positive safety culture in GP surgeries (182). 
 
However, there is strong evidence to suggest that many investigations into 
safety incidents in primary care are poorly conducted (178, 181, 182). There are 
several key issues that contribute to this problem. For clinicians and others, 
being involved in a significant event is similar to receiving a form of negative 
feedback.  The subsequent emotional reaction to this type of feedback can 
interfere with the personal ability to assimilate and process the information 
beyond the ‘self’ level (183), thereby potentially impeding an objective and 
constructive approach to significant events and their analyses. There is also 
evidence that the health and emotional wellbeing of clinicians involved in these 
types of events can suffer (the so-called ‘second-victim’ syndrome) leading to 
increased stress and anxiety levels and feelings of guilt, helplessness, frustration 
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and anger (184-186). This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, page 
217. Additionally, a prevailing ‘blame culture’ is still widely perceived within 
health care, which impacts on the preparedness of clinicians to highlight patient 
safety issues because of concerns about punitive action and professional 
embarrassment (187). The implications are that many clinicians are highly 
selective in the types of safety incidents they raise for team-based discussion 
and analysis, potentially ignoring those of a complex, serious or highly sensitive 
nature and opting instead for less controversial examples, or even for non-
engagement in this learning activity overall (188).  
 
Therefore, while there is strong engagement with SEA in UK primary care, the 
evidence for its impact on improving the quality and safety of patient care 
remain mixed (178). The standard of reflection and critical analyses of such 
events is poor in a substantial proportion of SEAs with many teams seemingly 
lacking an understanding of the systems and organisational factors contributing 
to these incidents. Indeed, a recent review of SEA reports showed that most 
clinicians tend to view the causes of incidents as being mainly attributable to 
their own actions (181). This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. For 
now, the important implications are that there may be numerous missed 
opportunities for individual, team-based and wider organisational learning from 
PSIs in order to minimise their risks of recurrence and there is wasted time and 
financial resources associated with participating in (frequently predictable) sub-
optimal learning and improvement efforts. 
 
3.1.1.2. Failure mode and effects analysis  
 
Incident reporting systems, SEA and root cause analysis (RCA) are all examples of 
health care risk assessments using a structured retrospective review of PSIs. A 
complementary approach in high-risk industries is prospective risk assessment of 
complex processes to systematically identify possible ways in which they may 
fail, the likely impact of such failures, and proactively mitigate these risks. One 
of the most widely used prospective risk assessment approach in health care is 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). FMEA includes the multidisciplinary 
activities of mapping out processes and systems, quantifying risks according to 
their probability, severity and detectability, calculating risk priority numbers 
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(RPN) and then intervening to reduce the RPNs. FMEA is increasingly being used 
as a research and quality improvement tool and serial RPN measures are  held as 
proof that care processes are becoming safer. While this application of FMEA 
makes sense conceptually, a recent non-systematic review of FMEA found a lack 
of standardisation, ‘no evidence that its outcomes are valid and reliable’ and 
that it is very time consuming. The review also described several mathematical 
challenges associated with ordinal scales and warned that ‘the use of numerical 
scores gives an unwarranted impression of objectivity and precision’ (189). 
 
Retrospective and prospective risk assessment approaches such as incident 
reporting systems, SEA and FMEA can therefore not be recommended for 
quantitative assessment of risk or as a reliably metric of harm.  However, they 
do have great potential benefits as qualitative approaches to improve patient 
safety, particularly when multidisciplinary teams are involved and contribute to 
analyses and mapping of shared processes and systems. 
 
3.1.2. Patient safety checklists 
 
Checklists are strongly promoted as an effective way to standardize processes, 
increase the reliability of health care delivery and as cognitive aids to ensure 
task completion by clinicians and care teams (190). The expectation is that this 
will support workforce safety performance and provide further systemic 
defences against error and preventable harm to patients (191). In addition to 
widespread support from clinical champions the checklist approach is also 
underpinned by a more robust evidence base compared with many other quality 
improvement methods (192). A large group of international patient safety 
experts recently published the findings of their comprehensive assessment of the 
literature to identify potential patient safety strategies. They conducted a 
three-stage review over a four year period and identified ten patient safety 
strategies that are ready for immediate adoption in health care (193). Three of 
the ten measures hospitals were encouraged to implement relate to checklists of 
some kind: preoperative checklists and anaesthesia checklists; checklists to 
prevent central line associated bloodstream infections; and ‘do-not-use’ lists for 
hazardous abbreviations. The other seven strategies apply to specific clinical 
conditions and secondary care settings: interventions to reduce urinary catheter 
67 
use; care bundles to reduce ventilator-associated pneumonia; hand hygiene; 
multi-component interventions to reduce pressure ulcers; barrier precautions to 
prevent health care associated infections; real-time ultrasonography for central 
line placement; and interventions to improve prophylaxis for venous thrombo-
embolisms.   
 
At first glance, none of these strategies or specific checklists seems directly 
applicable to UK general practice. However, the conceptual benefits of a 
checklist approach are clearly desirable: a safety checklist provides a method to 
engage front-line staff in the timely and consistent checking of important issues 
that can impact on the safety, health, and wellbeing of people and practice 
performance. Bowie et al recently took the first step to this goal by developing 
and validating a preliminary safety checklist for general practices. The list has 
78 items and six domains: medication management; housekeeping; information 
systems; practice team; patient access and identification; and health and safety. 
The preliminary checklist has potential as an intervention to measure, monitor, 
and improve elements of general practice safety and performance, but it is too 
early to know what the uptake or utility of this list will be, whether it will be 
associated with improved patient outcomes or the specific barriers to its 
implementation. However, it seems reasonable that the same barriers (i.e. 
competing priorities for time, inadequate training and lack of incentives) and 
facilitators (i.e. a mandate for compulsory use) identified by Shapiro et al to the 
implementation of checklists in USA procedural primary care would at least have 
to be considered (194). 
 
In addition to the new general practice safety checklist, there is at least one 
type of secondary care checklist that may also be useful for the general practice 
setting – the ‘Never Event’ list. Never Events are ‘serious, largely preventable 
patient safety incidents that should not occur if the available preventable 
measures were implemented by healthcare workers’ (195).  An unambiguous 
example of a Never Event in the acute hospital context is performing a surgical 
procedure on the wrong limb. The rationale for devising and implementing lists 
of Never Events in healthcare, therefore, is to mitigate or eliminate the risks 
associated with these types of serious but preventable occurrences. There is now 
emerging evidence that Never Event lists and policies are delivering on this 
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promise in selected hospital settings (196). Consequently, a preliminary list of 
ten Never Events was recently developed for the UK general practice setting 
with the intention to help improve patient safety (Box 3.1) (197). 
 
Before the list is implemented it may be prudent to first consider and address 
three important and unresolved concerns about secondary care Never Event 
policies in case they are equally applicable to general practice. The first concern 
is that some ‘Never Events’ currently included on lists may not in fact be 
preventable in every instance despite the best efforts, intentions and adherence 
to clinical guidelines of the healthcare workforce (198).  A second concern 
pertains to the proliferation and ‘broadening’ of the Never Events concept with 
additional items periodically being added to lists (199). The potential risk is that 
the core essence of the Never Event concept as a means of focusing attention on 
relatively rare but serious patient safety incidents may be diluted in this 
process. The third concern is that Never Event policies may have unintended and 
unwanted consequences, not least being that Never Event lists may become 
synonymous with medical negligence (200). 
 
Even if these concerns are addressed, there remain a number of important 
challenges in addition to those mentioned already for the safety checklist 
approach that will first have to be overcome for the Never Event approach to be 
successfully implemented in general practice.  For example, how do you enforce 
mandatory reporting in general practice settings where engagement in voluntary 
incident reporting systems is minimal and inconsistent?  A second challenge is 
whether the specified Never Events can be detected reliably by every general 
practice.  Recent research on the effort required to identify adverse events 
shows, unsurprisingly, that the rarer the event, the greater the number of 
patient records to be reviewed to identify such events (201). Other challenges 
include determining who should be responsible for implementation of such a 
policy and how this would be resourced, promoted and prioritised.  
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Box 3.1. Preliminary list of Never Events for UK general practice (197) 
 
1. Prescribing a drug to a patient that is recorded in the practice system as 
having previously caused her/him a severe adverse reaction 
2. A planned referral of a patient, prompted by clinical suspicion of cancer, 
is not sent 
3. Prescribing a teratogenic drug to a patient known to be pregnant (unless 
initiated by a clinical specialist) 
4. Emergency transport is not discussed or arranged when admitting a 
patient as an emergency 
5. An abnormal investigation result is received by a practice but is not 
reviewed by a clinician 
6. Prescribing aspirin for a patient <12 years old (unless recommended by a 
specialist for specific clinical conditions for example, Kawasaki’s disease) 
7. Prescribing systemic oestrogen-only hormone replacement therapy for a 
patient with an intact uterus 
8. Prescribing methotrexate daily rather than weekly (unless initiated by a 
specialist for a specific clinical condition, for example, leukaemia) 
9. A needle-stick injury caused by a failure to dispose of ‘sharps’ in 
compliance with national guidance and regulations 
10. Adrenaline (or equivalent) is NOT available when clinically indicated for 
a medical emergency in the practice or GP home visit 
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3.1.3. Cyclical improvement methods  
 
Criterion audit, care bundles and PDSA are three quality improvement methods 
that may appear similar to healthcare professionals because of their cyclical 
nature. Criterion audit and care bundles are both methods that can be used to 
measure clinical performance and quality of care. If performance is found to fall 
short of a set standard, the individual or team is encouraged to implement 
change in order to improve care.  The PDSA method is one possible method to 
achieve this aim. It requires measurement as part of this process, which is 
underpinned by the same considerations as criterion audit and care bundles. 
Each of these three methods are briefly discussed below. 
 
3.1.3.1. Clinical audit 
 
Criterion-based clinical audit is a widely accepted method for monitoring, 
assessing and improving care quality (202), particularly in UK general practice 
where a defined method was developed and successfully implemented by Lough 
and colleagues (203).  A Cochrane systematic review of audit (n=140 studies) 
concluded that the overall strength of evidence for this type of approach to 
improve quality and standards of care was moderate. In terms of ‘success’ as a 
quality improvement (QI) intervention this ranked highly as an effective strategy 
(>10% increase in appropriate care or equivalent measure) compared with many 
other approaches (204, 205).  
 
Research strongly suggests that small, highly focussed audits often lead to a 
much better chance of meaningful improvements in patient care being 
implemented and sustained (204).  In general practice, there is good evidence 
via external review by trained peer colleagues that many GPs can implement a 
defined method of criterion based audit and successfully demonstrate 
potentially sustainable improvements in patient care, although a significant 
proportion can struggle with this approach (206). A review of the standard of 336 
criterion audit reports found a number of ‘application of method’ issues which 
impacted on the potential for effective change and care improvement.  For 
example, 119 projects (35.4%) were judged to have at least one methodological 
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deficiency in the data analysis and change management stages of the audit 
(207). 
 
3.1.3.2. Care bundles 
 
The ‘care bundle’ approach is promoted as a method that may be particularly 
useful to achieve the aims of improving the reliability of evidence-based care 
delivery and hence clinical outcomes (208).  A care bundle is simply a small 
number of health care interventions grouped together which normally has a 
synergistic relationship that impacts on clinical outcome for patients. Bundles 
usually contain three to six components which may include clinical interventions 
such as care processes, procedures, or diagnostic tests, but are not deemed 
suitable to act as comprehensive lists of all possible care.  Selection of 
appropriate bundle components is based on best evidence and/or local 
considerations and may change with time and experience (209).  
 
There are many similarities between the care bundle and the criterion-based 
audit method. In fact, a simple way to conceptualize a care bundle is to imagine 
it as a group of audit criteria (209). However, there are also a number of key 
differences: 
 The care bundle method typically focuses on specific clinical areas or 
conditions, while the focus of audit is typically on specific processes of care.  
 The care bundle involves a composite ‘all or nothing’ compliance measure, 
while criterion audits typically report singular compliance measures for 
individual criteria.   
 Every individual component in the bundle should be recognised as an 
intervention that is routinely delivered or considered for every patient within 
a specified time period.  Compliance with a care bundle and its components is 
measured on an ‘all or nothing’ basis, whereas the performance achieved for 
any given audit criterion does not affect the result of any other criterion 
(assuming more than one criterion was specified).  
 
Specific care bundles have been implemented in a range of secondary care 
settings such as paediatric and adult ICU, medical and surgical wards and 
Accident and Emergency departments in North America and the UK (210, 211).  
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Reported clinical outcomes have included: significant reductions in health care 
acquired infections; lower condition-specific and all-cause mortality; reduced 
re-admission rates of elderly patients; and decreased length of ICU stay and 
number of ventilation days (212).  Although higher compliance rates with 
bundles are associated with improved outcomes (213), these are difficult to 
sustain because of organizational and human-system performance factors which 
often result in rates below 50% (214).  In UK secondary care settings, reported 
compliance with a variety of clinical care bundles ranges from 19-52% (214, 215). 
Low compliance rates have important safety implications, as a positive and 
significant association has been found between compliance rates and clinical 
outcomes such as mortality (210, 215). The care bundle approach has recently 
been piloted in UK general practice and is included as a core component in the 
SPSP-PC (216). There is emerging evidence of improvements in specific, high-risk 
processes such as drug-monitoring but not (yet) of significant reductions in 
iatrogenic harm in this setting (42). 
 
3.1.3.3. The PDSA method  
 
The Institute of Healthcare Improvement popularized the PDSA method as a key 
intervention in quality and safety improvement collaboration in the early 2000s. 
Since then it has been used as a standalone intervention or as a key component 
of many different quality improvement (QI) programmes in healthcare settings 
worldwide (217-220). 
 
The PDSA method is an improvement tool that can be used by individuals or 
teams to plan and test multiple, small and incremental changes to their 
everyday work practices and systems in a structured manner and then evaluate 
the impact over time to determine whether improvements in work quality are 
apparent.  A single PDSA cycle consists of the four steps ‘Plan, Do, Study and 
Act’ which are performed sequentially. Any number of PDSA cycles can be 
undertaken sequentially, with the aims of trying different or adapted change 
interventions (potential improvements) and to increase the number of patients 
affected by the change per cycle.  Cycles often build on the results of previous 
efforts so that improvement gains accumulate in an incremental manner (221).  
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The PDSA method has a number of potential benefits.  Using this approach 
potentially enables frontline staff to test out planned care or system changes in 
their own local environment.  This increases understanding of the potential 
feasibility, costs and impact of an intervention before change is implemented on 
a larger scale, and allows for the opportunity to adapt or abandon the changes if 
they do not work as planned.  As each test (cycle) is small and rapid, the method 
can provide ‘real time’ feedback and is therefore relatively safe and resource 
efficient. The PDSA method may also help to overcome initial resistance to 
change from other practice colleagues who may be sceptical about the planned 
change.  
 
However, like all other QI methods, the PDSA approach is not a panacea. A 
recent systematic literature review found that the reported application of PDSA 
cycles varied significantly, with many studies failing to comply with the basic 
principles of the method (222). A key conclusion was that there was much room 
for improvement in the application and use of the PDSA method and it remains 
unclear why, when, for whom and in what contexts it is effective (223, 224). 
 
3.1.4. Mortality data and claims analysis 
 
3.1.4.1. Mortality data 
 
Baker et al reviewed the literature (n=53 studies) to determine how mortality 
data are currently used in the general practice setting (225). They found 
evidence of increasing interest in this approach in quality improvement activities 
with exploratory studies conducted about the roles of practice ‘death’ registers, 
monitoring and audit and critical incident reviews. However, these activities are 
hindered by a lack of access to timely and relevant data. In addition, no 
association between mortality data, quality improvement initiatives and 
subsequent reductions in mortality rates have been found in general practice (so 
far). This may be because: the relative numbers of deaths per practice are 
small; only a tiny proportion of deaths may be avoidable; and quality 
improvement efforts focusing on structures and processes may not directly 
affect mortality, or the effect may only become evident after longer periods of 
study.  
74 
3.1.4.2. Medico-legal claims 
 
A large peer-reviewed study (n= 26,126 cases) of settled primary care medico-
legal claims in the USA have important implications for patient safety and UK 
general practice (101).  The main finding was that different proportions of 
claims can be due to negligence (in this case 23%), clinical errors or are the 
unavoidable result of appropriate care. Conversely, many errors (especially 
those with trivial or no consequences for the patient) and instances of negligent 
care are not included in medico-legal data estimates. The distinction between 
negligence, error and unavoidable harm is critical as there are different 
potential solutions and approaches depending on this differentiation. Medico-
legal data analyses and studies therefore provide estimates of ‘claims risk’ and 
not ‘error risk’. However, medico-legal claims data remain valuable in extending 
our understanding of patient safety, especially when combined with data from 
other methods. In particular, these types of studies have significantly increased 
our understanding about the incidence, nature and contributing factors to 
diagnostic errors, as was discussed in Chapter 2. They also provide evidence of 
the relative frequency of error and harm in general practice settings and the 
complexity of the associated and contributing individual and systems factors. 
 
3.1.5. Clinical record review  
 
Clinical record review (CRR) is a well-established approach of detecting and 
quantifying sub-optimal care issues. In fact, it is considered the gold standard 
approach in patient safety (226). It allows estimation of harm rates for specific 
patient populations at given points in time and, if repeated, allows comparisons 
to detect significant changes across time, whether they be deterioration or 
improvement. The key strength of CRR compared with the other available 
research, measuring and improvement methods is that it detects a significantly 
greater proportion of all harm incidents (227). In fact, CRR harm rate estimates 
are currently the closest approximation a single method can provide of the ‘real’ 
epidemiological state of patient safety.   
 
Unsurprisingly, the original landmark studies about the prevalence of adverse 
events in hospitals in the USA (11), UK (14), Australia (12), Canada (228) and 
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New Zealand (229) therefore all used some form of CRR. However, while the 
studies all used CRR, their methods were typically adapted to include a 
‘stepped’ process and included the application of various predefined screening 
criteria and different groups of clinician reviewers with specific tasks 
commensurate with their clinical experience (227). 
 
A further strength of CRR is therefore its flexibility. Over the years there have 
been many examples of different successful adaptations. Different versions of 
CRR may involve an automated or manual process; retrospective or prospective 
reviews; reviewing every section or only some sections of medical records; using 
internal or external reviewers to the organisation; and having one, two or a 
team of clinicians review records. There is no single ‘correct’ adaptation (230).  
 
It is important to acknowledge that using the CRR approach to detect patient 
safety incidents (PSIs) and measure harm does not provide information about 
their aetiology and contributing factors, nor does it automatically lead to 
improvement. It is also time consuming and expensive (177, 231, 232). In 
addition, the reliability (and therefore potential usefulness) of the harm rates 
detected with any adaptation of CRR is dependent on the method’s many 
constituent parameters (or factors) such as: the quality of the clinical records; 
individual reviewer factors; and specific characteristics of the review process 
(227). The parameters will be considered again in more detail later. However, of 
all the currently available methods, the clinical record review (CRR) is, 
arguably, the least affected by these barriers and therefore has the most 
potential as a metric. This will be considered in more detail in the following 
sections of this chapter. 
 
One of the better known examples of an adaptation of the CRR approach is the 
‘global trigger tool’ popularized by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
(IHI) in recent years as a means for frontline clinicians to estimate harm rates 
using a rapid, focused and structured approach to record review. Their rationale 
for the trigger tool method in secondary care settings is its ability to quantify 
harm accurately with relatively small samples of medical records and to 
longitudinally track changes in harm rates (233).  However, the term ‘trigger 
tool’ predates the IHI and was first used in 1974 to describe sentinel words that 
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may help to identify adverse events in medical records (234). Then, in the early 
1990s it was adopted by Classen et al to describe their method of using trigger 
phrases to search for adverse drug events in patients’ electronic records and the 
hospital pharmacy system (235). Specific trigger tools are now routinely used in 
many hospital settings worldwide (85, 233, 236, 237) and in ambulatory primary 
care settings, including Scottish general practice, where it is known as the 
Trigger Review Method (TRM). Given the relevance the TRM has for this study, 
the following sections will describe its practical application and potential value.  
 
3.2. Practical application of the TRM 
 
The TRM allows primary care clinicians (e.g. GPs, GP trainees, practice nurses 
and pharmacists) to review small samples of patient records for previously 
undetected patient safety incidents (PSI) in a structured, focused, rapid and 
active manner:  
 Structured – clinical reviewers consider each of the five sections of a 
primary care record in turn (Table 3.1.). 
 Focused – a specific search for pre-defined ‘triggers’ (e.g. sentinel 
phrases or words) is conducted. Triggers are prompts or ‘signs’ in the 
record that may indicate the occurrence of PSIs (Table 3.1.). 
 Rapid - a maximum of 20 minutes is allocated per record and only a pre-
specified period in each record is reviewed (usually three calendar 
months) (39).  
 Active – clinical reviewers are encouraged to reconstruct each patient 
journey and should probe, analyse and critically appraise the record for 
evidence of PSIs and latent risks hidden in it. 
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Table 3.1. The five sections of primary care records and associated, pre-
defined triggers (39) 
 
 
Section of the record 
Trigger 
(must be present during the review period) 
 Clinical encounters  
(face-to-face, telephone or 
house calls) 
 ≥3 clinical encounters in any given 7 day 
period 
 Medication  ‘Repeat’ medication item discontinued  
  Optional triggers, e.g. acute prescription 
of NSAIDs or opiates 
 Clinical codes  A clinical READ code for an adverse drug 
event and/or allergy was added 
  Any new ‘high priority’ clinical code added  
 Correspondence  
(referrals, clinic letters, 
discharge summaries, reports) 
 Any out-of-hours health care contact (out-
of-hours service or Accident & Emergency) 
  Emergency hospital admission for ≥ 1 day 
 Investigations  
(imaging, laboratory) 
 Haemoglobin ≤ 10,0 g/dl. 
  Optional triggers, e.g. INR > 5 or < 1.7 or 
AST/ALT > 100 IU/L 
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Clinical reviewers are encouraged to record their findings, reflections and 
actions on a ‘Trigger Review Summary Sheet’ (SS). The SS is a double-sided 
template for collecting and summarizing data on the number of detected 
‘triggers’, the details of any PSIs uncovered, any learning needs identified and 
actions that were or should be taken as a result of the review process. There 
have been many versions of the SS because it is periodically adapted to 
incorporate the feedback from its users. The version of the SS that was used in 
this study is included as Appendix 10. The definition of a PSI is provided on the 
SS to remind reviewers that the TRM’s key focus is on detecting a circumstance 
where harm occurred (physically or psychologically and regardless of severity) or 
could have happened but was prevented (a near miss) or could happen at some 
point in the future.  
 
The TRM has three consecutive steps which are described in more detail below:  
(1) Planning and preparation;  
(2) Review of records; and  
(3) Reflection and action.   
 
3.2.1. Planning and preparation 
 
The first step is to define the specific patient population or medical condition 
from which a small random sample of clinical records will be sampled for 
review. Although any patient population or medical condition could conceivably 
be selected, the records of frail elderly patients and those with multiple co-
morbidities and polypharmacy are more likely to contain evidence of PSIs and 
latent risks.  Examples of potential high-yield patient sub-populations are shown 
in Box 3.2. Specific patient population characteristics may suggest optional 
triggers.  For example, a trigger of ‘INR >5’ would be suitable for a sample of 
patients prescribed Warfarin.  
 
The next step is to decide the number of clinical records to sample and what 
period of time is to be reviewed in each record.  Practical experience suggests 
that reviewing three recent consecutive calendar months in each of the 25 
records (randomly sampled from the chosen patient population) is feasible for 
the vast majority of clinicians.  
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Box 3.2. Examples of specific ‘high risk’ patient groups that could be selected 
for review (39) 
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3.2.2. Reviewing records 
 
Once the sample of records has been identified, a clinical reviewer screens each 
record, searching for previously validated pre-defined ‘triggers’ (Table 3.1.) 
which may point to the existence of an unknown PSI or latent risk to the patient. 
For example, the reviewer finds an INR >5 (trigger) and, on further examination 
of the record, detects that the patient was treated for an associated bleed in 
secondary care. There is no ‘correct’ number of triggers.  Instead, the number 
of triggers should be decided by considering the available time and resources 
(less triggers) and the number of PSIs to detect (more triggers). In practice, only 
a few triggers will be ‘positive’, e.g. lead to the detection of a PSI. On the other 
hand, one trigger may lead to the detection of more than one PSI. A maximum 
time of 20 minutes is allocated per record and only three calendar months are 
reviewed in each record. Trigger review studies have consistently found that this 
amount of time is sufficient (85).  
 
When PSIs are detected, a brief summary of the event should be recorded on the 
SS. Reviewers are also encouraged to rate the perceived severity and 
preventability of each detected PSI on a scale from 1 to 4.  The dual scoring 
system was developed by CdW and PB in response to the lack of published 
guidance on how to judge the ‘preventability’ of detected PSIs and is described 
further in Chapter 5. Unfortunately, but inevitably, some patients will be 
unavoidably harmed as a result of their interactions with healthcare for a range 
of highly complex reasons. This is a critical and often overlooked issue in the 
patient safety literature.  The key focus from the patient’s and the clinician’s 
perspective should therefore be on detecting and learning from those incidents 
which are judged to be preventable e.g. there is consensus that they should not 
have occurred if the appropriate preventative strategies had been in place.  
 
3.2.3. Reflection and action 
 
In the third step of the TRM, reviewers document any clinical actions they 
performed during the review (this option is left to their own discretion) and 
indicate which further actions they intend to take on their SS. A selection of 
possible actions is offered (Box 3.3) but with the flexibility to consider any 
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action they considered appropriate. They are also encouraged to reflect on their 
findings and write down any learning points and needs on a professional and 
practice level. 
 
Once the SS is completed, the reviewer should consider who they should share 
the findings with.  The ideal forum for sharing the finding is during a practice 
meeting involving all staff.  Finally, the reviewer should consider when they are 
going to conduct another trigger review.  At present, the requirements of QOF 
are for two trigger reviews during a 12-month period. The first time the TRM is 
used, a clinician reviewer requires, on average, about two hours of protected 
time to complete all three stages and the SS - although this may range from 
around one hour to a maximum of four hours.  
 
3.3. Potential value of the TRM 
 
3.3.1. Appraisal and revalidation 
 
In terms of regulatory and educational policy in the United Kingdom, ‘safety and 
quality’ is one of four professional domains describing the expected duties and 
standards of every doctor registered with the General Medical Council (GMC). 
Specifically, registered doctors are expected to ‘take part in and respond 
constructively to the outcome of systematic quality improvement activities (eg 
audit), appraisals and performance reviews’ (238). The TRM is perfectly aligned 
with this expectation and could therefore play an important role in helping to 
achieve this standard.  
 
The TRM was therefore included in the GP Appraisal process in Scotland in 2012 
as a potential Quality Improvement Activity (239). In Scotland, GPs’ 
participation in the annual appraisal process is mandatory and a prerequisite for 
their successful revalidation every five years. GPs have to submit supporting  
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Box 3.3. Suggested actions that could be performed after the review (39) 
 
 Significant event analysis  
 Criterion audit 
 Implement change for improvement and how this will be achieved 
 Provide feedback to a colleague 
 Add SS to appraisal documentation 
 Submit a formal incident report 
 Update or develop a protocol 
 Discuss with a GP educational supervisor 
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evidence of ongoing learning and ‘good practice’ in four domains: (i) knowledge, 
skills and performance; (ii) safety and quality; (iii) communication, partnership 
and teamwork; and (iv) maintaining trust. Each domain has core elements and 
minimum requirements. The minimum requirements for the ‘safety and quality’ 
domain are that GPs will submit ten SEAs and three Quality Improvement 
Activities in a five year cycle (239). The effect of including the TRM in the GP 
appraisal process is discussed further in Chapter 9. 
 
3.3.2. Educational value 
 
In response to the recognised patient safety problem, medical educators have 
started to integrate safety-related topics and issues into undergraduate 
education and specialty training programmes.  The UK Royal College of General 
Practitioners (RCGP) – which has responsibility for the content of the specialty 
training curriculum - has developed a curriculum statement on ‘patient safety’ 
(240).  They also defined specific learning objectives which require GPSTs to 
demonstrate a whole range of problem-solving skills aimed at improving the 
management of clinical risk and enhancing the patient experience of care. The 
TRM is one of the potential quality improvement activities they could undertake 
that would fulfil these requirements. The TRM also has potential educational 
value for non-GPST general practice staff. The findings from trigger reviews may 
help to pinpoint individual and team learning needs and points where patient 
safety may have been avoidably compromised. The educational value of the TMR 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. 
 
3.3.3. Improving patient safety  
 
In general practice, safety incidents are typically reported by patients, 
identified directly by clinicians or highlighted by colleagues as part of routine 
practice.  However, some incident types are not detected so easily – in fact, 
there is evidence that the majority of incidents remain undetected because they 
are not reported by patients or clinicians. Systematically reviewing clinical 
records for previously undetected incidents and potential threats using the 
Trigger Review Method (TRM) therefore provide care teams with a new 
perspective on patient safety, by offering valuable opportunities to take pre-
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emptive action before harm occurs. The potential value of the TRM as an 
improvement approach to care in general practice will be discussed in detail in 
Chapters 7 and 10. 
 
3.3.4. Measuring health care performance 
 
There are at least two important reasons why harm should be measured and why 
harm rates should be calculated in health care, including in the general practice 
setting. The first reason is that knowledge of the scale of the patient safety 
problem helps to guide decisions about the amount of resources required to 
invest in or re-allocate to the potential problem and can inform the design and 
implementation of improvement initiatives.  The second reason is that safety 
improvement initiatives and interventions need to be formally evaluated to 
determine whether they are cost-effective and leading to safer care (or not) and 
robust evaluation requires reliable serial measurements. 
 
The original purpose of the ‘trigger tool’ approach as applied in secondary care 
settings was to reliably measure rates of harm detected in the records of 
specific groups of hospitalised patients over time. There, external reviewers 
‘objectively’ determine and monitor harm rates for individual clinical wards, 
units and hospitals. Only the aggregated results (harm rates) are typically shared 
with the care teams. This application of the trigger method has two major 
drawbacks: the first is that frontline staff do not have ownership of the data and 
the second is that no attempt is made to investigate why the detected incidents 
occurred or how they may best be prevented in future.  The general practice 
TRM was adapted to address both these drawbacks.  
 
The TRM has the potential to reliably measure harm in general practice at the 
regional and national level, providing certain caveats that will be described 
shortly are observed. However, measuring harm rates at the individual practice 
level is a potential distraction from the arguably greater benefits to be accrued 
from applying the method to enhance learning and facilitate improvement 
activities. This approach is consistent with the explicit understanding that 
Trigger Tool data should not be used for ‘benchmarking’ purposes between 
institutions (241).  
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There are three important reasons for shifting the focus of the TRM from 
‘measurement’ to ‘improvement’. The first reason is that, when this study 
commenced in 2011, the available resources at the time seemed inadequate to 
recruit sufficient practices and clinician reviewers to review enough records in 
order to estimate harm rates with adequate precision or to detect changes in 
harm rates over time with acceptable power. As a result the decision was taken 
by CdW to prioritise the TRM’s improvement potential over its measurement 
function.  
 
The second reason relates to the philosophical question of ‘how much harm is 
too much?’ In 2011 there was already sufficient evidence to suggest that the 
safety of care in all health care settings, including general practice, was 
suboptimal and that there was great potential for improvement (174).  A simple 
clinical analogy would be to consider morbidly obese patients.  While measuring 
and recording an exact weight before implementing reduction strategies is 
recommended and would be helpful, the absence of a scale should not be used 
as an excuse for inaction.  Similarly, detecting PSIs and becoming aware of 
patient safety threats in your own practice should be enough motivation for 
health care professionals to take remedial action, irrespective of what the true 
incidence of harm may be. These issues will be considered again in Chapter 10.    
 
The third reason was of a more personal nature and informed by anecdotal 
feedback from clinicians and colleagues during the development and testing of 
the TRM. While many clinicians understood the importance of measuring harm, 
they reported a ‘disconnect’ between ‘measurement’ activities and what they 
perceived as the more important task – improving the standards of care they 
deliver. From their perspective, the overall number of harm incidents, the 
reliability of estimates and how harm rates compared across practices were 
unimportant or even irrelevant.  
 
The most common feedback we received during TRM testing can be paraphrased 
as a question: ‘what do we do after we detect harm incidents?’ The answer to 
this question is considered in more detail in Chapter 7. It seemed to me that 
unless the TRM could be adapted and made more relevant to the individual 
clinicians and practices who were expected to implement it, it would have no 
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realistic chance of ever becoming part of normal care. The best way to achieve 
relevance seemed to be through simplifying the method further, emphasizing 
the TRM’s potential for learning and improvement, encouraging clinician 
reviewers to use their own initiative when applying the method and for them to 
accept ‘ownership’ of their findings. This approach was recently endorsed by the 
authors of a systematic review of the Global Trigger Tool (GTT). They 
recommended that the purpose of the TRM should be re-framed, as it was in this 
study, to understand and characterize PSIs, rather than just count them (242).  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter summarized the second group of patient safety knowledge, focusing 
on the specific methods and tools that are available for measuring and improving 
health care in general practice. The chapter began by describing five methods 
that can be used to measure and improve patient safety in general practice. Of 
these, the TRM is the main focus of this study and its practical application 
through three consecutive steps were described. Next, the potential value of the 
TRM was considered in relation to GP appraisal and revalidation, GP specialist 
training, as an approach to improve the safety and quality of care and as a 
metric for estimating harm rates.  
 
In conclusion - Chapter 3 described the potential value and practical application 
of the TRM and provided a rationale for allocating time and resources to its 
implementation and study. However, successfully developing and testing a 
method – while important first steps - are not sufficient to ensure its successful 
implementation or eventual ‘normalisation’ into routine care. The next chapter 
will therefore review the different theoretical perspectives and approaches to 
implementation. In addition, a rationale for selecting normalisation process 
theory (NPT) as this study’s theoretical framework to describe, understand and 
explain the implementation of the TRM will be provided. Chapter 4 will conclude 
with a description of the main study aims. 
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Chapter 4. Implementation Science and Normalisation Process 
Theory 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter begins by introducing Implementation Science and summarizing 
some of the different models, frameworks and theories applied to health care, 
with specific reference to Normalisation Process Theory (NPT). Next, the main 
constructs, components and potential utility of NPT are described and illustrated 
with a small selection of practical examples of its use in other studies and the 
rationale for choosing NPT as the theoretical framework for this study is 
provided.  The chapter concludes by formulating the main study aims. 
 
4.1. Implementation Science 
 
Conducting rigorous research, building a sound evidence base to inform high-
quality care and designing and developing useful interventions, methods or tools 
for complex health care settings are all challenging tasks. However, successfully 
disseminating this evidence into practice or implementing an intervention and 
ensuring it is used long enough to become embedded into routine care processes 
are arguably even greater challenges. In fact, there are often ‘translational 
gaps’ as much research and many interventions are never implemented at all, or 
only partially adopted or not sustained despite their potential utility (243, 244). 
This is true across health care, but a particular exemplar in respect of quality 
and safety initiatives (45). As a result, precious time and resources are often 
squandered on unsuccessful projects while the alluring promise of efficiency and 
quality gains remain unfulfilled. 
 
Unsurprisingly, researchers and policy makers are very keen to avoid this waste 
and are interested in identifying the facilitators of improvement initiatives as 
well as overcoming the multiple barriers to the transfer of knowledge in order to 
build research-policy-practice links (245). Implementation science was borne out 
of this desire and is defined as the scientific study of methods to promote the 
systematic uptake of research findings and other evidence based practices into 
routine practice to improve the quality and effectiveness of health services and 
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care (246). A more practical description of this ‘relatively young science’ (247) is 
that it aims to open the ‘black box of change’ (248).  
 
Our current knowledge about implementation dates back more than half a 
century and has its roots in many disciplines, including sociology, behavioural 
economics and psychology. Over the years, a diverse range of implementation 
models, frameworks and theories have been developed and proposed, offering 
researchers a rich selection to choose from. However, much of the early 
research in health care was empirically driven without consideration of the 
theoretical underpinnings of implementation. This has been likened to ‘an 
expensive version of trial-and-error’ and made it difficult to understand or 
explain how and why interventions succeed or fail, or to identify the 
determining factors of successful implementation efforts (249).  
 
There are at least two main reasons why explicit theoretical underpinnings are 
desirable for designing and implementing interventions.  First, theory provides a 
generalizable framework enabling the comparison of effectiveness of 
interventions in different contexts and settings and opportunities for 
incremental accumulation of knowledge. Second, there are almost always 
multiple factors at different levels that determine health care outcomes. 
Applying theoretical frameworks may help to reduce the risk of important 
determining factors being overlooked (248). 
 
Seeking to address this ‘theoretical vacuum’ (250) in the intervention designs of 
empirical studies, the MRC issued guidelines which strongly recommend the 
explicit and active application of theory in order to proactively enhance the 
transfer of research findings into clinical practice (251). The implications of the 
MRC recommendations are that researchers should aim to: establish the nature 
of associations between an intervention and observed outcomes; recognise the 
potential interactions between an intervention and the setting in which it is 
introduced; and consider the mechanisms through which the intervention and 
interactions improve care or, conversely, fail to improve care. In other words, 
determining whether and to what extent new methods, tools, guidelines or 
interventions are successful in particular health care settings requires that the 
factors hindering and facilitating their implementation be identified and 
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understood. These necessary processes are greatly facilitated by judiciously 
selecting and applying appropriate models, frameworks and theories from which 
interventions’ main determining factors can be derived and/or described (248).  
 
Before considering the potential options, it is necessary to first define four 
common terms in this chapter: theory; model; framework; and implementation. 
A common definition of ‘theory’ is a system (or set) of analytical ideas, 
principles or statements held as an explanation or account of a group of facts or 
phenomena (252, 253). The terms ‘models’ and ‘frameworks’ are often and 
inappropriately used interchangeably with ‘theories’.  Models are deliberate 
simplifications of phenomena and are descriptive, but not explanatory. 
Frameworks consists of descriptive categories that provide outlines, structures 
or overviews of the concepts, constructs and variables that presumably give rise 
to specific phenomena but without explanations (254). ‘Implementation’ is 
defined and understood for the purposes of this study as ‘the process of putting 
to use or integrating new practices within a setting’ (254). It is part of a 
diffusion-dissemination-implementation continuum, but should be differentiated 
from these related terms. Diffusion refers to the passive, untargeted and 
unplanned spread of new practices, while dissemination implies the active 
spread of new information to target audiences using specific strategies.  
 
4.2. Models, frameworks and theories of change in health care 
 
A review in 2004 of the available theories relating to innovation in health care at 
that time concluded that the literature was complex, diverse and large and 
articulated the challenge of describing and understanding change as the product 
of multiple, unpredictable interactions between interventions, specific contexts 
and settings (255). The different theories, models and frameworks of change in 
health care can be classified into five different groups, depending on whether 
their main focus is on: (i) stages of change; (ii) individuals; (iii) social contexts; 
(iv) organisations; or (v) political and economic contexts (248). 
 
From the perspective of the ‘stages-of-change’ models and theories, change 
happens as a result of individuals and teams taking ‘steps’ to progress through 
consecutive stages. Each stage is characterized by different determining factors 
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and therefore requires unique strategies for change.  In Roger’s innovation-
diffusion theory there are: innovators; early adopters; early majority; late 
majority; and laggards (256) while the stage-of-readiness-to-change model 
describes levels of motivation by distinguishing between: precontemplation; 
contemplation; preparation; action; maintenance; and completion (257). 
 
The different theoretical approaches focussing on individuals as the main agents 
of change can be further subdivided into cognitive, educational and motivational 
theories.  
 
 Cognitive theories: Rational decision-making theories assume the 
behaviour of clinicians is the result of considering evidence and balancing 
the relative advantages and disadvantages of different choices in an 
objective and impartial manner. In reality, the decisions of many 
clinicians may not be rational but are instead based on contextual 
information, previous experience and cognitive structures which combine 
to create so called ‘illness scripts’ (258).  
 
 Educational theories: Adult learning theories state people are more 
motivated to change problems they identify themselves, compared with 
those that are presented to them. However, clinicians have different 
learning styles, e.g. activist; reflective; theoretical; and pragmatic 
learning styles (259). Consequently, not all clinicians will have the 
inclination to undertake self-directed learning. Even when clinicians do 
undertake self-directed learning, self-assessment is notoriously 
challenging (260).  
 
 Motivational theories: The theory of planned behaviour states behaviour 
is influenced by intentions, and intentions are in turn influenced by 
perceptions of social norms (e.g. peers), self-efficacy (e.g. perceived 
control in relation to the behaviour) and the individuals’ attitudes (261). 
Attitudes are determined by the expected outcomes of the behaviour and 
the clinicians’ appraisal of these outcomes. 
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From a social context perspective, there are models and theories of 
communication (e.g. the persuasion-communication model; elaboration 
likelihood model; and heuristic systematic model), professional development and 
leadership, social network and influence theories and social learning theories.  
The different types of theories focusing on organisations include: theories of 
organisational culture and integrated care, organisational learning culture, 
complexity theory and the theory of quality management. Finally, examples of 
theories with an economic /political focus include reimbursement theories and 
the theory of contracting. 
 
An alternative taxonomy with five categories was recently proposed based on 
the application of the different types of models, frameworks and theories in 
implementation science. The categories are: (i) process models; (ii) determinant 
frameworks; (iii) classic theories; (iv) implementation theories; and (v) 
evaluation frameworks (254). However, the author acknowledges that there is 
considerable overlap between these categories.  
 
Taxonomies of models, frameworks and theories are interesting and satisfying 
from a scientific perspective, as is recognising and applying specific ‘labels’ to 
individual implementation approaches. However, there is a more important and 
serious rationale for this explicit differentiation, which is the acknowledgement 
that models, frameworks and theories all have different assumptions, aims and 
characteristics which strongly influence their potential relevance and usefulness 
for specific research designs.  
 
A third and admittedly oversimplified taxonomy of the different theories, 
models and frameworks is therefore to categorize them into one of two main 
groups depending on whether they consider implementation as the product of 
‘institutionalization’ or ‘individual action’ (5).  ‘Institutionalization’ theories are 
those with the theoretical perspective whereby implementation is understood as 
the product of organisational activity.  From this perspective, the ‘actors’ and 
‘contexts’ are considered to interact in a predictable and rational manner during 
implementation processes. In contrast to ‘institutionalization’, theories with an 
‘individualized’ perspective describe implementation and implementation 
outcomes from the perspective of the ‘actors’. A central assumption of these 
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theories is that individuals have ‘free will’ and actively choose to implement an 
intervention (or not).  Current evidence supports this perspective - at least to a 
degree – with a general consensus that ‘individual’ factors are indeed important 
determinants of successful implementation, but that they only account for an 
estimated quarter of the observed outcomes (262, 263). 
 
Several decades of research and the anecdotal experiences of many clinicians 
strongly suggest that, while these two perspectives of implementation are 
helpful, neither fully describe or ‘capture’ the complexities of developing, 
successfully implementing and evaluating complex health care interventions. 
Organisational innovations and new health care interventions are often imposed 
and individuals and teams have to work creatively to flexibly configure their 
existing practices to accommodate the changes according to their own specific 
requirements and local contexts. If there are workability issues with an 
intervention that they cannot resolve it leads to problems with integration. The 
majority of models, frameworks and theories also only describe and explain 
implementation processes retrospectively, e.g. they either lack predictive power 
or it may be that they have not been used in this way.  
 
Given the relative limitations of existing theoretical perspectives about 
implementation, the need for a new and different theory of implementation 
became apparent that can mediate between macro (e.g. diffusion, 
institutionalization and organisational level factors) and micro (cognitive and 
individual action) levels of analysis (46). In response to this challenge 
Normalisation Process Theory (NPT) was developed. While there are many 
similarities between NPT and other, existing theories, NPT expands our 
understanding of implementation by offering a third potential perspective: 
successful implementation is the product of the ‘work’ health care staff have to 
do individually and collectively to implement research, a new method or a 
complex health care intervention.  This, arguably, makes NPT a useful 
theoretical approach with which to explore the implementation of patient safety 
initiatives, such as the TRM. Before considering this, NPT is first described in 
more detail below.     
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4.3. Normalisation Process Theory (NPT) 
 
The Normalisation Process Model (NPM) was developed and validated while 
conducting telemedicine and chronic disease management research in UK 
primary care settings in order to better understand the work required to 
implement such interventions in primary care across  multiple studies conducted 
between 1995 and 2005 (44). This model consisted of four components that 
allowed barriers and facilitators in relation to the work of implementation of 
complex healthcare interventions to be identified, described and evaluated. 
However, it does not explicitly consider what the intervention is trying to 
achieve; who needs to be involved; and how the impact of the intervention is 
monitored. Innovation and change are recognised as often arising from external 
sources or being imported into local contexts but, because the departing point 
of the model is ‘normalisation’, the focus is on the ‘creativity imbued in 
everyday professional work’ (46).  
 
Recognising that implementation work is greater than the actual activities and 
resources required, NPM was subsequently further developed into the 
Normalisation Process Theory (NPT) (5, 243, 264). The most significant changes 
to the model were grouping the four original components together as a single 
construct – ‘collective action’ – and then adding three additional constructs 
focused on understanding, engagement and monitoring (264). NPT is a formal 
and verifiable theory with the purpose of empirical application rather than 
abstract critique. It is defined as an ‘explanatory framework for investigation of 
the routine embedding of material practices in social contexts’ (5). Material 
practices are regarded as all of the things people do when they implement 
complex health care interventions (245).  
 
NPT is a middle-range theory of social action making it amenable to the 
development of testable questions and propositions. Theories are considered 
‘high’, ‘middle’ or ‘low’ depending on their place in an abstraction level 
continuum. The ‘high’ level theories have a universal or almost unlimited scope 
of application, while ‘middle’ level theories explain limited sets of phenomena 
(253). There is currently no ‘high’ level theory of implementation. It is possible 
in some disciplines to build a higher level theory from lower abstraction level 
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theories (analogous to building a wall from bricks). While a general theory of 
implementation has recently been proposed (265) the general consensus is that 
it is very unlikely there will ever be a grand theory of implementation because 
implementation is too multifaceted and complex to allow universal explanations 
(254).    
 
NPT is a theory about the ‘work’ people do collectively and as individuals to 
implement and sustain an intervention – in the instance of this study, the 
intervention is the TRM and the main agents of change are primary care 
clinicians. From this perspective, ‘work’ is defined as ‘purposive social action 
that involves the investment of personal and group resources to achieve goals’ 
(5). In other words, NPT is more concerned with understanding what people do 
than in their attitudes or beliefs.  
 
The term ‘normalisation’ is defined as the embedding of a technique, technology 
or organisational change as a routine and taken-for-granted element of clinical 
practice (46). It includes all of the stages from design, development and testing 
of an intervention, through to its implementation, embedding and finally 
integration (5). Normalisation should be differentiated from adoption (e.g. an 
intervention is accepted and is used from time to time) and rejection (e.g. an 
intervention is spurned). Just because some innovations and interventions 
become normalised do not necessarily imply that they were effective in 
achieving their intended outcomes, nor that they are of high quality or that they 
are permanent, e.g. they may become de-normalised with time (44). The 
converse is also true – an intervention may be useful and meet the organisational 
criteria for success and yet not become normalised (266). This is why ‘proof of 
concept’ studies add little value to the evidence base in implementation science 
and are unlikely to do so (267, 268). However, despite this conceptual problem 
much research still focuses on ‘can it work/does it work?’ questions rather than 
asking ‘how’ interventions should be implemented.  
 
4.3.1. NPT constructs and components 
 
NPT focuses attention on the different types of implementation work as 
described and categorized according to four main interactive constructs termed: 
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coherence; cognitive participation; collective action; and reflexive monitoring. 
NPT postulates that for evidence and innovation to become routine practice 
(‘normalised’), work has to be done to understand and organise the method 
(coherence), staff have to be enrolled into using it (cognitive participation), the 
method has to be enacted (collective action) and work has to be done to 
organise, collect and interpret data about the method’s effects (reflexive 
monitoring) (5). 
 
The four main constructs are characterised by specific types of ‘investments’ 
required from implementers, without which successful normalisation becomes 
highly unlikely. Each construct is further divided into four sub-constructs or 
‘components’, which allows the specific nature of the work to be described in 
more detail. The components have been referred to as ‘generative mechanisms’ 
because aggregating their different and specific ‘work’/tasks produces the 
outcomes from implementing an intervention (5).   
 
Although the constructs and components describe different types of ‘work’, they 
are highly synergistic, fluid, dynamic and often exist concurrently (5).  In 
practical terms, this means that constructs and components constantly ‘interact’ 
with the potential to influence and change each other. The relative importance 
of each of the constructs and components fluctuate over the implementation 
period but also between particular empirical contexts. A simple analogy of NPT 
would be that ‘components’ are atoms and ‘constructs’ are molecules. Just as 
atoms and molecules may potentially interact, influence each other to varying 
degrees and change over time, the constructs and components affect each other 
and are also affected by external factors. An example would be the work of 
‘enrolment’ of staff and ‘initiation’ of a project which are clearly related in a 
practical and temporal sense.  These tasks are particularly important during the 
early phases of implementing a new initiative.  
 
The NPT constructs and all of their components are described next in more 
detail (5, 243, 264). The NPT coding framework that was used in this study are 
summarised in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. The NPT Framework  
NPT constructs and 
components 
Description 
Coherence The work participants have to do to understand the 
TRM 
 Differentiation The work participants do to understand the 
differences and similarities between the TRM and 
their existing methods, tools and practices. 
 Communal Specification The work required by all those involved to understand 
the purpose, aims and potential benefits of the TRM. 
 Individual Specification The work of considering and quantifying the expected 
‘effort’, time and resources that will be required by 
the individuals involved to successfully implement the 
TRM. This work helps to determine whether the TRM is 
perceived as feasible. 
 Internalization The work participants do to understand and interpret 
the TRM in relation to their own principles and beliefs 
and also the prevailing culture in their team or 
organisation. This work helps to determine whether 
the TRM is perceived as acceptable. 
  
Cognitive Participation  The relational work required to build and sustain a 
community of practice around TRM. 
 Initiation The work of preparing for the implementation of the 
TRM. This includes identifying and involving key 
participants willing to ‘drive forward’ the 
identification of the TRM. 
 Enrolment The work of recruiting participants who will 
implement the intervention and keeping them 
engaged in the process. 
 Activation The continuing support work that is necessary to 
sustain the use of the TRM  
 Legitimation The work required by everyone involved to legitimize 
and justify their involvement with the TRM to 
themselves and each other 
  
Collective Action  The operational work required to enact the TRM and 
requires participants to invest effort 
 Interactional workability The work of applying the TRM in practice (e.g. what 
respondents actually did) and the time and effort this 
required (as opposed to what they perceived it would 
be). What effect (if any) did implementing the TRM 
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have on their routine work? 
 Relational integration The work of building and maintaining confidence, 
trust and accountability in the TRM and in each 
other’s ability to successfully implement it. To be 
effective, this work requires formal and informal 
sharing of trigger review findings 
 Skill-set workability The work of dividing tasks and allocating resources so 
that the TRM can successfully be implemented in 
practice 
 Contextual integration The work of integrating the TRM into existing 
structures, contexts and policies; the level of 
organisational support and resources at local, regional 
and national level.  
  
Reflexive Monitoring  The work of assessing and appraising the individual 
and communal worth of the TRM 
 Systemisation The work of collecting and organizing adequate and 
reliable data about the TRM to enable evaluation and 
to identify the benefits or problems of the TRM 
 Individual appraisal The work participants do to evaluate the TRM’s worth 
for them 
 Communal appraisal The work of participants to collectively evaluate the 
TRM’s worth, including to others 
 Reconfiguration The work participants do to modify the TRM, 
themselves or their contexts 
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4.3.1.1. Construct: Coherence  
 
Coherence (CO) is the work individuals and teams have to do in order for them 
to make sense of an intervention - in this case, the TRM. This includes the work 
required to understand an intervention as something new and worthwhile. In 
other words, they need to create ‘a cognitive and behavioural ensemble’ of the 
TRM (5). In practical terms this means working to package the TRM so it becomes 
a unique and recognizable entity that can ‘stick’ within specific contexts. 
Participants’ understanding typically increases and evolves over time and 
requires them to invest meaning in the TRM.  Coherence has four components: 
differentiation; individual specification; communal specification; and 
internalization.  
 
Differentiation 
 
Differentiation is the work participants do to understand the differences and 
similarities between the proposed method, tool or intervention and their 
existing methods, tools and practices.  In the case of the TRM participants may 
have to do work to compare and contrast the TRM with formal and informal 
review processes of medical records they currently undertake and with existing 
QI methods such as SEA and clinical audit they already routinely applied. They 
also need to understand how the ‘steps’ of the TRM relate to each other and 
how a first and subsequent reviews may be different.  
 
Communal specification  
 
Communal specification is the required work to understand the purpose of the 
intervention (the TRM).  What is the TRM’s likely value for them collectively, for 
the practice and for their patients? In other words, do they think the TRM is 
useful? Participants’ understanding of the aims and benefits may be different 
from the intervention’s intended aims and benefits. If this difference is small, 
there is a ‘high degree’ of ‘communal specification’, which is desirable as it 
helps to facilitate normalisation. 
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Individual specification 
 
Individual specification (IS) is the work of considering and quantifying the 
expected ‘effort’, time and resources that will be required by the individuals 
involved to successfully implement the intervention, and how this could best be 
done. In other words, how feasible would it be to implement the TRM? While a 
sound understanding of the task requirements are important, it does not 
necessarily mean that the resources or appropriately skilled, trained and 
experienced staff are available or willing to participate. Allocating adequate 
resources and effectively recruiting (the work of ‘enrolment’) and engaging 
clinicians in the project require the additional work of ‘skill set workability’ 
(discussed later).  
  
Internalisation  
 
Internalisation describes the work participants do to understand and interpret 
the TRM in relation to their own principles and beliefs as well as the prevailing 
culture in their team or organisation. In other words, is the TRM acceptable to 
them and do they see the benefits of using it? Internalisation also includes the 
work they have to do to interpret the findings from the trigger reviews in 
relation to their own contexts.  
 
4.3.1.2. Construct: Cognitive participation  
 
The cognitive participation (CP) construct describes the relational work that is 
required to build and sustain a community of practice around an intervention 
and requires participants to invest commitment. This involves identifying who 
should be involved with the TRM, recruiting and organizing them and keeping 
them engaged throughout the implementation process.  CP’s four components 
are: initiation, enrolment, activation and legitimation. 
 
Initiation  
 
Initiation (IN) is the initial work of successfully ‘bringing forth’ an intervention 
and requires key participants who are capable of ‘driving forward’ an 
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intervention. Examples of initiation work include promoting and raising 
awareness of the TRM and planning and delivering educational events.  
 
Enrolment  
 
Enrolment (EN) is the work of recruiting participants who will implement the 
intervention and keeping them engaged in the process. In other words, EN 
describes who was involved with the TRM and when, in what capacity and to 
what degree they contributed. In particular, it addresses the degree of ‘buy-in’ 
that individuals show towards the intervention. However, the work of 
determining who should be involved in implementing the TRM is described by the 
‘skill set workability’ component.  
 
Activation   
 
The activation (AC) component describes the continuing support work that is 
necessary to sustain the use of an intervention. From a TRM perspective, 
‘activation’ work includes the different improvement actions reviewers and 
teams considered or undertook after trigger reviews. For this work to be 
successful, participants needed to remain actively involved in the process.  This, 
in turn, depends on whether they feel ‘empowered’ to enact change and they 
consider ongoing participation as ‘right’ for them (the work of Legitimation – see 
below).   
 
Legitimation  
 
Legitimation (LE) is the work clinicians and general practice staff have to do, but 
also the work of policy makers and professional organisations, in order to 
legitimise and justify their involvement with the TRM to themselves and each 
other. In other words, it is the work that is necessary so participants believe 
implementing the TRM is the ‘right’ thing to do. 
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4.3.1.3. Construct: Collective action  
 
Collective action (CA) is the operational work required to enact the TRM and 
requires participants to invest effort. The CA construct describes the 
organisational, external, immediate and internal factors that may hinder or 
facilitate the implementation process. The four components of CA are: 
interactional workability, relational integration, skill-set workability and 
contextual integration. 
 
Interactional workability  
 
Interactional workability (IW) is the work of applying the intervention and, in 
particular, whether the intervention makes the ‘day job’ easier or harder for 
individuals. In the case of the TRM it therefore involves screening samples of 
electronic patient records for PSIs. It is important to consider whether informal 
work-place rules may be affecting this work, and if the intervention helps or 
hinders clinicians’ ‘normal’ work. The IW component includes the actual time 
and effort the work required, whereas participants’ perceptions of the time and 
effort they invested is described by the ‘individual specification’ component 
(part of the coherence construct). 
  
Relational integration  
 
Relational integration (RI) is the work of building and maintaining confidence, 
trust and accountability in an intervention and in each other’s ability to 
successfully implement it. In other words, RI is the work of incorporating the 
TRM within existing relationships. This component should be differentiated from 
the work of ‘legitimation’, which is the work participants and external parties 
do in order to agree that they should be enacting the intervention. Are TRM 
findings being shared and, if yes, how and with who? 
 
Skill-set workability 
 
The Skill-set workability (SW) component describes the work of dividing and 
allocating resources so that an intervention can successfully be implemented. 
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This requires division of labour, e.g. ‘who does what?’ In the case of the TRM, 
records may only be screened by trained clinicians. The SW component also 
includes the work of deciding who has the power to make the decisions about 
resource allocation and work delegation. To be effective, skill-set workability 
requires consideration of the knowledge, skills, attitudes and capacity of staff.  
 
Contextual integration  
 
Contextual integration (CI) is the work of integrating the TRM into existing 
structures, contexts and policies: the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF); 
Local Enhanced Service (LES); appraisal and revalidation; GP Specialist Training 
(GPST) curriculum; regional and national Quality improvement initiatives such as 
SIPC and SPSP-PC. In addition, there is work to incorporate the TRM within the 
prevailing safety culture (work that is shared with the ‘initiation’ component) 
and professional roles (work that is shared with the relational integration 
component). The work of CI depends on the availability of adequate and 
appropriate resources and therefore also includes: provision of new resources or 
re-allocating existing resources; senior leadership support; restructuring current 
policies and infrastructure to include, promote and support the TRM.  
 
4.3.1.4. Construct: Reflexive monitoring  
 
Reflexive monitoring (RM) is the work of assessing and appraising the individual 
and communal worth of the TRM. It has been defined as: ‘the work of 
understanding and evaluating a complex intervention in practice’ (269) and 
requires participants to invest comprehension. This work requires adequate 
time, reliable metrics and sharing of results. The four components of RM are: 
systematisation, individual appraisal, communal appraisal and reconfiguration.  
 
Systematisation  
 
Systematization (SY) is the work of collecting and organizing adequate and 
reliable data about the TRM to enable evaluation and to identify the benefits or 
problems of the TRM. This work is normally undertaken through a combination of 
formal and informal methods. This component is therefore also concerned with 
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the methodological formality with which implementers derive value-judgements 
about the TRM’s usefulness. 
  
Individual appraisal 
 
The individual appraisal (IA) component describes the work participants do to 
evaluate the TRM’s worth for them, e.g. the clinician reviewer, the reviewer’s 
practice team and their patients. IA is typically informed by data derived from 
informal methods and relies on ‘experiential and unsystematic practices of 
judging the value and outcomes of practice’. 
 
Communal appraisal   
 
This component describes the work of participants to collectively evaluate the 
TRM’s worth, including to others, e.g. clinicians, practices and specific 
professional and patient groups other than their own. Communal appraisal is 
typically informed by data derived from formal methods (at least in comparison 
with IA).  
 
Reconfiguration  
 
Reconfiguration (RE) is the work participants do to modify the TRM, themselves 
(e.g. their attitudes, skills, knowledge, tasks) or their contexts (practice 
procedures, policies and infrastructure).   
 
4.3.2. The rationale for selecting NPT for this study 
 
NPT has at least three important ‘strengths’ which help justify its selection to 
inform the study design and analysis in this work. First, it was developed in the 
UK primary care setting with methodological rigour, its design process was 
transparent and it was subsequently validated through practical application in 
‘real life’ settings. Second, because NPT is about ‘workability in practice’ (269) 
it can be applied iteratively to study temporal changes in perceptions, actions 
and outcomes. Third, it is transferable to different healthcare settings and can 
be applied to a wide range of innovations, methods, tools and interventions. 
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Even though NPT is relatively young in research terms – it was developed only a 
decade ago - it has already been successfully used in multiple studies and 
settings.  
 
For example, in the UK, NPT has been used to study the implementation of 
nutrition guidelines for elderly patients in residential care homes (270), to 
evaluate the integration of Telecare management of chronic diseases in the 
community (268, 271), as a framework for generating and analysing data relating 
to the management of early chronic kidney disease in primary care (272) and to 
assess the treatment burden among patients with chronic heart failure in general 
practice (273).  In Australia, the barriers and enablers to initiating insulin in 
primary care were identified (274) and a conceptual NPT framework was used to 
design a new model of depression care in general practice and study its effective 
implementation (275). A similar approach was adopted in the Netherlands to 
implement a stepped-care approach to the management of depression in primary 
care (276). Finally, NPM was used in South Africa to analyse provider experiences 
of a new tuberculosis treatment programme (277) and a provider-initiated HIV 
testing and counselling intervention (278). 
 
This small selection of studies help to demonstrate some of NPT’s multiple 
potential applications. Its main use so far has been as a validated, conceptual 
framework for describing, understanding and evaluating complex health care 
interventions. However, it can and has been used to help design, develop and 
test complex interventions and to optimize trial parameters (269, 279). In this 
way, NPT allows implementers to focus through a socio-technical lens on areas 
likely to be problematic and direct their efforts accordingly (243). Another 
important application is to help ‘bridge the translational gap’ between research 
and innovation and their practical implementation by identifying possible 
barriers and facilitators to these processes (245). 
 
While post-hoc explanations and interpretations of events are important, an 
‘ideal’ theory overcomes the significant methodological and theoretical 
challenge inherent in predicting future outcomes with at least a modicum of 
reliability and success.  This holds true in the field of implementation science 
because, no matter how complex and emergent implementation processes may 
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appear, they are subject to normative and structural constraints that are usually 
not arbitrary. Consequently, the ‘trajectory of a practice can be anticipated 
within certain limits’ which in turn enables ‘prospectively assessing the 
potential of practices to normalise’ an intervention (5). In other words, NPT can 
be applied to determine the more likely outcomes of an intervention, e.g. 
whether it will be successfully normalised or not.  At the very least, NPT can be 
applied to judge the implementation potential of an intervention.  The practical 
implication is that NPT may therefore have utility as a potential ‘trial killer’ 
(243, 269). Applying the NPT framework to a study proposal would help to 
determine the likelihood of that intervention being successfully normalised, and 
hence whether it is worthwhile to proceed with the study or not (245).  
 
4.4. Study aims 
 
This thesis describes the study of the implementation of the TRM in the general 
practice setting in Scotland. There are four main study aims.  
 
 To describe the perceptions and understanding of general practice clinicians 
and staff about the concept of ‘patient safety’ prior to the TRM being 
implemented. Perceptions powerfully influence and create the unique 
contexts within which health care interventions are implemented. The current 
consensus is that the successful implementation of interventions is strongly 
associated with the degree to which the planners consider and take into 
account the contextual factors and the setting into which they transfer their 
interventions (243, 250, 251, 280). Becoming aware of and understanding pre-
existing perceptions and contexts are therefore important to understand the 
outcomes from implementing the TRM, and are described in Chapter 6. 
Considering the perceptions of the participants in the design and planning 
stages of the study helped to increase the likelihood of the TRM being 
understood as acceptable, feasible and potentially useful. 
 
 To evaluate the usefulness of implementing the TRM by describing its main 
outcomes. Chapter 7 considers the questions related to this aim: how did the 
general practice staff implement the TRM, what did they find and what did 
they do next? More specifically, how many trigger reviews were undertaken, 
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what number and types of patient safety incidents were detected, which 
improvement actions were considered or undertaken and how much effort did 
this require? In addition, the degree to which the study participants perceived 
the TRM as feasible, acceptable and useful is also described. The qualitative 
and quantitative results that are presented in Chapter 7 provide evidence of 
the different aspects of the usefulness of the TRM. The study findings 
therefore help to answer an important question which is raised in Chapter 10: 
should the TRM be normalised?    
 
 To explain how the TRM works. Chapter 8 explains how the TRM produced the 
results that were observed – whether positive or negative. It also describes 
the related issue of the learning that occurred as a result of the trigger 
reviews.   
 
 To identify and describe the main factors that facilitated or hindered the 
implementation of the TRM in general practice. Understanding what the main 
factors are that determine whether interventions are successfully 
implemented and normalised extends the potential impact of the study from a 
single intervention in a single setting. However, for this potential to be 
realized, a structured assessment of potential factors that may facilitate or 
hinder these processes are required, which is provided in Chapter 9. The study 
findings also help to inform recommendations about future improvement 
interventions and application of the TRM; whether the TRM should be 
normalised or not and how the process may best be facilitated; and which 
areas of research should be prioritised (Chapter 10).  
 
Before the main findings are presented, the different methods that were used to 
achieve the four main aims are first described and discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5. Methods 
 
This chapter begins with an overview of the study design and a description of the 
sampling and recruitment strategies. The two main data sources are described: 
semi-structured interviews with practice managers (PM), practice nurses (PN) 
and GPs; and (iii) Trigger Review Summary Sheets (SS). In particular, the data 
collection strategies and the methods that were used to analyse the qualitative 
and quantitative data are described. The chapter concludes by considering data 
protection issues and ethical requirements. 
 
5.1. Study design  
 
The study design was a mixed-methods approach comprising semi-structured 
interviews with a range of general practice clinicians and staff at two different 
points in time and a cross-sectional review of electronic patient records by 
trained clinicians who applied the Trigger Review Method (TRM).  
 
Some of the early studies about patient safety in general practice have been 
likened to ‘picking low hanging fruit’ because they were opportunistic, the 
results could not be generalised from the original to other settings and they 
often provided only a narrow perspective of certain types of harm and error 
(177). In reality, patient safety incidents (PSIs) have complex and diverse 
contributing causes that can be understood from different perspectives (281). 
Four specific perspectives of the contributing causes of PSIs will be described in 
Chapter 6, page 163. For now, the important implication is that different 
improvement approaches and interventions only provide information about 
specific aspects of patient safety. Similarly, different research methods can only 
provide patient safety-related data from specific perspectives.  
 
One of the key benefits of a mixed-methods study design is therefore that the 
different, complementary perspectives about PSIs that they provide can, in 
combination, enhance our overall understanding of patient safety. A second 
benefit of this approach is that, by combining different methods, their 
respective limitations are compensated, at least to some degree, while the 
veracity of the main findings are enhanced (282). In this study quantitative 
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methods were used to collect data about the incidence and nature of PSIs and 
the range of improvement actions considered or undertaken during and after the 
trigger reviews. Simultaneously, qualitative methods were used to explore and 
describe the perceptions of general practice staff and clinicians about the TRM, 
the contexts within which it was being applied and the related implementation 
processes. Combining the results from the different sources of data provided 
more complete and reliable answers to the questions posed in Chapter 10 about 
the potential usefulness of the study and how generalizable its findings were 
than would have been the case if only a single source of data had been 
available.  
 
5.1.1. Setting and sample 
 
The study was undertaken in the West of Scotland region in two NHS Health 
Boards (henceforth BOARDS): Greater Glasgow and Clyde (GGC) and Ayrshire and 
Arran (A&A). The BOARDS contain 262 and 57 general practices respectively and 
cover a wide range of settings from severe socioeconomic deprivation to areas of 
affluence, with practices located in urban, suburban and rural areas. 
 
A range of different types of general practice staff was included in the study to 
allow exploration and comparison of clinical and non-clinical perceptions of 
patient safety in general and the trigger review method in particular. The 
decision to include multiple staff groups was also motivated by the 
multidisciplinary nature of general practice and its strong ethos of working in 
teams.  
 
The study sample was obtained from two main sources.  The first source was a 
convenience sample of 12 GP practices from GGC (n=10) and A&A (n=2) BOARDS.  
In each surgery, at least one GP and the practice manager actively participated, 
while participation by a practice nurse was strongly encouraged. The second 
source was a convenience sample (n=25) of GP specialist trainees (GPSTs) from 
the West of Scotland. 
 
The pragmatic choice of a convenience (or non-probabilistic) sampling strategy 
was motivated by time and resource constraints and ready access to an 
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established network of general practices with an interest in quality improvement 
and research. The sample size was informed by the need to collect sufficient 
qualitative and trigger review data, to allow for a proportion of practice teams 
potentially withdrawing during the study period and the budget that had been 
allocated to this specific research project.   
 
The GP teams and GPSTs were not involved in any other research projects during 
the study period. However, some of the practices were participating in two 
Local Enhanced Service (LES) Quality Improvement projects. The projects were 
medication reconciliation; and improving the reliability of care delivered for 
patients prescribed disease-modifying anti-rheumatic drugs (DMARDs) by 
applying a Care Bundle approach.  
 
5.1.1.1. The ‘QOF study’ sample 
 
The inclusions of the TRM in the Scottish QOF and as an integral component of 
the SPSP-PC were described in Chapter 2.  These events occurred shortly after 
the data collection phase of this study had been concluded and before the 
analysis had been completed. A timeline of the events were provided in Figure 
1.1, page 27.  The implication was that virtually all general practices in Scotland 
implemented the TRM from April 2013 onwards, using essentially an identical 
approach as in this study. Consequently, thousands of patient records were 
reviewed in Scotland, and more than a thousand Trigger Review Summary Sheets 
(SS) were submitted to the BOARDS in the 2013-14 financial year.  
 
CdW was commissioned to evaluate the implementation of the TRM as part of 
QOF by NHS Education for Scotland (NES) on behalf of the BOARDS. The final, 
approved evaluation reports were subsequently rewritten, submitted for peer-
review and published (48). CdW also provided informal support and advice to a 
third BOARD, NHS Lothian. Direct access to the aggregated trigger review data 
from the three BOARDS (with their express permission) provided a unique 
opportunity for comparative analysis with the data collected for this study. In 
Chapter 7, when the quantitative results of this study are presented, the 
aggregated data from the BOARDS will also be presented for comparison and 
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context. The results from the BOARDS will henceforth be referred to as the ‘QOF 
study’ to differentiate it from this study. 
 
5.1.2. Recruitment  
 
Potential participants for this study were identified from two different NHS 
Education for Scotland (NES) ‘lists’. The first list consisted of the contact details 
of approximately 21 practices that had previously supported NES research 
projects, including the implementation of other quality improvement 
interventions, and who had provided invaluable feedback about their perceived 
utility.  
 
The second list was the e-mail addresses of all of the active general practice 
educational supervisors in the West of Scotland. NES maintains this database to 
help support its core business, which is postgraduate medical education, 
including the delivery of GP Specialist Training in Scotland. The strategies that 
were used to recruit general practices and GPSTs for this study are described 
below. 
 
5.1.2.1. Recruitment of practices 
 
Practice managers (n=21) were sent written information about the proposed 
study, its rationale and an invitation to participate via e-mail in April 2012. The 
invitation letter is included as Appendix 2, page 293. There were three main 
requirements:  
(i) The designated clinician reviewers and the practice manager would 
undergo TRM training; 
(ii) The general practitioner, practice nurse and practice manager would 
each participate in two individual, semi-structured interviews. The 
first interview would be scheduled before the training event and 
trigger reviews. The second interview would be conducted after all of 
the SS had been submitted;   
(iii) The practice would submit four SS, with at least two of the four 
prepared by a GP reviewer.    
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The first 12 general practices who responded affirmatively to the invitation were 
selected. Each practice nominated at least two clinicians, one of which had to 
be a GP, to receive TRM training. Each participating practice received an equal 
professional fee paid once they had agreed to participate in order to help 
recompense them for the time spent on the project. The amount was equivalent 
to that of one practice manager, three GP and three practice nurse sessions and 
was calculated from the sessional payment rates NES agreed at that time.  
 
5.1.2.2. Recruitment of GPSTs 
 
In April 2012, all GP Educational Supervisors in the West of Scotland Deanery 
were e-mailed (n=322) with details of the study and were asked to discuss this 
with their trainees. The invitation letter is included as Appendix 3, page 295. 
There were two main requirements of participants:  
(i) They would undergo TRM training; 
(ii) Each participant would submit one SS; 
 
The number of participants was restricted to the first 25 GP trainees to indicate 
a willingness to participate via email response. The GPSTs did not receive a 
professional fee but could claim their travel costs incurred in relation to the TRM 
training event. 
 
5.1.3. TRM training  
 
The TRM training sessions had a number of key components, which are shown in 
Box 5.1 These components were developed and refined over several years prior 
to this study through practical experience and participant feedback during initial 
TRM pilot work and the SIPC programme. The components are flexible and can 
be tailored to the size of the group of learners, their specific learning needs and 
the available time. 
 
The aim of a TRM learning session is to help prepare clinicians to successfully 
apply the TRM. The two main objectives are that, as a result of the training 
sessions, reviewers will be able to: (1) review their own clinical records in a 
rapid, structured and focused manner in order to detect PSIs and potential  
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Box 5.1. Components of the TRM training intervention 
 
 A patient safety quiz with feedback to introduce the evidence base for the 
epidemiology of error and harm in primary care. 
 A group work exercise on matching a range of patient safety terms to their 
definitions in order to help increase participants’ shared understanding of 
key terms such as ‘patient safety incident’. 
 A short PowerPoint presentation about the Trigger Review Method (TRM) 
 Provision of a TRM educational support package consisting of: (i) a step-by-
step implementation guide; (ii) simulated patient records with ‘worked 
out’ solutions; (iii) the Trigger Review SS template; and (iv)  practical 
examples of how to rate PSI severity and preventability.  
 Opportunity for individual participants to practice performing ‘trigger 
reviews’ of simulated patient records, followed by discussions in small 
groups and then feedback in an open forum. The objective is for reviewers 
to identify at least four of the PSIs contained in the examples within 20 
minutes, and to make judgements on the severity and preventability of 
these incidents.  
 Clarification of the study’s expectations, including informing participants 
about the ‘high risk’ patient groups from which they were to select their 
sample of clinical records for trigger reviews and where to send their 
completed SS documentation. 
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safety-critical issues and; (2) learn from and act on the findings in order to 
improve the quality and safety of the care they deliver.  
 
5.1.3.1. Training of practice teams 
 
The nominated clinicians from each participating practice were trained to use 
the TRM by CdW at a time of their choice. Any number of additional team 
members was able to attend. Training lasted up to three hours and was 
delivered on the practice premises. All of the training components were 
delivered, but the duration of each component was adjusted according to the 
needs of each practice team. 
 
5.1.3.2. Training of GPSTs 
 
A dedicated three-hour training session was offered exclusively to participating 
GPSTs.  They were offered two possible dates in May 2012 in a central Glasgow 
location to give some attendance flexibility to the volunteer participants. The 
two training sessions were delivered by the same facilitators (PB and JM).  
 
5.2. Data collection 
 
The data in the study were collected with two different methods, semi-
structured interviews and Trigger Review SS templates, and are described 
below. 
 
5.2.1.Semi-structured interviews 
 
Two different interview schedules were developed – one for the first round 
interviews scheduled before the TRM training session - and the other for the 
second round interviews undertaken after the practice teams had concluded 
their reviews and submitted their SS. The schedules were derived from patient 
safety literature, previous experience of research in this discipline and through 
discussion with PB and COD (283). In addition, the second interview schedule 
was based on the NPT framework. The interview schedules are included in 
Appendix 6 and 7, pages 299 and 300. 
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The first interview with each participant was conducted before the training 
session and aimed to explore in confidence participants’ awareness, experiences 
and perceptions of the state of patient safety in primary care and how safety 
may be addressed. The second interview was conducted after all SS had been 
submitted. The second interview aimed to explore the potential acceptability, 
feasibility and usefulness of the trigger review method.   
 
The interviews were conducted in the participating GP practice premises at a 
time convenient to the participants. Informed consent was obtained before 
commencing interviews. The practice and individual consent forms are included 
as Appendix 4 and 5, pages 297 and 298. Following written consent, interviews 
were recorded using a digital recorder and supporting field notes were made. 
The number of interviews, their duration and the types of individual participants 
are summarized in Table 5.1. 
 
Only one participant was unable to commit to a time for the first round of 
interviews (GP12). A minority of participants were unable to participate in the 
second round of interviews. This was because two PMs had developed significant 
health problems, while PN07 had left the practice and her position had not been 
filled by the end of the study period. 
 
5.2.2. Trigger reviews 
 
Each practice was asked to conduct four trigger reviews in total during the 
period of time from June 2012 to July 2013, with at least two of these 
performed by a GP. GPSTs were given a four-week period after their training 
session to undertake the TRM and submit one completed SS each. Each Trigger 
Review was conducted on a random sample of medical records (n=25).   
 
After the data collection phase of the GPST component of the study had 
concluded, the trigger review process was slightly adapted. Reviewers in the GP 
component of the study were advised to stop searching for PSIs once they had 
detected five. Instead, they were encouraged to use the remaining time to 
consider how to act on their findings. The reason for ‘capping’ reviews at five  
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Table 5.1. Summary of the number and duration (in minutes) of individual 
interviews 
 
ID 
GP interviews PN interviews PM interviews 
All 
1st 2nd Both 1st 2nd Both 1st 2nd Both 
           
1 45 * 45 58 * 58 NA NA - 103 
2 66 52 118 57 45 102 46 19 65 285 
3 56 57 113 58 27 85 54 22 76 274 
4 59 54 113 49 30 79 58 x 58 250 
5 54 62 116 49 28 77 45 x 45 238 
6 53 49 102 55 30 85 60 35 95 282 
7 57 50 107 38 X 38 60 x 60 205 
8 48 62 110 73 70 143 76 x 76 329 
9 54 15 69 56 41 97 64 41 105 271 
10 57 44 101 58 54 112 52 28 80 293 
11 58 54 112 44 22 66 43 x 43 221 
12 x 41 41 49 21 70 59 x 59 170 
All 607 540 1147 644 368 1012 617 145 762 2921 
 
*GP01 and PN01 requested a group interview in lieu of a second, individual interview.  Its 
duration was approximately 90 minutes and is not included in Table 5.1. 
NA = PN01 was also PM01.  She indicated her preference to be assigned as PN rather than PM for 
this study. 
X = participant unavailable for an interview 
  
116 
PSIs was pragmatic as it is possible that GP teams would not be able to feasibly 
deal with all incidents detected during a review, given time and resource 
constraints. 
 
Reviewers were asked to complete a trigger review SS after reviewing each 
sample of records (n=25). The SS template is described in more detail in the 
next section and is included as Appendix 8, page 301. Reviewers were also 
strongly encouraged to ‘fix’ any obvious problems that could be achieved quickly 
and without much effort while conducting the reviews, e.g. updating a patient’s 
allergy coding status. Participants were advised that the total review process 
(collecting and reviewing a sample of 25 records and completing the SS) should 
take approximately two to four hours and that no more than 20 minutes should 
be taken for any single record.   
 
The recommended number of reviews, the study period and recommendation of 
a maximum number of PSIs per review were informed by feasibility concerns and 
reflected how the TRM could practically be implemented as part of the QOF. It 
had been the intention all along to propose that the TRM be included in the QOF 
if the findings indicated that it was an acceptable, feasible and useful 
intervention. As it turned out, the TRM was included in the QOF before the study 
was concluded. 
 
5.2.2.1. Selection of patient record samples for trigger reviews 
 
The recommendation to clinicians was that they should select their random 
samples of patient records to review from a specific high-risk patient group - 
patients who were older than 75 years and had a record of confirmed 
cardiovascular disease.  This ‘high-risk’ patient group is particularly prone to 
error and harm (as described in Chapter 3) and therefore increases the likelihood 
of detecting PSIs. However, reviewers were informed that they had the final say 
in deciding which patient group to select. The decision to allow reviewers 
discretion in relation to their choice of patient population was pragmatic, to 
account for the professional requirements and attitudes of some reviewers and 
because, based on previous experience with the TRM, increasing the flexibility 
of the TRM had improved its acceptability. The reviewers were therefore also 
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provided with a pre-selected list of alternative ‘high-risk’ patient populations 
group (Box 5.2). 
 
5.2.2.2. The ‘review period’ for records 
 
The ‘review period’ was defined as any three consecutive calendar months in 
each patient record before the review date, as this period of time arguably 
offered the most efficient compromise between yield of triggers and time spent 
by the healthcare professional examining the notes [1]. It was left to each 
practice to decide which three-month period clinicians would review.  
 
5.2.2.3. The Trigger Review Summary Sheet (SS) 
 
The trigger review SS is a structured, two page template guiding reviewers 
through the three steps of the TRM, which are: (1) planning and preparation; (2) 
reviewing a sample of patient records and (3) reflection and action. The SS were 
used to collect and summarise anonymised data. It contained a number of tick-
boxes as well as free-text data fields for clinicians, including those in the GPST 
group, to: record triggers and details of detected PSIs, including their perceived 
severity and preventability; describe the improvement actions and intended 
actions undertaken during and after the trigger reviews; record their own 
learning needs and points and those of their practice teams; and reflect on or 
provide feedback about the trigger review process.  
 
In addition to the eight validated, pre-defined triggers on the SS template, 
reviewers could add optional triggers, depending on the characteristics of the 
specific ‘high-risk’ patient population they selected to review. For example, 
‘prescription of a NSAID’ might have been a useful optional trigger to add to the 
list of validated triggers when screening the records of patients with 
cardiovascular disease. The SS continued to evolve and a number of minor edits 
that were made as a result of and subsequent to this study are described in 
Chapter 9, page 240. 
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Box 5.2. Potential high-risk patient groups from which samples of records 
could be selected for Trigger Reviews 
 
 Patients on DMARD therapy; 
 Patients with diagnosis of Left Ventricular Systolic Dysfunction; 
 Patients on Warfarin therapy; 
 Patients with a higher SPARRA score, e.g. >40; 
 Recent admissions with COPD; 
 Care home residents; 
 Patients on chronic district nursing caseload; 
 Patients aged >75 years on 6 or more medications 
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5.2.2.4. Severity and preventability of detected PSIs 
 
The dual scoring system included on the SS to allow reviewers to judge the 
perceived severity and preventability of detected PSIs is shown in Table 5.2. The 
severity classification system was adapted from previously published work to suit 
the general practice context (284).   
 
5.3. Data analysis 
 
5.3.1. Quantitative data analysis  
 
The quantitative data from the submitted SS were extracted and coded in an 
Excel spreadsheet and included: (i) the numbers of individual triggers and PSIs 
identified; (ii) the severity and preventability ratings of Patient Safety Incidents; 
(iii) actual or proposed improvement actions resulting from the trigger reviews; 
and (iv) the time required to conduct the reviews. 
 
In general, data can either represent measurements on a continuous scale or 
information about categorical (discrete) characteristics. For example, age is 
‘continuous’ and gender is ‘categorical’ data. Some variables may be considered 
as one or the other.  For example, the ratings of PSI severity on a 4-point scale 
may be considered as either continuous or categorical data. In this study, all 
ratings were considered to be categorical data. The characteristics of the 
quantitative data collected during the study and the statistical methods to 
analyse them are summarized in Table 5.3. 
 
5.3.1.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
The clinician reviewers were classified into one of three groups according to 
their professional roles. The three groups were: ‘GP’, ‘nursing’ and ‘GPST’. The 
nursing group included practice nurses and nurse practitioners.  
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Table 5.2. Severity and preventability rating scales for detected PSIs (39) 
 
Severity Scale Preventability 
Any incident with the potential to 
cause harm 
1 
Not preventable and originated in 
secondary care 
Mild harm: inconvenience, further 
follow-up or investigation to 
ensure no harm occurred. 
2 
Preventable and originated in 
secondary care OR not 
preventable and originated in 
primary care 
Moderate harm: required 
intervention or duration for 
longer than a day 
3 
Potentially preventable and 
originated in primary care 
Prolonged, substantial or 
permanent harm, including 
hospitalization 
4 
Preventable and originated in 
primary care 
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Table 5.3. Summary of the quantitative data derived from the trigger review summary sheets 
 
Description Type of data Descriptive statistics Statistical tests 
Reviewer characteristics Categorical, nominal Counts, percentages  
    
Triggers Continuous, ratio Counts, percentages, 
means, SD, range 
Comparison of means and proportions: two-
sample t-tests, ANOVA, Chi-square 
    
Number of PSIs Continuous, ratio Counts, percentages, 
means, SD, range 
Comparison of means: two-sample t-tests, 
ANOVA 
    
PSI Severity / Preventability ratings Categorical, ordinal Counts, percentages Comparison of proportions: Chi-square 
 
    
Classification of PSI types and 
commonly implicated medications 
Categorical, ordinal Counts, percentages Comparison of proportions: Chi-square 
 
    
Number and types of actions or 
intended actions 
Continuous, ratio Counts, percentages, 
means, SD, range 
Comparison of means and proportions: two-
sample t-tests, ANOVA, Chi-square 
    
Time taken for reviews Continuous, ratio Counts, percentages, 
means, SD, range 
Comparison of means: 
two-sample t-tests, ANOVA 
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Microsoft Excel was used to perform simple descriptive statistical calculations, 
including: counts, percentages, means, standard deviations and ranges of the 
relevant study variables. All other statistical tests, e.g. comparison of means 
(section 5.3.1.2) and proportions (section 5.3.1.3), were performed with 
MedCalc Version 14.1.   
 
5.3.1.2. Comparison of means 
 
Two statistical methods were used to compare means: two-sample t-tests and 
ANOVA.   
 
Two-sample T-tests: This test is used to compare the means of two study 
populations (groups). More specifically, t-tests are used to compare one 
continuous variable between two groups. To compare how two variables vary 
together, correlation and regression should be used. If one variable is compared 
for more than two groups ANOVA should be used.  
 
The validity of T-tests is based on two assumptions.  The first is that the 
populations being studied have a normal distribution. Although the variance 
within each group is unknown it is assumed to be the same.  The second 
assumption is that the samples of data from the two groups are independent. 
 
T-tests were used to compare the aggregated mean scores of this study with the 
aggregated mean scores of the QOF study for the following data: 
 Time required to complete Trigger Reviews and SS; 
 Numbers of detected triggers; 
 Numbers of detected PSIs; 
 Numbers of improvement actions and intended actions undertaken during 
and after Trigger Reviews. 
 
In other words, t-tests were used to determine whether, for example, 
significantly more (or fewer) PSIs were detected in this study compared with the 
QOF study. In each instance when t-tests were used, the following were 
calculated: t-value, p-value, degrees of freedom (DF), 95% confidence interval 
(CI) and the standard error of difference 
123 
 
ANOVA: This test was used to compare the mean scores of three or more groups.  
In addition, post-hoc t-tests were performed to further analyse observed intra-
group variation. ANOVA tests were applied to the following data of the three 
reviewer groups (GP, GPST and PN): 
 Time required to complete Trigger Reviews and SS; 
 Numbers of detected triggers; 
 Numbers of detected PSIs; 
 Numbers of improvement actions and intended actions undertaken during 
and after Trigger Reviews. 
 
In each instance when ANOVA was used, the following were calculated: Sum of 
squares, F-ratio, p-value and degrees of freedom (DF) 
 
5.3.1.3. Comparison of proportions 
 
Chi-square (χ2) tests: The Chi-square test is used to ‘test’ how likely it is that an 
observed distribution is due to chance. It is also called a ‘goodness of 
fit’ statistic because it measures how well an observed distribution of data fits 
with the expected distribution if study variables were independent. Chi-square 
tests may only be applied to categorical data. The validity of the test is based on 
the assumptions that data were randomly and independently gathered from the 
populations (groups) and that there are at least five study participants in each 
group that is being compared. These minimum requirements were exceeded in 
this study.  
 
Chi-square tests were applied to the following data to compare the difference in 
proportions for: 
 Reviewer groups (GP, nursing and GPST) who selected their samples of 
patient records from the recommended ‘high-risk’ patient group. 
 The severity and preventability ratings applied by the reviewer groups in 
the study and the BOARDS; 
 The different PSI types in the preliminary classification; 
 The most commonly implicated medications in detected PSIs; 
  Actions and intended improvement actions undertaken during and after 
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trigger reviews. 
 
In each instance when chi-square tests were used, the following were 
calculated: the difference in proportion (%), the 95% confidence interval (CI) of 
the difference, the chi-square value, p-value and degrees of freedom (DF). 
 
5.3.2. Qualitative data analysis 
 
Analysis of the qualitative data commenced shortly after the first interviews had 
been conducted in 2012 and continued until the second half of 2016. This section 
describes the different qualitative data analysis processes and strategies that 
were used in order to achieve the aims of this study. Table 5.4 provides a 
summary of the main points.  
 
5.3.2.1. Assignment of unique identifiers to practices and participants 
 
All interviews were carefully transcribed verbatim in order to preserve 
colloquialisms, repetition and other important aspects of communication, e.g. 
‘pause’, ‘giggle’, ‘laugh’, ‘cough’ or ‘a knock on the door’. The transcripts were 
anonymised by removing all names from them. Each of the twelve participating 
practices was assigned a unique, double digit identifier, commencing with ‘01’ 
through to ‘12’. The same unique identifier was applied to every participant 
within a given practice. Participants from the same practice were differentiated 
by adding a further, unique identifier as a prefix, derived from their professional 
role: general practitioner – GP; practice nurse – PN; and practice manager – PM.  
 
The results chapters (chapters 6 through 9) include a large selection of verbatim 
quotes from the interview data that are presented in a similar way to the 
following example:  
 
‘I like nothing more than going back over notes, and reviewing and 
researching what we have or haven’t done’ (GP06) 
 
The unique identifier at the end of the quote in the example, e.g. ‘GP06’, 
indicates that this exact phrase was spoken by a general practitioner (GP) from  
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Table 5.4. Summary of the study’s qualitative data analysis strategies and 
processes (285) 
Processes Analysis strategies 
Thematic analysis NPT framework application 
Sources of data  All of the data from the 
first round of semi-
structured interviews with 
PNs, GPs and PMs 
 Free-text entries by 
clinician reviewers on the 
Trigger Review SS 
 Some of the data from the 
second round of semi-
structured interviews 
 The majority of the data 
from the second round of 
semi-structured interviews 
   
First cycle coding The data were coded using: 
 Grammatical methods 
(attribute and simultaneous 
coding); and 
 Elemental methods 
(descriptive and structural 
coding) 
The data were coded 
according to the main NPT 
constructs 
   
Second cycle coding The initial codes and data 
were analysed further 
through pattern and focused 
coding  
The data were sub-coded to 
the NPT components 
 
   
Derive categories, 
themes and main study 
findings 
The findings relate to: 
 Perceptions of patient 
safety (Chapter 6) 
 Classification of PSIs 
(Chapter 7) 
 How the TRM works 
(Chapter 8) 
The findings relate to: 
 Factors that facilitated or 
hindered implementation of 
the TRM (Chapter 9)  
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practice six of the twelve participating practices. In order to reflect the reality 
of modern general practice, which is that it is delivered by teams, the 
qualitative data included 'matched' interviews within each practice, e.g. a 
practice nurse, GP and practice manager, who were interviewed (where 
available) using the same schedules. In this example, data from the practice 
nurse and manager from the same practice as GP06 would be indicated by the 
unique identifiers ‘PN06’ and ‘PM06’ respectively.  
 
5.3.2.2. Thematic analysis  
 
The first round interview transcripts were read and re-read to provide an 
overview of the contents and as a primer for the ‘first cycle’ of coding (285). 
The two main tasks during the first cycle were to: (i) develop and apply codes to 
the data and; (ii) to write reflective memos about the codes and initial 
impressions of the data. An exemplar reflective memo is provided in its original 
format in Box 5.3 for interest. The memo was written while analysing the first 
interview with PM08.  
 
For the purposes of this study, a ‘code’ was understood to mean ‘a word or short 
phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or 
evocative attribute for a portion of language-based data’ (285). The majority of 
the first cycle coding was performed using pen and paper, as this was found to 
be easier and also more conducive to reflection than using Computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). 
 
After initial experimentation with various coding methods, I found the 
grammatical (e.g. attribute and simultaneous coding) and elemental (e.g. 
structural and descriptive coding) methods to be the most useful and intuitive 
for application to the first round interview data (285). A brief description of 
these methods is provided in Box 5.4. 
 
Once first cycle coding had been completed for the majority of transcripts, the 
second cycle of coding were commenced. During ‘second cycle’ coding, the 
memos and codes from the first cycle were searched for patterns and categories 
and were combined, re-combined and reconfigured. The codes were then  
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Box 5.3. Example of a reflective memo 
12/01/2013; 10:00 am  
 
‘I selected PM08 to code, as I hoped it would be a little 'easier' than another 
GP/PN.  So far, quite a few 'memorable quotes'.  She is clearly a very 
enthusiastic person, and just about the only one so far enthusing about QOF.  
Not surprising, as it gave her a number of opportunities, including becoming a 
QOF practice inspector. However, after a few years the health board 'didn't need 
us anymore'.  I really like her philosophical, no-nonsense response to being fired: 
'...anyway that was that [chuckle] and this is now...' No wasted self-pity here!  
Reminded me about the well-known poem 'if’ ...' if you can meet success and 
sorrow the same...' (I paraphraze) 
 
11:40: Still coding PM08:  The longest passage is when I ask her about 'culture' 
(ethos) - more unstructured than semi-structured interview?  One of the reasons 
she left her previous practice was because she was 'frustrated' and it was the 
only way she could implement change.  What a loss to the previous practice!  
Interesting, that the PM from the previous practice retired?? The 'new' PM came 
to her and has now adopted some of the systems (access/triage) that she put 
into place!  Excellent example of cross-practice relationships and learning.  How 
can this be captured better, and disseminated? 
 
I've come away very impressed by the 'flat' hierarchy in this practice.  They don't 
'vote', just reach consensus. Lots of different, regular meetings, with standing 
items on their agenda.  All meeting minutes are disseminated to 'everyone'.  
Attached staff are involved in meetings and considered part of the team.  Having 
said that, the GPs still seem to have all of the 'power'.  As far as the 50:50 split 
of types of PMs, I think she slightly misunderstood what I asked and insinuated.  
For all that the PM has autonomy, she very much seems to leave decisions to 
GPs.  It was clear that she doesn't censure information for them.   
 
Of all the PM transcripts I've read so far, I'm most impressed by her - very 
positive, practical attitude, good systems in place - in one word, I'll describe her 
as a 'fixer'. 
 
128 
Box 5.4. Summary of selected coding methods (285) 
Qualitative data 
coding methods 
Description 
  
Grammatical methods: Grammatical methods are used to enhance the 
organisation and texture of qualitative data. The word 
‘grammatical’ refers to the principles of the specific 
coding techniques and not to the grammar of 
language. 
 Attribute coding: Attribute codes are used for basic, descriptive 
purposes. They typically relate to a study’s setting and 
the demographics and characteristics of participants. 
Examples from this study include: ‘teaching practice’ 
and ‘salaried GP’ 
 Simultaneous coding: Two or more different codes are applied to describe a 
single piece of text. For example, a participant’s 
description in this study of sharing a mistake with his 
colleagues during a dedicated SEA meeting was 
simultaneously coded as: ‘positive safety culture’, 
‘SEA’ and ‘practice meeting’  
  
Elemental methods Elemental methods are the ‘foundation’ approaches 
and focused filters for coding qualitative data  
 Structural (or 
utilitarian) coding: 
Structural codes are used to categorise data and help 
to identify their commonalities, differences and 
relationships. Examples from this study include the 
codes ‘assumptions’, ‘distractions’, ‘lack of 
knowledge’ and ‘fatigue’ to describe some of the 
reasons clinicians gave for making errors.  
 Descriptive (or topic) 
coding: 
Descriptive codes summarise the topic (not content) of 
text passages in a single word or short phrase. An 
example from this study would be the descriptions 
participants provided of patient harm, that were 
descriptively coded as ‘patient safety incident’   
 
129 
gathered into related categories and themes, which were mapped and displayed 
with NVivo version 9.2.81.0. The codes were therefore not simply labels for the 
data but the ‘critical links’ between the interview data and the explanations of 
what the data were understood to mean (286). This is why, although coding and 
analysis may not be synonymous, ‘coding is a crucial aspect of analysis’ (287). 
The number and nature of the themes are described in detail in Chapters 6 and 
8. However, overall, the analysis identified 21 broad themes relating to the 
different study aims. 
 
Two specific, related strategies were used to reduce bias: double coding and 
coding clinics (288). The double coding was performed at the beginning of the 
first cycle by CdW and JF, who independently analysed the same interview 
transcripts of GP05, PN05, PM05 and GP06. During a series of coding clinics, they 
then compared their initial codes, preliminary understanding of the data and any 
differences in interpretation. However, because ‘all coding is a judgement call’ 
and dependent on the researchers’ ‘subjectivities, personalities, predispositions 
and quirks’ (289) any unresolved disagreements about coding were subsequently 
discussed with either COD or PB. In this way, the different perspectives were 
triangulated to inform the generation and application of suitable codes. 
  
5.3.2.3. Application of the NPT framework 
 
In thematic analysis, as described in Section 5.3.2.2, codes are constructs 
generated by the researchers themselves, in order to symbolise and summarise 
attributed meaning to data. In contrast, theoretical frameworks provide a-priori 
codes for researchers to apply to their data. In this study, the majority of the 
qualitative data from the second round of interviews were coded using the 
constructs and components of the NPT framework. The four main constructs are: 
coherence (sense-making work); collective action (operational work); cognitive 
participation (relational work); and reflexive monitoring (appraisal work). The 
NPT framework has previously been described in detail in Chapter 4 and is 
summarised as Table 4.1, page 96. 
 
The sequential processes that were involved in analysing the data using the NPT 
framework are described next, and illustrated through the practical example of 
130 
the following verbatim quote (a datum) from GP05: ‘I think it’s useful as a 
learning tool to learn about your own systems and a way of trying to improve 
those systems and a way of learning as a team with the results’ The quote is 
also shown in Box 5.5 with the original highlights, first and second cycle codes 
and written notes that were made while analysing the data. 
  
Preliminary, first cycle coding was performed independently by CdW and JF, who 
used coloured pens and paper copies of selected interview transcripts (GP05, 
GP06, GP02, PN02) for this purpose. They held data clinics to compare and 
evaluate the consistency of their coding, to discuss their interpretations of the 
data and understanding of the NPT coding framework and to identify exemplar 
quotes for each construct and component. They discussed any differences or 
uncertainties with COD in order to reach a shared understanding of the meaning 
of the NPT constructs and components. Once this has been achieved, all further 
coding were performed by CdW in NVivo version 9.2.81.0. 
 
During first cycle coding, most data were coded using one of the four main NPT 
constructs. However, some data clearly related to a more specific component, 
and could therefore immediately be coded accordingly. In the example of GP05, 
the participant’s words, ‘I think’, was interpreted as him doing the work of 
trying to understand the potential value of the TRM. The quote was therefore 
coded as ‘coherence’, which is one of the four main NPT constructs. The validity 
of this code was examined by CdW in a related memo. If the words ‘it’s useful’, 
rather than ‘I think’, had been considered in isolation, they could have been 
coded as ‘reflexive monitoring’, one of the other four main NPT constructs. 
However, when the rest of the quote is considered, it is clear that the 
participant was doing ‘sense-making’, rather than ‘appraisal’ work, which is why 
this piece of text  was coded as ‘coherence’.  
 
Four informal, aide-memoires questions were used to help differentiate between 
the main NPT constructs. The questions were: 
 Coherence - what do participants think the work is?  
 Cognitive participation - do people join in to do the work?  
 Collective action - how do people do the work?  
 Reflexive monitoring - how do we know the work is happening? 
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Box 5.5. An example of a datum after the first and second coding cycles 
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During second cycle coding, data were coded in more detail by using the NPT 
components. In the example above, the participant’s words ‘trying to improve 
those systems’ and ‘learning as a team’ were interpreted as him doing a specific 
kind of coherence work, which was to try and understand the potential value of 
the TRM. This kind of coherence work is described by either the ‘individual 
specification’ or ‘communal specification’ components. Because GP05 described 
his understanding of the potential value of the TRM in terms of a practice team,  
rather than in relation to himself or another individual, the datum was coded as 
‘communal specification’. The other kinds of coherence work GP05 might have 
done were: comparing the TRM with improvement methods he already used (the 
‘differentiation’ component of coherence); or considering how the TRM would fit 
within the existing culture of his practice (the ‘internalisation’ component of 
coherence).  
 
The first and second cycle codes, in combination with their related, reflective 
memos, were then analysed further in order to extract and summarise their 
meaning, which produced the results that are reported in Chapter 9. In the 
example of GP05, CdW considered the original quote, its first cycle code 
(coherence) and second cycle code (communal specification) before describing 
the result as: ‘one GP participant thinks the TRM is useful because of its 
potential for helping practice teams learn’. Then, through a process of constant 
comparison, this result was compared with the rest of that participant’s data 
and with the related results of all of the other participants, e.g. the data 
relating to the ‘communal specification’ component of the NPT framework. In 
many instances the results from the other study participants provided additional 
insights and allowed more nuanced interpretations that helped to enrich the 
preliminary results and refined them until they became the study’s main 
findings.  
 
In the example of GP05, many other participants shared his perception about the 
usefulness of the TRM, and no one fundamentally disagreed with this viewpoint. 
When all the different perceptions were combined, the preliminary result was 
expanded and refined into a main study finding, which is that the majority of 
participants perceived the TRM as useful, because it helped them identify 
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specific learning needs and points relevant to them and their practice teams. 
This finding will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
 
5.3.2.4. Development of a preliminary classification of PSIs 
 
The PSIs that had been detected, recorded and submitted in this study, as well 
as the QOF study, were coded and thematically analysed by CdW, SL and CB. 
Initially, CdW, SL and CB independently coded the same 100 PSIs. They met to 
compare their codes and agree which categories of types of PSIs were emerging 
from the data. Next, CdW, SL and CB coded 100 additional PSIs each, before 
meeting for a second time to clarify any remaining discrepancies and to further 
refine the categories describing the different types of PSIs. CdW then double 
coded two samples, different from the aforementioned 200 PSIs, that were also 
coded by SL (n=50 PSIs) and CB (n=50 PSIs) respectively. No further discrepancies 
or new types of PSIs were identified. Consequently, the remaining PSIs were 
coded individually by either SL, CdW or CB.  
 
The nine categories of different types of PSIs that were identified through this 
analytical process provided a preliminary classification of the types of PSIs that 
were detected with the TRM in this study and the QOF study. The classification 
and the proportions of PSIs in each category are reported in Chapter 7, page 
187.  
 
Classification systems are valuable tools in patient safety research. They provide 
a systematic and potentially transparent approach for describing health care 
processes and systems; support reliable analyses of PSIs and clinical outcomes; 
and allow integration of data from heterogeneous data sources. Consequently, 
there is considerable interest in this concept and a wide range of patient safety 
classification systems and taxonomies have been proposed. However, the vast 
majority of these were considered unsuitable for direct application in this study. 
This is because: (i) they were developed for application in secondary care 
settings; (ii) describe related yet fundamentally different concepts to PSIs such 
as ‘error’, ’harm’ or ‘adverse event’; or (iii) had not been appropriately 
validated.  
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One of the first taxonomies of medical error in primary care was developed 
fifteen years ago in the USA (290). It consisted of eight categories: 
administrative failures, investigation failures, treatment delivery lapses, 
miscommunication, payment system problems, error in execution of a clinical 
task, wrong treatment decision and wrong diagnosis. Shortly after, an 
international taxonomy of general practice errors was proposed. It was 
developed from voluntary incident report data and was more detailed with five 
different levels and 171 different types of error (291). A few years later 
taxonomies of medical error in general practice were developed in Canada (six 
error categories: administrative; communication; diagnostic; documentation; 
medication; and surgical/procedural) (292); New Zealand (three levels: 
‘patient’, ‘clinician’ and systems’ with 70 types of errors) (293); and the UK (six 
error categories: prescriptions, communication, appointments, equipment, 
clinical care and ‘other’) (72).  
 
A comparison of general practice ‘error’ taxonomies suggests that the main 
source of their differences may be attributable to the development approach the 
researchers selected rather than their content. There are two main approaches 
when developing taxonomies – ‘lumping’ or ‘splitting’ categories, referring to 
the predilection of researchers to merge or subdivide categories (292). 
Therefore, while some taxonomies have now been superseded by more recent, 
validated instruments, the categories they describe remain relevant.  
 
One example of a new and validated classification system that will be of 
particular importance to future primary care patient safety research is the 
LINNEAUS collaboration’s recent, comprehensive and multi-dimensional patient 
safety incident classification-system which they developed specifically for this 
purpose (294). The system provides definitions of dimensions and classes of PSIs, 
and is independent of data sources and accounts for the different organisations 
and professions involved in care episodes.  
 
If the LINNEAUS system of classifying PSIs had been available at the time this 
study was designed or when the data were analysed, it would have been applied 
in preference to the method that was used. The classification of PSIs in this 
study is therefore relatively simple in comparison to the LINNEAUS framework, 
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but the overall approach, content and PSI classes are still compatible with the 
newer, validated system.  
 
5.4. Ethical approval and considerations 
 
The study was submitted to and approved by the Glasgow University’s College of 
Medicine, Veterinary & Life Science’s Ethical Committee, reference number 
2012054. The ethical approval letter is included in Appendix 1. 
 
5.4.1. Consent 
 
The practice team agreed to participate in writing.  They gave consent to allow 
the researchers supervised access of the premises and medical records at 
arranged times. Every individual participant (GP, PN, PM, GPST or any other) 
was asked to indicate their consent to participate in the study in writing - 
separately to the practice - to actively participate in the training, reviewing of 
medical records and before any research-related activity commenced. The 
surgeries, individual team members and GPSTs retained the right to withdraw 
from the study at any time.  The consent forms are included in Appendices 4-6. 
 
5.4.2. Analysis of risk 
 
Prior to commencement of the study, a risk-analysis was performed. The 
potential risks associated with the study were considered to be very low. 
However, a separate concern was whether and what risk there may be from 
implementing the TRM and clinician reviewers finding previously undetected 
PSIs. Practical experience with the trigger review method in Scotland during the 
previous four years suggested that the vast majority of detected patient safety 
incidents would be of low or moderate severity. Only in exceptional cases would 
an incident of severe patient harm have gone undetected.  However, this 
possibility was considered and reviewers were encouraged to deal with it in an 
appropriate manner through disclosure to the patient and family, reporting the 
incident (if relevant) and significant event analysis.  Reviewers who may have 
experienced emotional difficulties as a result of the trigger review method 
would have been provided with contact details of a health care professional to 
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discuss their concerns in private but this eventually did not arise during the 
study period.  
 
5.4.3. Data storage, access and handling 
 
All data were stored securely on NHS Education for Scotland IT systems in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act of 1998.  CdW, PB and HB had access to 
all of the data.  COD could request access to any data considered relevant and 
had access to selected transcripts for analysis purposes.  Data were anonymised 
and stored on an internal network for the duration of the study and will be 
stored for five years after its completion. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter described the study design and the methods that were used to 
collect and analyse the data. The two main sources of data were: 
 
1. Two rounds of semi-structured interviews with practice managers, 
practice nurses and GPs. The first round of interviews were analysed 
thematically and the results are provided in chapter 6. The majority of 
data from the second round of interviews were coded to the NPT 
framework, although some data were also analysed thematically. The 
results are presented in chapters 7 to 9.  
 
2. Trigger Review summary sheets, containing both numerical and free-text 
data. The quantitative data were counted and percentages were 
calculated. Means, standard deviations and ranges were calculated for 
continuous and ratio-type data. Comparisons of means were performed 
with t-tests (two variables) and ANOVA (three variables) and comparison 
of proportions with Chi-square tests. The qualitative data were analysed 
thematically. The results of the quantitative analysis are reported in 
Chapter 7 and the qualitative analysis results in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
The specific strengths and limitations of the study design and methods are 
described in Chapter 10, from page 269.  
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Chapter 6. Participants’ perceptions of patient safety   
 
This chapter describes the results that relate to the study aim of describing the 
perceptions and understanding of general practice clinicians and staff of patient 
safety. The main source of data for this chapter was the first round of 
interviews with practice managers, general practitioners and practice nurses. 
The data were thematically analysed.  
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 described how patient safety incidents (PSIs) commonly occur, and 
that a substantial minority result in preventable, iatrogenic harm to patients. 
From a patient safety perspective, the main priorities in modern health care 
systems are therefore to improve standards of care, reduce the risk of avoidable 
harm and remove (or contain) latent safety threats from systems where possible. 
Consequently, a number of improvement initiatives ranging from small-scale, 
informal actions in single units or teams to formal collaborative-type 
programmes at regional and national levels have been implemented in the UK, 
including in general practice. Chapter 3 described five main types of 
improvement methods - including the TRM - that were specifically developed or 
adapted for use in patient safety research and in these improvement 
programmes.   
 
However, despite more patient safety initiatives interventions and research than 
ever before, there is still very little evidence that health care safety standards, 
including in general practice, have been substantially improved as a result (35). 
There are many potential reasons for this, including some that are still unknown 
at this time. Arguably, the most pressing question right now is therefore whether 
the safety improvement methods available to us are actually useful? It is 
challenging, if not impossible, to provide a short and clear answer to this 
deceptively simple question. The reality is that the utility of a method or 
intervention is determined by a range of emergent, complex and interlinked 
factors that are typically absent when its performance is evaluated during 
testing or pilot studies. Three of these factors that are particularly important 
are described to help illustrate this point further.  
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The first factor that helps to determine the practical usefulness of improvement 
methods is the reciprocal effect of the diverse, dynamic and complex health 
care contexts within which interventions are implemented (295). The same 
method produces significantly different results depending on when, where and 
how it is implemented. The second factor is the perceptions of the intended 
users. If health care staff perceive methods as acceptable, feasible and useful 
they are more likely to implement and use them. However, positive perceptions 
about the utility of a method do not necessarily imply a willingness or ability to 
use it. The third factor is therefore whether the knowledge, skills and attitudes 
of the intended users are sufficient to enable effective use of the method. 
  
Before health care policy makers and researchers attempt to implement 
complex health care interventions, it is therefore important, and possibly 
essential, that they first consider and understand whether and how frontline 
clinicians and staff perceive related problems and their potential solutions. This 
is because perceptions about the nature and scale of the problem, and the need 
for, and characteristics of, interventions will largely determine how they are 
received, interpreted and applied in practice. In fact, this may be more 
important than the potential or actual ‘technical’ value of the intervention. 
However, the perceptions of general practice staff about patient safety are 
currently largely unknown.  
 
The aims of this chapter are therefore fourfold:  
 To explore the perceptions and experiences of a range of general practice 
staff about the concept of ‘patient safety’; 
 To list and describe the factors they perceive as most important in 
contributing to patient safety incidents (PSI);  
 To identify which improvement actions, methods and tools are known or 
currently being used by practices, which areas they perceive as important 
for further improvement and the requirements to do so; and 
 To consider the safety culture that was prevailing in the general practice 
teams when the TRM was implemented. 
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Throughout this chapter, the main findings are discussed when they are reported 
to raise a number of directly relevant issues, and to compare them with the 
patient safety evidence-base where applicable. The chapter concludes with a 
summary description of the four main perspectives of the contributing factors to 
PSIs, and explain how each perspective helps to inform the selection of different 
approaches to health care improvement (296).  
 
6.1. Perceptions and experiences of ‘patient safety’ 
 
6.1.1. Patient safety definitions and perspectives 
 
Only a few participants were able to provide a definition of patient safety. 
Others felt that a formal definition of patient safety had little value for them 
and could, paradoxically, even distract them in their efforts to provide high 
quality care. One practice nurse said: ‘sometimes it can feel in health care like 
we just define things that we are already doing and you’re not sure why. Who is 
doing the defining? It would be people higher up... sometimes it can feel like 
it’s quite divorced from where we are.’ (PNO2) However, all participants were 
able to clearly articulate their understanding of patient safety through practical 
examples and rich descriptions.  
 
Despite the seemingly disparate nature of the patient safety narratives, three 
themes clearly emerged during analysis, based on the different perspectives 
from which participants initially understood and explained patient safety. The 
perspectives were related to: (i) patients; (ii) clinicians and health care staff; 
and (iii) systems and processes. The different perspectives are summarised in 
Table 6.1 and illustrated with a selection of verbatim quotes. 
 
Those participants who interpreted safety from a ‘patient’ perspective, typically 
talked about ‘harm’ or ‘journeys’ and thought patients could actively contribute 
to their own safety, but also to PSIs. Other participants had a predominantly 
‘clinician and staff’ perspective of safety. They were more likely to describe 
patient safety in terms of ‘responsibilities’ and ‘duty of care’ and considered the 
actions of health care workers, whether intentional or not, as particularly 
important determinants of PSIs. The remaining participants had a third  
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Table 6.1. Participants’ patient safety narrative perspectives  
 
Perspective Verbatim quotes 
  
Patients I always put myself in the patient’s point... if that’s the way I 
was treated how would I feel about that? I suppose I always do 
that and it’s just natural for me (PM07) 
I don’t think it [patient safety] is as simple as making sure you 
are prescribing the right drug - it is looking at the patient as a 
whole and thinking outside the box (PN06)  
  
Clinicians 
and staff 
It’s about taking personal and professional responsibility for 
that patient... not passing the buck, taking responsibility for 
each patient (PN02) 
As practice manager I have to make sure that when the 
patients come in to the health centre they are protected 
throughout (PM02) 
  
Systems and 
processes 
Double checking, checking, double checking. I think that keeps 
everybody safe. That’s how I view it [patient safety] (PN11) 
It just makes me think about clinical safety - I think to make 
sure that prescriptions are correct, and referrals are dealt with 
properly and that patients are followed up (PM11) 
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perspective of patient safety, namely that it is about ‘systems and procedures’. 
Their narratives typically included terms such as ‘protocols’ and ‘guidelines’ and 
they perceived organisational factors, systems and processes to be the main 
drivers of patient safety. 
 
The three different perspectives from which participants shared their patient 
safety narratives were not associated with their professional roles. Being in the 
same practice team did not increase the likelihood of participants having the 
same perspective either. Rather, the specific perspectives from which 
participants understood patient safety in this study seemed to be mainly derived 
from their own, unique and individual experiences.   
 
These study findings, i.e. that the vast majority of participants were able to 
explain patient safety in practical terms, even though they were unable to 
provide formal definitions of the concept, and that their patient safety 
narratives were delivered from different perspectives, are similar to the 
international literature. In a qualitative study of GPs (n=22) and practice nurses 
(n=7) in the Netherlands, none of the respondents provided a definition of 
patient safety, but they were also able to offer a wide range of descriptions and 
perceptions of this concept when asked (297).  
 
One implication of this finding is that the way in which researchers and policy 
makers define patient safety may not have any practical meaning for frontline 
staff. In order for improvement interventions to be successfully implemented, it 
may therefore be necessary to first align how patient safety is understood by all 
stakeholders, and especially their intended users, to ensure overall consistency 
of purpose and application.  From an NPT perspective, the work to achieve this 
goal is described by the ‘coherence’ construct. This will be considered in more 
detail in Chapters 9 and 10. 
 
6.1.2. Patient safety perceptions and experiences  
 
The experiences and perceptions participants had of patient safety could be 
summarised as four main themes. They are, that patient safety is: (i) important; 
(ii) integral to care; (iii) characterized by impermanence; and (iv) imperfect, 
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but amenable to improvement.  The themes are discussed below and 
summarized in Table 6.2 with a selection of verbatim quotes. 
 
6.1.2.1. Patient safety is important 
 
All participants agreed that patient safety is important, and for some of them, it 
was the most important characteristic of the care they aim to deliver. However, 
the majority acknowledged that there are a number of equally important  
 
priorities competing for increasingly limited time and resources. As a result, the 
relative importance they placed on patient safety could change in response to 
internal and external factors. Two examples of the relative importance of 
patient safety increasing would be after detection of a significant PSI in the 
practice, and in response to the promotion of a safety improvement initiative by 
a local Health Board.    
 
6.1.2.2. Patient safety is integral to care 
 
The vast majority of participants expressed the opinion that patient safety had 
been an integral part of their practice for many years, even if this had not been 
explicitly acknowledged.  According to them, the significant change had been 
that external agencies had started taking an interest in it too.  As a result, many 
felt patient safety had become ‘fashionable’ and ‘sexy’ (GP04) and also: 
‘…anything that’s got a government initiative becomes a buzz word’ (GP08). 
This perception was re-enforced by the fact that patient safety had been 
formally prioritised and improvement programmes were promoted by policy 
makers at around the time of the study. Arguably the best example of this was 
the launch of the national Scottish Patient Safety Programme (SPSP) in 2008 and 
the subsequent expansion to include general practice in 2013 (42). Participants 
recognised the importance of this aspect of the care they deliver being newly 
labelled as ‘patient safety’ by external agencies. In NPT terms this legitimised 
their involvement in the improvement initiatives – a factor that helped to 
facilitate the TRM. This issue is discussed further in Chapter 9. 
 
  
143 
Table 6.2. The four main patient safety themes participants described 
 
Theme and 
description 
Verbatim quotes 
  
Important: Patient 
safety is important, 
but one of several 
priorities competing 
for limited time and 
resources 
 [Patient safety] is almost the ‘be all and end all’. 
Whatever you do you have to make sure that 
patient safety is your highest priority (GP11)  
 When things come along we should be grabbing 
them and taking the opportunity to look at things 
and how you do things and how you’re going to 
change things for the better ... it’s just I suppose 
for most practices, it’s just something else to do in 
your already crammed up day (PM10) 
Integral: Patient 
safety is and has been 
integral to care 
delivery for many 
years, but was only 
recently formally 
prioritised  
 We’ve been doing this same thing under different 
names for years. It has been going on for years. It’s 
just been called different things (PM04) 
 I think [patient safety is] the next big thing really, 
and somebody in government’s decided to throw 
money at it, so that’s what we’re doing now. 
That’s not to say it’s a bad thing or that it 
shouldn’t have been done years ago, but I think it 
is [pause] today’s big thing (PM11) 
Impermanence: 
Patient safety is the 
dynamic and emergent 
product of the many 
health care processes 
that shape patient 
journeys 
 I suppose [GP X] has changed my view of patient 
safety from things that happen from a sort of 
medication or a medical point of view, wrong 
diagnosis, error in prescribing that sort of thing. So 
now I look at patient safety from that point of 
view, as opposed to the view that I had (PM06) 
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 It’s a whole kind of journey, and we’re involved in 
so many aspects of it. There’s safety in the 
physical viewing, there’s safety in the medical 
assessment, medical administration and then the 
ongoing care, and I suppose secondary care. You 
know, you can talk about the journey into it 
secondary care as well. So yes, it [patient safety] 
covers everything really (GP07) 
Imperfect: the quality 
of safety can – and 
should – be improved 
further. However, it is 
unlikely that it will 
ever be ‘perfect’ 
 Nothing can be 100% safe. You can always aim for 
that as an ideal but, for anybody that thinks 
they’re going to be 100% safe all the time – they 
are fooling themselves and probably missing what 
they are doing wrong… When I say inevitable, I 
didn’t mean it in the sense of ‘well it’s inevitable 
so just live with it’ I mean it’s inevitable so don’t 
accept that it [PSIs] doesn’t happen (GP01) 
 Total patient safety is [pause] will I say 
unachievable? I don’t think it’s ever going to be 
achievable, but I think there’s a lot of things can 
be done to change things, but I don’t think you’ll 
ever get 100% perfect - you’ve got too many 
ingredients for that, too many ingredients (PN08) 
  
145 
6.1.2.3. Patient safety is characterized by impermanence 
 
The majority of participants explained that they understood patient safety not 
only as the state of care at important moments, such as when PSIs occur, but as 
the dynamic and emergent product of many different and variable processes in 
health care, all in temporal (and sometimes contradictory) relationships with 
each other. They were aware that, just as levels of relative safety risk 
fluctuates, their own understanding and experiences of the prevailing levels of 
safety changed too. There were many potential reasons for this, such as: direct 
or indirect involvement in PSIs – not only as clinicians but also as patients; 
personal reflection; feedback from patients and colleagues; and the degree to 
which national policy prioritises safety. A practical example of how a 
participant’s recent, personal experiences as a patient informed her perceptions 
of care safety is provided in Box 6.1. Many participants explained the 
impermanence of patient safety by referring to patient journeys, both within 
primary care but also interfacing with hospital care, and how they are often 
unpredictable with many twists and turns and may include a range of health care 
staff able to influence the different potential endpoints. 
 
6.1.2.4. Patient safety is imperfect but can be improved 
 
All but one of the participants thought that PSIs were the inevitable 
consequence of clinical care and even if infinite resources were theoretically 
available to try and prevent them, they could never be completely prevented. 
This perception is widely shared by other clinicians worldwide and fits with what 
we know about the inevitability of failure at some point in highly complex socio-
technical systems (281, 298, 299). Some participants therefore described the 
possibility of ‘perfect’ patient safety as a ‘pipedream’ or a ‘wish’. Despite this 
perception, all participants agreed that this was not an excuse for not 
attempting to reduce PSIs and that much could still be done in this regard. They 
also all agreed that improving patient safety was an ethical and professional 
responsibility for every health care worker, for general practice teams and also 
organisations. However, according to them, the expectations about the results 
of these efforts should be tempered by the acknowledgement that clinicians are 
‘human’ and therefore imperfect and prone to err.  
146 
 
Box 6.1. Example of a participant’s personal experience as a patient  
I was an inpatient just for, well, for two nights. I had a thunderclap headache and I had 
to have an ehm CT and an LP. Anyway, it happened on a Friday, which was unfortunate 
ehm and I had to go to A&E was so sick, got reviewed, bloods, CT, all within an hour, so 
impressive. Sent over to medical assessment unit, waited about five hours to be seen 
then was seen by the consultant who said: ‘okay, your CT’s fine, we need to do an LP. 
We’ll get that done, we’ll get the results tomorrow and if it all is okay, you can get 
away.’ Well, so I was like ‘oh, that’s fine’.  
 
So then nothing happened the next day. It was so loud overnight - there was an old 
demented lady who was so agitated and they were speaking quite [firm voice] ‘Shh, 
come on shhh’ in the middle of the night. It was ehm quite upsetting. Anyway, she got 
moved to another ward in the middle of the night. I think probably cause she was quite 
hard work. There was another lady who was really wheezy who they also moved in the 
middle of the night and I was going to go and say I think she needs a nebuliser, I think 
she needs reviewed. None of this was done on the acute medical ward ehm and anyway, 
they did the LP too late, they sent the samples off, they told me they hadn’t arrived. 
Turns out they don’t process at the labs after twelve o’clock on a Saturday. Had to wait 
til the Sunday. They wouldn’t let me go home even though it was less than a mile from 
the hospital, so I had to wait another twenty four hours but they kept me because I was 
independent and self caring...  
 
I was not impressed at the level of nursing and care... there’s not enough time nursing 
anymore I don’t think, and I think we need to get back to good caring, nursing, that’s 
my rant [chuckle]. I was, I was very saddened by my stay, and it actually makes me 
think I don’t want to admit people to the [hospital X]. I think patients might be better 
dealt with at home. So nursing, more nursing time, more nurses on the wards so they 
can do their job fantastically but also care for the patients...if they don’t increase the 
number of nurses you’re going to have people having acute LVF [heart failure] or people 
going off with COPD, people arresting and no-one else noticing...we’ve lost the human 
aspect of it and I think that’s a big loss... you’re not meant to move old delirious, 
demented patients in the middle of the night cause it increases delirium, it increases 
that [whispering] we all know that. They should have moved me but they moved the 
one who was hard work, short of breath, not being reviewed. I mean, I, was just about 
to go and say ‘look, can you get this person’, then they wheel her, but I was ‘oh’? It was 
quite bad from the other side (GP07). 
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There are at least three practical reasons that support the perceptions of the 
participants that patient safety will always be imperfect. The first reason is the 
variable quality and timeliness of information. Clinicians often have insufficient 
information or the wrong information and increasingly also have to contend with 
information overload and information ‘chaos’ (300). Even when they are familiar 
with all the latest evidence-based information and have access to reliable 
investigations they may still not understand or know all the relevant contexts 
and patient-specific issues. For example, some medication side effects and 
serious drug interactions may be known but cannot reliably be predicted for 
every patient; and rare and occult diseases may go undetected or unrecognised. 
The second reason is that clinicians are in many instances only one contributing 
factor to PSIs. Technology can fail without human involvement and patients 
contribute to some PSIs too. The third reason is that, even if clinicians worked 
with ‘perfect’ patients in ‘perfect’ systems, their own psychological and 
physiological limitations predispose them to error. These factors will be 
considered in more detail next. 
 
6.2. The main contributing factors to patient safety incidents (PSI)  
 
Participants felt PSIs were most likely to occur in medication and medication-
related processes, such as prescribing, dispensing, administration and 
monitoring: ‘our biggest area where things can go wrong is generally through 
prescribing, and it’s where you can do the most harm as well’ (GP03). Three 
specific examples of medication-related risks participants identified were: 
patients intentionally and unintentionally varying from prescribers’ intended use 
of their medication; a lack of reconciliation of medication items between 
different health care settings; and the sheer volume of prescription requests 
that made effective monitoring a challenge. One GP explained: ‘the way that 
the service is set up, we as prescribers aren’t the ones that are doing the 
monitoring’ (GP10). 
 
Another important practice system participants identified as high-risk for PSIs 
was ordering investigations and managing results, e.g. ‘I’m really worried I put 
the wrong label on things - that’s awful easy done’ (PN11). Many clinicians 
recounted personal experiences of specimens, requests and reports being 
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mislabelled, lost or not followed-up appropriately. Despite this, the vast 
majority thought the volume of data made it unfeasible to implement a 
monitoring system, e.g. ‘We don’t have any processes [to monitor investigation 
requests] and a lot of that is about capacity you know. The practice just doesn’t 
have capacity to manage everything’ (GP08). Participants also identified the 
processes of sharing, storing and accessing information as important safety risks: 
‘the ability for error is huge. I mean I scan something and then you drop and 
drag it into a patient’s records. How do you know you’ve put it into the correct 
patient?’ (PM02).  
 
Elderly and housebound patients and nursing home residents in particular were 
considered to be at increased risk of PSIs and more likely to suffer harm. 
Participants explained this risk was because of relatively higher levels of 
multimorbidity, polypharmacy and reduced physiological reserves compared with 
other patient populations, but also because elderly patients often struggle with 
access to appointments and clinicians have insufficient time for pro-active 
management of physical and social problems.   
 
The specific patient characteristics and practice processes the study participants 
identified as being particularly ‘high-risk’ for PSIs are almost identical to those 
identified through years of patient safety research and which was summarised in 
chapter 2. A further, specific example from the international literature is a web-
based survey of GPs in the Netherlands. The two risk factors they perceived as 
most frequently constituting safety threats were, similar to this study, 
prescribing and monitoring of medication and patient age over 75 years. In 
addition, they identified polypharmacy, poor doctor-patient relationships and 
insufficient continuing education by GPs as important (301). The 
recommendation to practice teams in this study was to select the records of 
high-risk, elderly patients for trigger reviews. One of the pre-defined triggers 
required reviewers to screen for medication changes, while several others were 
related to specific laboratory results. In terms of NPT, the high degree of 
congruence between the perceptions of the study participants, the international 
literature and the TRM helped to facilitate its implementation through the work 
of coherence.  
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All participants were able to identify a range of contributing factors to PSIs. The 
factors were related to five main themes: (i) inadequate time and resources to 
deal with increasing workloads; (ii) lack of care continuity; (iii) patient-related 
factors; and (iv) clinician-related factors; and (v) chance. The participants 
explained that all of the contributing factors were potentially relevant to all 
types of PSIs and could affect any practice system, process or patient. The 
implication is therefore that, in order to improve the safety of care, it is 
necessary to adopt a holistic, systems-perspective rather than simply attempting 
to ‘fix’ each factor in turn. These themes are discussed below and summarized 
in Table 6.3 with a selection of verbatim quotes.  
 
6.2.1. Inadequate time and resources to deal with increasing workloads 
 
All of the participants described how they, and the rest of their practice teams, 
were struggling to safely manage their existing workloads and that their 
workloads continued to increase. They responded to the increasing workloads 
with a range of formal and informal adaptive behaviours. Four practical 
examples of adaptive behaviours provided by the participants were: 
intentionally deviating from policies and procedures (e.g. violations); working 
additional, unpaid hours; choosing to forego breaks and meals; and re-
prioritising the urgency of competing tasks and making changes to their 
appointment systems.  
 
Despite these behaviours – in a sense their best efforts to adapt - they remained 
aware of potential safety threats in the practice which, in some instances, had 
even increased.  For example, some patients may have been inappropriately 
triaged, prescriptions were often signed without being reviewed and reception 
staff sometimes offered patients appointments with team members who were 
not clinically appropriate to their needs. One nurse explained: ‘we can’t see 
these types of patients’ but because ‘there’s no appointments [reception staff 
is] putting it in for us just to get them really off the phone’ (PN09).  
 
Participants clearly understood the potential risk of increasing workloads and 
relative lack of time, but were unable to find an alternative solution that was 
acceptable and feasible in practice.  Procuring additional time (whether through  
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Table 6.3. Factors perceived as contributing to patient safety incidents (PSIs) 
 
Main factors Specific examples Verbatim quotes 
   
Inadequate 
resources 
Excessive workload It was almost getting really too dangerous - we’re talking sixty people in that hour and a half every 
morning (GP02)  
The pressure that is on practices to churn out patients and churn out facts, figures, returns - it’s 
phenomenal (PM02) 
 Time constraints At my lunch break I’m putting information on the computer (PN03) 
   
Clinician factors Distractions If you’re doing that while you’re trying to do six million other jobs, your phone’s ringing and everything 
else then you could miss it. Discharges are particularly bad - we’ve had it one or two incidents with the 
discharges [deep breath] (PM04) 
 Assumptions I don’t really remember what I was doing at the time. I do remember seeing it, but I made an 
assumption. Assumptions aren’t good for safety (GP02) 
 Difficult ‘personalities’ 
in the team 
[There is] huge variance from practice to practice and I guess it’s all about the GPs that you work with 
(PM08) 
 Lack of knowledge or 
skills 
I think the biggest threat to patient safety is the fact that loads of people do things that they don’t 
actually know how to do in nursing (PN02) 
 Stress  You get stressed; you’re kinda rushing against the clock all the time. So because you’re rushing it’s 
probably more stress...which in itself isn’t a great thing either from a safety point of view (PN03) 
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Main factors Specific examples Verbatim quotes 
   
Clinician 
factors... 
continues 
Being unaware of 
personal limitations 
Nobody is perfect ever, so you have to be aware of your limitations (PN09) 
 Violations The systems are there. People either don’t follow the systems or don’t have time so try to cut corners 
with the systems, and that’s why things fail (PM07)  
   
Loss of care 
continuity 
 Sometimes we’ve had issues over the last few years and I think really it’s because people are darting in 
and out and don’t really know what’s going on (PM12) 
   
Patient-related 
factors  
Patient expectations I think they [patients] have some real unrealistic expectations of what doctors can and can’t do (PM03) 
 Compliance If you sat down and you’ve agreed that’s what you’re going to do, it’s then the patient’s responsibility 
to keep their part of the deal in inverted commas (GP11) 
 Diversity of presenting 
problems 
We have such a big remit as practice nurses that we’re expected to be, to at least a degree, experts 
in, that you can sometimes feel like you’re drowning a wee bit (PN02) 
 Multimorbidity People come in with a shopping list you know (PN08) 
   
Chance  It’s really just luck when bad things don’t happen (GP08) 
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employing new staff or increasing the hours of existing team members) reduces 
the income and livelihood of the partners and would in some instances make the 
business non-viable. One GP explained how they: ‘obviously have a set amount 
of money. If you employ too many doctors you’re not going to have a practice 
because it won’t be financially viable and it will close’ The challenge is ‘getting 
the right balance of what you can afford and what you can do’ (GP03). This 
important issue will be considered in detail in Chapter 10. 
 
Inadequate resources and high workload were not only perceived as important 
safety threats by the study participants, but were also understood to have a 
negative impact on the performance and wellbeing of clinicians and staff. These 
key findings are comparable with the international literature (302). In a focus-
group study of primary care physicians (n=32) in the USA, the lack of resources 
and time pressures were perceived as particularly important impediments to 
care quality. In fact, inadequate resources ‘often force physicians to 
compromise standards of care’ (303). Other important factors that were 
identified in that study included: lack of control over work environments and 
inflexible and unclear policies and procedures.  
 
Insufficient time to provide all of the necessary care patients require is a well-
recognised and important contributing factor to PSIs. A framework identifying 
specific types of ‘time problems’ or ‘tempos’ in general practice was recently 
proposed (304, 305). One of the five components of the framework is the ‘office 
tempo’ and quantifies the amount of time clinicians have available to provide 
care for patients. All participants identified this tempo as a particularly 
important risk factor for PSIs. The other four tempos relate to: (i) ‘diseases’ 
(estimated evolution and response to treatment times); (ii) ‘patients’ (wide 
variability in compliance with management plans and follow-up); (iii) ‘out-of-
office coordination’ (obtaining investigation results and access to specialists); 
and (iv) ‘knowledge’ (misinterpretation of initial symptoms or having to acquire 
new information). However, the study participants were less likely to identify 
these four tempos when discussing the importance of time. 
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6.2.2 Lack of care continuity  
 
Participants explained continuity meant ensuring that relevant, correct 
information accompanied the patient throughout their journeys and that named 
clinicians were involved in their care.  Continuity was generally perceived as an 
important contributing factor to safe care. Conversely, a lack of continuity was 
perceived to negatively impact on patient safety, particularly during care 
transitions between health care providers and at the interface between different 
organizations. One participant explained: ‘I refer them [patients] to hospital. 
They see two different consultants [pause] it’s a system it’s a patient pathway 
but it doesn’t necessarily mesh like that. It could butt up against each other 
like that and that’s where the problems lie. They don’t know what I’m doing 
and I don’t know what they’re doing’ (GP04). 
 
Many participants were also concerned that care continuity was being eroded at 
a practice level, which they attributed to increasing workloads; patient 
expectations of same-day consultations; and use of locum staff. However, one 
participant felt continuity paradoxically decreased patient safety in some 
instances. She explained that: ‘sometimes it can be the other way. It can put a 
lot of demand on you because they know you’ (PN05). In response, clinicians 
might be more inclined to accede to the requests of the patients who are well-
known to them or try and fit in additional issues within a single consultation.   
 
6.2.3. Clinician-related factors 
 
Participants described a wide range of ‘clinician’ factors that may contribute to 
PSIs (Table 6.3). However, they recognised that some behaviours intentionally 
(for example violations) or unintentionally (for example assumptions) ensured 
patients received an effective and ongoing service despite distractions, 
competing priorities and having to deal with large workloads. What the 
participants were describing are clear examples of ‘efficiency thoroughness 
trade-offs’ (ETTOs), although they did not use this term. ETTOs and the ETTO 
principle are therefore important in relation to this study and will be discussed 
on page 166.  
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One of the more insidious clinician factors that was identified by some 
participants was ‘personalities’ in their teams. They used the word ‘personality’ 
euphemistically to explain how specific characteristics of some clinicians 
increased the risk of PSIs occurring in the practice. These characteristics 
included clinicians being afraid to ask for help; lacking insight about their own 
knowledge and skill deficiencies; interpersonal relationships and communications 
skills that made it challenging for others to raise concerns about potential safety 
threats with them.  
 
6.2.4. Patient-related factors 
 
The majority of participants – and especially the practice managers - felt the 
expectations of patients about their care, of GP practices and the NHS had 
increased to the point where it was difficult or impossible to meet. This feeling 
was compounded by the perception that some patients take very little or no 
responsibility for their own health, but also by the increasing clinical complexity 
and prevalence of multimorbidity. One practice manager described her 
perspective: ‘we are becoming an older generation. I think there’s more and 
more, three or four things that people are wanting to discuss, where you just 
can’t do that in ten minutes’ and then there is the additional workload of ‘all 
the paperwork that comes behind that as well’ (PM02).  
 
The clinicians reported struggling and often failing to effectively and safely 
manage the ‘shopping lists’ (PN08) of their patients in the ten minutes allowed 
for consultations. However, while some patients were perceived as ‘demanding’, 
participants acknowledged that the majority of patient requests and 
expectations were appropriate and that clinicians and practices were responsible 
for meeting them. 
 
The first four groups of contributing factors to PSIs the participants in this study 
identified (sections 6.3.1 through to 6.3.4) are comparable to those reported by 
clinicians in other health care settings and countries. Three of many possible 
examples are provided as evidence. The first example is a qualitative study 
conducted in the USA more than twenty years ago. The authors explored the 
recollections of family physicians (n=53) of their most memorable errors and the 
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perceived causes through in-depth interviews. Similar to this study, many 
different possible contributing factors (n=34) were considered, which the 
authors categorized into three groups: physician stressors and characteristics; 
process-of-care factors; and patient-related factors. Some of the more 
important, common and specific factors within these categories included 
distractions, ‘hurry’, lack of knowledge and premature closure of the diagnostic 
process (306).  
 
The second example is a survey of clinicians (n=848) working in outpatient 
settings in the USA that identified many cognitive and systems factors felt to be 
related to diagnostic errors. Some of the more common factors reported by 
clinicians were: inadequate knowledge, detection or perception of clinical 
problems; excessive workload; issues in relation to investigation and information 
systems; and patients’ lack of adherence to physician recommendations (110).  
 
The third example is the qualitative study by Slight et al about the perceived 
causes of prescribing and monitoring errors in English general practice. They 
identified seven high-level categories, each containing a number of error-
producing conditions. The categories are: the prescriber; the patient; the team; 
the working environment; the task; the computer system; and the primary-
secondary care interface (307).  
 
In addition to these well-known contributing factors to PSIs, the participants in 
this study also identified a fifth group, ‘chance’. 
 
6.2.5. Chance  
 
The vast majority of participants considered ‘chance’ or ‘luck’ to be the most 
important contributing factor to safe care or, alternatively, whether PSIs 
occurred and the resultant harm severity. One GP explained how ‘things that 
could have gone wrong but didn’t’ was because of ‘the grace of God and good 
luck’ (GP10). Consequently, many participants expressed feeling helpless and 
unable to prevent these types of PSIs in the future because, as another GP 
explained, ‘if she were to have that same day again, probably the same thing 
would happen again. It’s just a set of circumstances... you might be lucky, you 
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might be unlucky’ (GP02). However, all participants acknowledged that chance 
was not always implicated or the main contributing factor for every PSI.  
 
This perspective of PSIs may seem negative, pessimistic or fatalistic to some. 
However, given the vast majority of participants share this understanding about 
at least some PSIs, their perception should at least be acknowledged, and its 
veracity examined. If we accept for a moment that some PSIs truly occur by 
random chance, what type of method or improvement initiative could we 
propose that would be acceptable for clinicians? How do we best safeguard 
clinicians and patients alike? This issue will be considered further in section 6.5, 
from page 166.    
 
6.3. Existing improvement actions and potential for future interventions 
 
6.3.1. Existing improvement actions 
 
Participants were aware of many different formal and informal methods that 
could be used to help improve the standards of care they deliver. Table 6.4 lists 
specific examples of methods and verbatim quotes. The methods ranged in scope 
from small changes for a single patient to system-wide re-organisation of 
practice systems. For example, a practice nurse (PN04) was able to recollect 
three recent improvement actions she had undertaken: (i) covering the light 
bulbs and fixing in place the examination lamps to prevent them falling or 
shattering on patients during cervical screening tests; (ii) convincing her 
practice to procure a hydraulic bed to facilitate the physical examinations of 
disabled patients; and (iii) she had designed and implemented a protocol for 
travel vaccinations to standardize management. This finding, that many 
clinicians develop informal, unique and successful solutions to safety risks in 
their own working environments, are consistent with the literature (308). 
 
A significant minority of participants, and many from the practice nurse group in 
particular, perceived the active involvement of patients as an important 
approach to deliver high-quality, safe care. For them, patient involvement 
meant involving patients in their own management plans through shared 
decision-making, providing patients with clear information about their conditions  
157 
Table 6.4. Examples of improvement methods participants already used 
  
Action or method Selected verbatim quotes 
‘Formal’ actions 
Significant event 
analysis (SEA) 
We do significant events regularly... we will meet to 
discuss it (PM06) 
Clinical audit We do lots of audits around [access] and check that it’s 
still as good as we think it is, and we occasionally have to 
tweak the amount of triage (PM08) 
Protocols  Over the last few years with being a training practice we 
have tried to put a lot of protocols and systems in place 
to protect it (PN05)  
CPD, appraisal and 
revalidation 
Individually you are doing the best for the patient that 
you have and that is your responsibility, so there is a bit 
about professional development, CPD and maintaining 
your knowledge and recognising your weaknesses (GP08) 
‘Formal’ and informal actions 
Involving patients 
 
We’re calling it ‘complaints, comments and compliments’ 
and what we’re asking, we’ll go out regularly and speak 
to the patients and say ‘how do you feel about how we’re 
doing? Is there anything we can improve on?’ How do we 
know we’re completely safe? I think this is maybe a way 
of us checking are we doing enough (PM02) 
Informal actions 
Raising awareness of 
safety critical issues 
People are making others aware of what has happened 
and that is the way forward and we will just continue to 
do that, and hopefully we will get better and better at it 
(PM06) 
Sharing information / 
peer feedback 
I think being able to discuss things with my nursing 
colleague - on a Wednesday I start at one, we have an 
hour’s handover - I find that really useful (PN02) 
Mitigation, esp.  
pharmacists and patients  
I think there are lots of sources that stop us from falling 
short more of the time, to be honest (GP03) 
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and treatments, pro-actively planning for future events (e.g. exacerbations of 
their chronic conditions) and eliciting patients’ feedback about the standard of 
care they received. One practice nurse explained that when she’s consulting: 
‘you’re hoping that they’re [patients] going to give you a wee bit of feedback as 
well... they’re the first ones to say: ‘hey wait a minute!’ (PN07) 
 
Many participants recognised or referred to instances where PSIs or their impact 
had been mitigated. This happened through the intervention of a wide range of 
potential factors, but the most important were other practice team members, 
pharmacists and patients. In other words, ‘people’ were responsible for creating 
patient safety. Specific instances of mitigation were considered to occur mainly 
through chance, but the overall likelihood of mitigation increased when there 
was effective teamwork and communication in the practice. One participant 
described how: ‘there is a whole team, you know - GP, staff, pharmacists. If 
everybody works together as a team then these things can be resolved before 
they get to the critical stage’ (PM06). This issue will be considered again in 
Chapter 10. 
 
6.3.2. Potential for future improvement initiatives 
 
When asked to suggest high-priority patient safety areas for future intervention, 
the majority of participants identified two specific issues. The first issue was 
medication and medication-related processes. Participants were concerned 
about the very large volume of repeat prescriptions generated on a daily basis, 
usually by administrative team members, which were signed without review by 
GPs: ‘If you see the amount of repeat prescriptions that wait to be signed, it 
can be two inches thick [this] puts a lot of stress on the doctors, because then it 
becomes a machine. So all you’re doing is you’re signing through the 
prescriptions and not actually looking at the prescriptions. How safe is that?’ 
(PM02). For them, the implication was that more, and more thorough, 
medication reviews would be useful to help prevent PSIs. The perceptions of the 
study participants are consistent with the international literature that have also 
identified the management of repeat prescriptions as an ‘important source of 
risk’ (309).  
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The second issue was ensuring housebound patients receive the care they 
require. One participant described how ‘housebound chronic diseases get 
neglected’ because ‘you can tick a box to say they’re housebound so therefore 
you don’t have to achieve targets for them’ (PN08). A substantial minority of 
participants therefore thought it might be helpful to create nursing roles 
specifically aimed at providing care to these patients, similar to how public 
health nurses care for children or incentivizing practices to provide this service. 
A practice nurse explained: ‘if the funds were there, that would be a good idea’ 
(PN12).  
 
In addition to these two issues, a substantial minority of participants also 
suggested: improving the reliability of their clinical coding and computer 
software usability; reducing the number of interruptions during specific tasks by 
allocating protected time for staff; and collectively learning from PSIs.   
 
Despite recognising potential areas for improvement, the study participants 
unanimously agreed that they had no time, resources or spare capacity to 
consider implementing these suggestions, or any other new interventions. They 
also doubted whether any other team in the general practice setting could 
feasibly undertake any additional, unfunded work. Some participants also 
expressed concern that quality improvement interventions may increase 
workload and paradoxically decrease patient safety by reducing time to provide 
clinical care. One participant explained that this was why ‘it can be seen as 
hassle for some’ because ‘it takes us out from the day to day practice when I 
have still got other patients and normal work carries on’ (GP06).  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, most participants identified externally funded, 
additional clinician and staff time as the most important determinant of patient 
safety, and whether they would be able to implement additional improvements. 
One practice manager described that ‘what we need is another body in the 
practice who’ll see another hundred patients a week, which would make a 
tremendous difference’ because ‘it means they [admin staff] can get on with 
the safety aspects of downloading blood results instead of answering a patient’s 
phone call four times when one would do if we had appointments to give them’ 
(PM12).  
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A small minority of participants disagreed, and thought increasing staff levels 
could actually decrease patient safety. They reasoned that this would be 
because of loss of care continuity, increased use of locums and the likelihood 
that patient demand would keep outpacing any additional capacity. They argued 
that rather than employing additional staff, existing team members could work 
more efficiently instead: ‘what you need is a good dependable well trained staff 
rather than more bodies on the ground’ (PM06). 
 
Participants also recognised a need for additional training, new quality 
improvement tools and IT support if they were to successfully implement further 
improvements.  However, these factors were relatively less important than 
workload, time and resources. One practice manager made it clear that ‘we 
don’t have the money for the other options [time, staff] so therefore we’ll take 
the tool’ (PM11). This key finding is reflective of the wider patient safety 
literature. In a survey conducted by Sarkar et al in the USA clinicians provided 
open-ended recommendations to reduce diagnostic errors. The vast majority 
suggested addressing workload issues and time constraints, improving 
investigation management systems and strengthening collaboration and 
communication between different health care providers. A tiny minority (3%) 
cited ‘training opportunities’ as a potential improvement strategy (110).   
 
6.4. Participants’ perceptions of safety culture  
 
All participants thought culture was an important determinant of patient safety 
in their practice but also in the wider health care service. They understood 
culture as a dynamic and evolving construct and were able to provide many 
examples of how cultures in different parts of the health service interacted to 
produce positive, but also negative, outcomes for staff and patients (Table 6.5). 
However, all participants perceived the culture in their own practices and, with 
a few exceptions, other general practices in Scotland as conducive to safe care. 
They felt the overall culture in general practice was characterized by effective 
teamwork, communication and leadership, but that this was not necessarily the 
case for other parts of the health service. The sentiment of PN02 that ‘there’s a 
very open communicative atmosphere [and] we’re all fairly aware of the  
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Table 6.5. Examples of the potential effects (positive or negative) when 
different cultures interact in health care 
  
Providers Verbatim quote 
District nurses There was a little bit of a stand-off between the receptionists and 
the district nurses but I don’t think, you’re not going to resolve that 
(GP03) 
General Medical 
Council 
At some level there is the big bad witch called GMC that must have 
some impact actually, if you end up making a lot of errors... that is 
one driver for people to not end up in trouble with GMC (GP06) 
NHS Health 
Boards 
There is always this suspicion as well of Health Board managers. Real 
suspicion from a lot of GPs... that engagement that you can actually 
work together - they don’t believe that that is what is happening 
(GP08) 
Secondary care 
referrals 
I think a lot of the systems that have been put in place to improve 
the flow of information haven’t really done that well. They’ve done 
it on one level but what we used to have in place - the sort of 
personal relationships that we used to have between primary and 
secondary care - that’s all been broken down, but it’s not been 
replaced by anything so I see that as a real problem (GP09) 
New practice 
staff 
I think it’s hard when you come in somewhere new to you. You’ve 
worked a certain way before. There is a tendency to want to come 
in and change everything but you have to obviously respect other 
people’s working practices as well (GP02) 
Accident & 
Emergency 
departments 
A&E letters at the moment from [x] hospitals gives a disclaimer that 
drugs are not included in the letter which to me seems like a 
shocking admission in any kind of a clinical correspondence but we 
live with it, for the time being (GP01) 
Improvement 
initiatives (SPSP-
PC) 
These [GPs] are independent contractor communities. We have to 
engage with them on that basis. We can’t tell them what to do 
(GP04)  
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threats to patient safety’ was representative of the perceptions of the study 
participants. 
 
Participants also recognised that the prevailing culture is an important 
determining factor of any new initiative’s degree of success. One GP explained 
that an essential prerequisite for the successful implementation of change is to 
‘get the culture right’ so that ‘there’ll be an appetite for the tools’ (GP04). 
Another participant agreed ‘the fundamental thing is culture’. According to him 
the specific methods were secondary to the overall success of a venture: ‘you 
are just using the tools to try and emphasize and drive and direct people’ 
(GP06). The importance of culture will be considered again in Chapters 9 and 10. 
 
While participants were aware of culture changing over time, few were able to 
describe how or why these changes occurred.  A number of participants 
attributed a strong, positive safety culture simply to ‘luck’: ‘maybe we’re just a 
lucky practice because we all more or less sing from the same hymn sheet’ 
(PM08). However, one factor they felt did affect their culture (in a positive or 
negative way) was team members leaving or joining the practice: ‘we’ll have 
someone new in the practice and that kind of gives everyone a bit of a buzz 
really’ (PM08).  
 
The characteristics and personality traits of team members also affected the 
culture. Some team members – usually one of the GPs and/or the practice 
manager - seemed to have a disproportionally large impact on the prevailing 
culture. These team members strongly influenced the practice safety culture 
through their actions, examples and leadership. GP06 was one of many 
participants who was identified by his team as being influential and important to 
their culture. The following verbatim description of how he approached PSIs 
provides evidence of how he helped to build a positive and open culture: ‘if I 
haven’t done something correct, I have always first to be self effacing and fall 
on the sword and say: ‘that was my fault, I made that mistake. I apologize, how 
do we make it better from here?’ Also being accepting of when other people say 
‘oh this didn’t go quite right’ - I won’t be likely to hit them over the head with 
a stick about it. I would far rather that I knew about it and then you can adapt’ 
(GP06). The issue of leadership will be considered again in Chapter 10. 
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Many participants were aware that the culture in health care had changed over 
the years and continues to change. While some of the changes were incremental 
and barely perceptible at first, other changes had been more dramatic and 
rapid. For example, some participants described being aware of a prevailing 
‘blame and shame’ culture’ in health care for a long time, but how this had 
changed for the better in more recent times. One participant thought: ‘the 
culture within medicine is far more open than it used to be, and everybody 
knows that they make errors (GP06). Another participant described ‘a big 
culture shift’ in the willingness of clinicians to admit their errors and interpret 
them as ‘opportunities to learn and make positive changes’ (GP10). 
 
There is corroborating evidence for the perceptions participants had about the 
prevailing safety culture in general practice in Scotland and England. A safety 
culture survey of general practices in England with the ‘Competing Values 
Framework’ instrument just over a decade ago found the majority of teams had 
a ‘clan’ culture type, which is characterised by high levels of teamwork (310). 
For the last few years perceptions of safety climate in general practice have 
been measured annually in Scotland with SafeQuest, a validated 30-item 
questionnaire (170, 311). The quantitative survey data suggest the safety 
climate in primary care is generally positive, although a small minority of 
practices has significantly less positive perceptions of safety climate than the 
main group (41, 42, 170, 311).  
 
6.5. Different perspectives of the causes and contributing factors to PSIs 
 
This section describes four main perspectives about the contributing factors to 
PSIs in the international literature (296). They are that PSIs result from: (i) 
individual human errors; (ii) systems and technical failures; (iii) weak safety 
cultures; and (iv) Efficiency-Thoroughness-Trade-Offs (ETTOs). These 
perspectives were reflected in the wide range of patient safety experiences and 
perceptions reported by participants in this study. The practical importance of 
the different perspectives is that they strongly influence which type of 
improvement approach individuals and teams are likely to select.  
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6.5.1. Individual human error 
 
The first perspective of the causes and contributing factors to PSIs is that they 
are the product of individual human failures and errors. Human error is 
considered a natural phenomenon and an important mechanism through which 
we learn. The phrase ‘to err is human’ is well-known and recognises the 
existence of finite physiological (e.g. attention span, short-term memory) and 
psychological (e.g. resilience, motivation) resources that will eventually limit 
the ability of even the most skilled and talented human being to continue to 
function effectively and safely (312).  For example, an inexperienced, tired and 
hungry GP specialist trainee (GPST) working in a busy and unsupported practice 
and who is often interrupted is more likely to make a diagnostic or prescribing 
error than her well-rested and experienced colleague working in a supportive 
environment. 
 
The implications from this perspective are that all health care workers are 
susceptible to err; that the likelihood of error increases as the number of 
‘demands’ on finite human abilities increase; and that the frequency and types 
of clinical errors are largely predictable. From this perspective, the contributing 
factors to PSIs can be conceptualised as simple linear cause-and-effect models. 
A practical example is that interrupting a clinician causes a lapse in 
concentration which results in a diagnostic error (effect). These models 
implicitly or explicitly implicate health care professionals in PSIs and may 
inappropriately and sometimes unintentionally be used to justify the ‘blame and 
shame’ culture that still prevails in some health care organisations.   
 
There are at least three reasons why individual clinicians may be inappropriately 
blamed for certain PSIs. The first reason is that, from a legal perspective, it is 
easier to prosecute an individual than an organisation. The second reason is that 
disciplining individual employees are more convenient for some health care 
organisations than analysing and improving their systems. However, the third 
reason is arguably the most pervasive and important, yet also the most 
challenging to overcome. As individuals and societies we are psychologically 
predisposed to attribute blame for unfortunate events to those visibly and 
directly involved in them.  
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Two examples of psychological predispositions are: ‘hindsight bias’ and the ‘just 
world’ hypothesis.  Hindsight bias creates the ‘I-knew-it-all-along’ effect. This 
means knowledge of an action’s outcome makes warning signs appear more 
obvious and consequences more foreseeable than they were to those involved in 
the PSI (313). The ‘just world’ hypothesis is the (often unconscious) assumption 
that ‘bad’ things happen because of ‘bad’ people (312). Unfortunately, the 
reality is that it is often the ‘best’ people who make the worst errors as they are 
more likely to be performing the most difficult tasks (164). 
 
From the perspective of ‘human error’, certain improvement initiatives will 
appear more appropriate than others. Examples of interventions that are 
strongly associated with this perspective include: (i) continuous professional 
development (CPD), providing educational resources and promoting (or 
mandating) specific training activities; (ii) increasing professional regulation and 
implementing a revalidation system; (iii) taking disciplinary actions against 
individual clinicians who are involved in PSIs; (iv) incorporating human factors 
engineering in health care organisations; and (v) clinical decision support 
systems (109, 314). 
 
6.5.2. Systems and technical failures 
 
The second of the four patient safety perspectives is that health care systems 
and technical failures contribute to PSIs. Health care organisations consist of 
many highly complex systems, and even relatively straightforward and common 
processes have multiple, interacting steps (281).  The inherent active and latent 
safety risks in these systems and processes are often graphically depicted by the 
admittedly oversimplified metaphor of the ‘Swiss-cheese’ model (1). In the 
model the slices of cheese represent the various system defences between 
potential hazards and accidents.  The holes in the cheese represent active and 
latent errors in the system and the slices of cheese have to be visualized as 
being in constant motion.  The holes in the cheese rarely form a straight line of 
openings because at least one slice typically blocks the hazard from reaching 
patients.  PSIs occur when the holes in the slices of cheese temporarily align, 
which allows hazards to reach patients.  
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Systems and technical failures can be represented by linear models in which it is 
possible to identify simple, complex and cascading causes, contributing factors 
and outcomes (315). In other words, a PSI is conceived as the product of a series 
of events which occur in a specific and (retrospectively) recognizable manner. 
The model therefore allows some knowledge about the future which is 
conceptualized as a mirror image of previous events and conditions. The 
implication for patient safety is that some PSIs may be prevented by detecting 
and eliminating potential threats proactively and by designing, incorporating and 
strengthening health care system defences (316). From this perspective, 
examples of system defences may include: guidelines; protocols; automating 
processes or including visual reminders for clinicians; redundancies (e.g. 
additional steps or duplication of actions); and ‘forcing functions’ in software. 
 
6.5.3. Safety culture as a contributing factor to PSIs 
 
The third perspective about the causative and contributing factors of PSIs is that 
the prevailing safety culture in a health care team or organisation helps to 
determine whether they occur or not. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, 
organisations and teams with a positive and strong safety culture are more likely 
to learn openly and effectively from error and adapt their working practices 
appropriately when PSIs occur. Safety culture will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 10. 
 
6.5.4. Efficiency-thoroughness trade-offs  
 
The fourth perspective about the causes and contributing factors of PSIs are that 
they are the inevitable by-products of efficiency-thoroughness trade-offs 
(ETTOs).  ETTOs are the approximate performance adjustments individual 
clinicians make in order to manage expected and unexpected variability in their 
environments and tasks (317, 318). The effectiveness and appropriateness of 
ETTOs can only be evaluated retrospectively, once patient outcomes are known. 
The implication is that ETTOs are not intrinsically ‘right’ or ‘wrong’.  
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An example of the ETTO principle in general practice is the challenge of GPs to 
balance their available time between taking complete histories and performing 
thorough examinations, and offering appointments to all the patients who 
request them. Taking incomplete histories and conducting partial examinations 
would allow GPs to see more patients. This approach prioritises efficiency over 
thoroughness. Alternatively, GPs may decide to take complete histories and 
conduct full examinations (increased thoroughness) but will then be able to offer 
fewer appointments or have to work longer hours (decreased efficiency). The 
benefit of maximum efficiency is that more patients will receive at least some 
care. On the other hand, it may increase the risk of diagnostic errors and only 
the most pressing problems may be dealt with. The benefit of maximum 
thoroughness is that rare or dangerous clinical conditions are more likely to be 
identified. However, fewer patients will receive care and other, equally 
important tasks, may be neglected.  
   
The stark reality in present-day UK general practice is that resources and time 
are at best finite but more typically scarce. The information available to GPs 
with which to diagnose and plan care is always underspecified. This is because 
undifferentiated patient populations present with complex, diverse and often 
atypical symptoms and signs and medical records are often incomplete or 
unavailable.  To provide effective patient care despite the challenge of ever-
changing demands, clinicians have to make approximate adjustments to their 
performance. In other words, they have to adjust (consciously or unconsciously) 
the efficiency in relation to their thoroughness. The adjustments are based on 
their interpretations of the requirements of their patients and the available 
resources (of all types) at given points in time. It is ‘performance variability’ 
that allow clinicians to balance the demand for resources with what is actually 
available and possible to do in practice (319). The challenges inherent in this 
balancing act will be considered in detail in Chapter 10. 
 
From an ETTO perspective, performance variability is therefore not only 
considered normal, but necessary, and the origin of both successful and 
unsuccessful health care outcomes. The ETTO approach to improve patient 
safety is by learning from positive deviance and increasing the resilience of 
clinicians and systems (6, 319-321).  
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Conclusion  
 
This chapter began with a description of the perceptions of a range of general 
practice staff about the concept ‘patient safety’ in Section 6.1.  All participants 
considered safety to be an important and integral part of routine care. The vast 
majority also perceived it as impermanent and imperfect. However, they 
recognised an ethical and professional duty to continue to improve the standards 
of care in their practices and felt that there was potential to do so. The TRM 
should therefore be acceptable to the participants, as the main reason for its 
development was to provide frontline staff with a practical method to examine 
their own records in order to detect and learn from PSIs and identify and address 
latent safety threats in their systems and processes.  
  
Section 6.2 described five groups of factors participants identified as causing or 
contributing to PSIs. In addition, they identified medication and medication-
related processes and elderly, housebound patients as being particularly at risk 
for PSIs. Most participants perceived a proportion of PSIs as inevitable, and 
therefore not preventable. However, they unanimously agreed that many 
contributing factors and high-risk processes and systems are amenable to 
improvement efforts. The TRM is compatible with these perceptions as it 
recommends selecting high-risk patient groups and the predefined triggers are 
consistent with the contributing factors to PSIs.  
 
Section 6.3 listed a range of improvement methods the study participants were 
aware of or already using. The implementation of the TRM may potentially be 
facilitated through its association with some of these tools.  However, there is 
also the possibility that implementation may be hindered if participants are 
unable to differentiate the TRM from their existing tools. This issue will be 
explored in Chapter 9. The vast majority of participants also indicated that 
additional resources would be required as a critical prerequisite before they 
would consider participating in future improvement initiatives. This issue will be 
considered in Chapters 9 and 10. 
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Section 6.4 described the prevailing safety culture in general practice in 
Scotland, which was perceived as ‘positive’. The NPT work of ‘internalization’ is 
facilitated when interventions and practice cultures are compatible.  The TRM 
should therefore be of interest to clinicians and staff. This issue will be 
considered in more detail in Chapter 9.  
 
The final section described four different perspectives from the international 
patient safety literature about the contributing factors to PSIs. Each perspective 
helps to inform the selection of specific strategies to improve the safety of care. 
For example, the ETTO principle helps to explain the perception of many 
participants that some PSIs occur by ‘chance’, and suggest increasing the 
resilience of clinicians, systems and organisations.  
 
In summary, this chapter provided an overview of the perceptions study 
participants have about patient safety. More specifically, it described what 
participants perceived as important patient-safety related problems; whether 
they believed the issues were amenable to change and their responsibility to 
deal with; and what they were already doing about potential safety threats. It 
also considered the prevailing cultures in the practice teams as an important 
determining factor for successfully implementing complex health care 
interventions.  
 
The main findings are that the all participants considered patient safety an 
important and integral part of their ‘jobs’. They were aware of many 
predisposing factors to PSIs and conceded that there are potential improvements 
that could be made in their systems and procedures. The implications are that 
the TRM should be: acceptable to the study participants and compatible with 
their perceptions about patient safety; compatible with the prevailing cultures 
within the teams; and suitable for contextual integration in the general practice 
setting.  Chapters 7, 8 and 9 will present evidence in support of these 
assumptions.     
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Chapter 7. Main outcomes from implementing the TRM 
 
This chapter describes the results that relate to the study aim of determining the 
usefulness of the TRM by describing the outcomes from its implementation. The main 
source of data for this chapter was the Trigger Review Summary Sheets (SS). The data 
were analysed using the statistical methods described in Chapter 5.  
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 introduced the concept of complex health care interventions and their 
three main components: ‘actors’, objects’ and ‘contexts’. The results that were 
presented in the previous chapter mainly related to the ‘actor’ and ‘context’ 
components. This chapter will focus mainly on the third component – the 
‘object’, which in this study is the TRM - how it was enacted and the outcomes 
that resulted from this. From a NPT perspective, the main work that will be 
considered is that of ‘collective action’ and in particular its component of 
‘interactional workability’. In other words, how did the clinician reviewers apply 
the TRM, were they able to detect triggers and patient safety incidents (PSIs) 
and what actions (if any) did they subsequently take? 
  
This chapter has four main sections. The first section describes the 
characteristics of the clinician reviewers and participating general practices, the 
types of electronic patient records that were selected for review and the 
number of completed Trigger Review Summary Sheets (SS) that were submitted 
during the study period.  The second section lists the number and types of 
predefined triggers. The third section reports the number of detected patient 
safety incidents (PSIs) and their severity and preventability ratings. The 
different types of PSIs are then described and a preliminary classification of the 
main types is provided. In the fourth and final section of this chapter the actions 
and intended actions of the reviewers and their teams during and after the 
trigger reviews are discussed.  
 
Throughout this chapter the main findings are discussed when they are reported 
in order to raise a number of directly relevant issues and to compare them with 
the patient safety evidence-base where applicable. In addition, the main 
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findings are compared with the aggregated data from the general practices in 
three Scottish NHS Health Boards who implemented the TRM subsequent to this 
study as a Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) requirement for the financial 
year April 2013 to March 2014 (48). This data will henceforth be referred to as 
the ‘QOF study’ and provide additional context for interpreting and discussing 
the main findings of this study.  
 
7.1. Characteristics of clinician reviewers and trigger reviews  
 
7.1.1.Reviewers  
 
A total of 47 clinician reviewers participated in the study. The professional roles 
of the reviewers were: general practitioners (n=12), practice nurses (n=11), a 
community pharmacist (n=1), GPSTs (n=22) and a nurse practitioner (n=1). They 
were recruited through two different strategies, as described in Chapter 5. The 
first strategy recruited 26 clinician reviewers from ten NHS Greater Glasgow and 
Clyde (Health Board ‘A’ - HBA) and two NHS Ayrshire and Arran Health Board 
(Health Board ‘B’ - HBB) general practices and exceeded the initial aim of 
recruiting two reviewers from each of twelve practices. The characteristics of 
the twelve participating practices, the reviewers and the number of Trigger 
Review Summary Sheets (SS) they submitted are summarized in Table 7.1. 
 
Through the second strategy, 25 GPSTs from the West of Scotland region were 
recruited and all of them attended the Trigger Review training sessions. 21 (84%) 
of the participants subsequently implemented the TRM and submitted SS that 
were suitable for analysis. 
 
The reviewers were classified into three main groups according to their 
professional roles. They are: (i) a GP group (n=12); (ii) a GPST group (n=22); and 
(iii) a nursing group (n=12). The data from the community pharmacist’s reviews 
were included in the overall analyses but not in the group analyses.  
 
7.1.2. Trigger Review Summary Sheets  
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A total of 67 SS were submitted, comprising 1659 individual electronic patient 
records. Clinicians from the general practice teams reviewed 1139 individual 
patient records and submitted 46 SS (see Table 7.1). The West of Scotland GPST 
group reviewed 520 individual patient records and submitted 21 SS. A three-
month period was reviewed in each of 1659 individual electronic patient records.  
 
Data were recorded and summarized by the clinical reviewers along with their 
actions, intended actions, learning points and needs, reflections and feedback 
on the trigger review summary sheets (SS) that were provided. 
 
The expected total number of SS for the study had been 73 - 48 from the 
practice teams (four SS from each of the twelve practices) and 25 from the West 
of Scotland GPSTs (one SS per GPST). The overall response rates for submitted SS 
were therefore 91.8% (67/73), with response rates of 96% and 84% from the 
practice teams and GPST groups respectively. 
 
The evaluation of the subsequent implementation of the TRM as part of the QOF 
for the financial year from 2013 to 2014 involved analysis of 755 submitted SS. 
The SS summarized the findings from reviewing a total of 18826 individual 
patient records from three NHS Health Boards in Scotland. The overall response 
rate for the general practices from the three Boards could not be calculated 
from the available data, but the response rate for Health Boards ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
were 66.1% and 88.2% respectively. 
 
The response rate in this study was higher than in the QOF study. There are a 
number of possible reasons for this finding. The practices and most of the 
reviewers in this study were essentially a self-selected group who were highly-
motivated to implement the TRM. The vast majority of the practices and many 
of the reviewers had participated in previous research projects and improvement 
initiatives. The participants invariably described their prevailing culture as 
proactive and took pride in being ‘early adopters’. In addition, participants were 
offered one-to-one, tailored training in the use of the TRM at a time and place 
of their choice and had direct access to external ‘expert’ support. They were 
also offered a slightly more generous financial remuneration for their time. 
These facilitating factors will be considered in more detail in chapter 9.  
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Table 7.1. Characteristics of the participating general practices  
 
Practice 
no 
Patient 
list (n)* 
GPs in practice (n) 
Area 
Training 
practice  
Clinician 
reviewers (n) 
SS 
(n) Partners Other 
1 2100 1  - Suburban No 1 PN 
4 
      1 GP 
2 4300 3 1 salaried Urban Yes 1 PN 
4 
      1 GP 
3 3200 1 
1 salaried 
1 long-term 
locum 
Urban No 
1 PN 
1 GP 
4 
4 4100 3 1 Retainer Urban Yes 1 PN 
4 
      1 GP 
5 11000 8 - Suburban Yes 1 PN 
4 
      1 GP 
      
1 Nurse 
practitioner 
6 5900 4 1 Salaried Urban Yes 1 PN 
3 
      1 GP 
7 8200 7 - Urban Yes 
1 Community 
pharmacist 4 
      1 GP 
8 6800 3 2 Salaried Urban Yes 1 GP 
4 
      1 PN 
9 6400 3 1 Salaried Urban No 1 PN 
4 
      1 GP 
10 9900 6 1 Retainer Urban Yes 1 PN 
4 
      1 GP 
11 3000 4 1 Retainer Inner City Yes 1 PN 
4       1 GP 
      1 GPST 
12 7500 6 1 Salaried Urban Yes 1 GP 
3 
      1 PN 
All  72400 49    26 46 
*rounded to nearest 100 
Abbreviations: GP=General practitioner; PN=Practice nurse; GPST=GP specialty 
trainee; SS=Summary Sheet  
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7.1.3. Selection of patient records 
 
The vast majority of trigger reviews (57/67, 85.1%) were performed by applying 
the TRM to the records of the specific ‘high risk’ patient group that had been 
recommended, i.e. patients aged >75 years and with confirmed cardiovascular 
disease. Reviewers from the GP, nursing and GPST groups indicated selecting 
this high-risk patient group on 22/24 (91.7%), 15/19 (78.9%) and 18/22 (81.8%) SS 
respectively. The differences between the reviewer groups were not statistically 
significant (chi-square 1.518, DF=2, p=0.151). Examples of alternative patient 
groups the remaining reviewers selected were: ‘patients prescribed warfarin’; 
‘patients with COPD’; and ‘patients seen in consultation in March’. One reviewer 
expressed an interest in the management of patients with diabetes mellitus and 
therefore applied the TRM to a selection of records from that patient group.  
 
7.1.4. Review time  
 
The mean reported time reviewers in the study required to conduct a trigger 
review and complete a SS was 138.3 minutes (min), SD 48.3, range 60 to 240. 
The mean times of the GPST, nursing and GP groups were 148.4 min/SS (SD 49.6, 
range 60 to 240), 140.7 min/SS (SD 52.3, range 65 to 240) and 126.3 min/SS (SD 
46.7, range 70 to 240) respectively. The difference between the group means 
was not statistically significant (p=0.351, DF=2, Sum of squares 5159.8 and F-
ratio 1.068).  
 
An alternative way to quantify the reported time requirements would be that 
reviewers required, on average, approximately five minutes to review a single 
patient record. This is well short of the recommended maximum of 20 minutes 
per record. It is also considerably less than a trigger review study in ambulatory 
primary care in the USA in which reviewers required approximately 20 minutes 
to screen each record (322). However, the different study methods mean the 
results are not directly comparable.  
 
The mean time to conduct a trigger review and complete a SS for reviewers from 
the QOF study was 165.7 min (SD 62.1, range 30 to 300, n=656/755 SS). The 
difference of 27.4 min is significantly longer than reported by reviewers in this 
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study (p=0.001, T=3.3, df=712, 95% CI -43.8 to -11.0, standard error of 
difference 8.371). In other words, reviewers in this study spent on average 
approximately two hours conducting a trigger review and completing the 
associated SS, while reviewers in the QOF study reported taking about two and a 
half hours. It is unclear what the practical implication (if any) of this difference 
may be or the reason for it. One potential explanation may be the difference in 
training between reviewers in this study (face-to-face) and the QOF study (in 
groups). The reported difference intuitively seems small, but the issue of time 
(or lack thereof) was repeatedly and strongly identified as a key barrier to the 
implementation of the TRM.  This issue will be considered again in more detail in 
Chapter 9. 
 
A small minority of reviewers indicated requiring more than four hours to 
complete the trigger reviews. It is possible they may have overestimated the 
actual time required, but this seems unlikely as there were no formal or 
informal incentives or assessments associated with the duration of reviews. It 
seems more likely that this finding is reflective of the characteristics of 
individual reviewers. Alternatively, it may indicate the need for further training 
to re-emphasize that the TRM should be structured and focused. It is also 
possible that some trigger reviews, PSIs and further actions are more complex 
than others and therefore required additional time.   
 
7.2. Triggers 
 
Overall, a total of 1407 triggers were detected, with a mean of 21.0 per 
Summary Sheet (SD 13.7, range 0 to 66).  Reviewers from the QOF study 
detected a mean of 17.5 triggers/SS (SD 11.9, p=0.023). The GP, nursing and 
GPST groups detected a mean number of triggers of 24.3 (SD 15.1), 15.4 (SD 9.3) 
and 21.4 (SD 14.6) per SS respectively. The comparative differences between 
calculated means were not statistically significant (p=0.104). The most 
commonly detected trigger was ‘repeat medication item discontinued’ (n=290, 
mean 4.3/ SS, SD 4.4, range 0 to 18). The frequencies, proportions, means, 
standard deviations and comparison of means between groups and between this 
study and the QOF study are shown in Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2. Number, type and comparison of triggers detected by reviewers in this study and the QOF study  
Trigger 
This study 
QOF study Comparison of means 
Comparison of 
proportions GP Nursing GPST 
Comparison of 
means (ANOVA) 
Total* 
 
n (%) 
Mean 
(SD) 
n (%) 
Mean 
(SD) 
n (%) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Sum of squares, 
F-ratio (p-value) 
and DF=2 
n (%) 
Mean 
(SD) 
n (%) 
Mean 
(SD) 
t-value 
(p-value) 
and 
DF=820 
95% CI (Std 
error of 
diff) 
Difference in 
proportion (%), 95% 
CI, chi-square (p-
value) and DF=1 
               
>3 consultations  
74 
(12.7) 
3.1 
(3.2) 
40 
(13.7) 
2.1 
(2.3) 
121 
(25.7) 
5.5 
(6.2) 
128.1, 64.1 
(0.037) 
249 
(17.7) 
3.7 
(4.4) 
1348 
(10.2) 
1.9 
(2.5) 
5.2 
(<0.001) 
1.1 to 2.5 
(0.345) 
7.5, 5.5 to 9.7, 72,4 
(<0.001) 
New high priority 
clinical code  
128 
(22.0) 
5.3 
(3.9) 
55 
(18.8) 
2.9 
(2.5) 
75 
(16.0) 
3.4 
(3.5) 
71.3, 3.073 
(0.053) 
271 
(19.3) 
4.0 
(3.5) 
2185 
(16.6) 
3.1 
(3.1) 
2.3 
(0.025) 
0.1 to 1.7 
(0.400) 
2.7, 0.6 to 5.0, 6.421 
(0.011) 
Allergy read code  
19 
(3.3) 
0.8 
(1.7) 
12 
(4.1) 
0.6 
(1.0) 
22 
(4.7) 
1.0 
(1.1) 
1.6, 0.461  
(0.633) 
59 
(4.2) 
0.8 
(1.3) 
310 
(2.3) 
0.5 
(0.8) 
2.8 
(0.006) 
0.1 to 0.5 
(0.109) 
1.9, 0.9 to 3.1, 18.178 
(<0.001) 
Repeat medication 
item discontinued  
146 
(25.0) 
6.1 
(6.0) 
71 
(24.3) 
3.7 
(3.0) 
64 
(13.6) 
2.9 
(2.8) 
127.7, 3.429 
(0.039) 
290 
(20.6) 
4.3 
(4.4) 
2458 
(18.6) 
3.4 
(3.0) 
2.3 
(0.025) 
0.2 to 1.7 
(0.400) 
2.0, -0.2 to 4.3, 3.203 
(0.074) 
OOH / A&E 
attendance  
96 
(16.5) 
4.0 
(2.0) 
52 
(17.8) 
2.7 
(2.3) 
70 
(14.9) 
3.2 
(2.5) 
18.7, 1.817 
(0.171) 
229 
(16.3) 
3.4 
(2.8) 
2335 
(17.7) 
3.2 
(3.7) 
0.4 
(0.666) 
-0.7 to 1.1 
(0.463) 
1.4, -0.7 to 3.4, 1.626 
(0.202) 
Hospital admission  
75 
(12.9) 
3.1 
(2.0) 
34 
(11.6) 
1.8 
(2.0) 
66 
(14.0) 
3.0 
(2.6) 
21.2, 2.148 
(0.125) 
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(12.7) 
2.7 
(2.2) 
2461 
(18.7) 
3.4 
(3.7) 
1.5 
(0.128) 
-1.6 to 0.2 
(0.459) 
6.0, 4.0 to 7.8, 30.444, 
(<0.001) 
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Hb < 10  
8 
(1.4) 
0.3 
(0.5) 
4 
(1.4) 
0.2 
(0.5) 
19 
(4.0) 
0.9 
(1.4) 
6.1, 3.706 
(0.030) 
32 
(2.3) 
0.5 
(0.9) 
365 
(2.8) 
0.6 
(0.8) 
1.0 
(0.332) 
-0.3 to 0.1 
(0.103) 
0.5, -0.5 to 1.3, 1.008 
(0.315) 
Optional trigger(s)  
37 
(6.3) 
1.5 
(1.3) 
24 
(8.2) 
1.3 
(1.2) 
33 
(7.0) 
1.5 
(2.6) 
20.5, 0.081 
(0.923) 
99 
(7.0) 
1.5 
(1.8) 
1731 
(13.1) 
2.3 
(3.1) 
2.1 
(0.038) 
-1.6 to -0.0 
(0.384) 
6.1, 4.5 to 7.5, 42.663 
(<0.001) 
Total   583 
24.3 
(15.1) 
292 
15.4 
(9.3) 
470 
21.4 
(14.6) 
855.5, 2.352 
(0.104) 
1407 
21.0 
(13.7) 
13193 
17.5 
(11.9) 
2.3 
(0.023) 
0.5 to 6.5 
(1.535) 
 
*Includes data from a community pharmacist 
Abbreviations: OOH=out of hours; A&E=Accident and Emergency 
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There are at least two explanations why the ‘repeat medication item 
discontinued’ trigger was detected the most. The first is the relatively high 
incidence of polypharmacy and multimorbidity in the high-risk patient 
populations that were selected. The second reason is that during the study 
period a number of medication reconciliation initiatives were underway locally 
and involved the participating general practices. Two examples of medication 
changes that were being promoted at that time were: (i) decreasing the dose of 
simvastatin or prescribing an alternative lipid-lowering drug for patients 
concurrently prescribed amlodipine; and (ii) changing omeprazole to 
lansoprazole for those patients concurrently prescribed clopidogrel.  
 
The second most common trigger in this study (and the third most common in 
the QOF study) was ‘new high priority clinical code added’. This finding may 
indicate the increasing prevalence of chronic disease detection; the increasing 
workload of general practices; and the fact that coding clinical conditions have 
become a routine part of day-to-day work because of the QOF. From an NPT 
perspective, it would seem that coding has been ‘normalised’ through its 
contextual integration with QOF.   
 
The predefined trigger that was detected least in both studies was ‘haemoglobin 
(Hb)<10’ (n=32, mean 0.5/SS, SD 0.9, range 0 to 7). Reviewers were also 
encouraged during the training sessions to add the trigger ‘prescription of a non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID)’. The rationale for adding this trigger 
was that elderly patients and patients with heart disease are at increased risk of 
adverse drug events if prescribed NSAIDs. In fact, Morris et al previously found 
NSAIDs were the drug most commonly associated with adverse drug events in UK 
general practice (323). However, in this study the NSAID trigger was least 
detected. This finding may indicate a high level of awareness of this potential 
patient safety threat amongst the clinical workforce and might provide indirect 
evidence of improved, safer prescribing. 
 
Selecting the optimal number of pre-defined triggers was discussed in Chapter 3. 
Despite much research, the choice of triggers essentially remain at the 
discretion of researchers and reviewers and require reaching a compromise 
between the greater sensitivity afforded by more triggers and the improved 
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efficiency of fewer triggers. As a result, the numbers of triggers in different 
studies range from two (324), six (325) through to 72 (326). A study of 
preventable adverse drug events in primary care found the majority (60%) were 
detectable by four triggers only (323). In general practice, increasing the 
numbers of triggers may help to detect additional PSIs, but with variable and 
diminishing returns which are not commensurate with the increase in 
research/review effort this requires. Given that the intention of the TRM is to 
facilitate rapid record reviews, larger numbers of triggers may in fact decrease 
the effectiveness of this method.  
 
The overall number of triggers that arguably provide the best compromise 
between feasibility and likelihood of detecting PSIs seem to be approximately 
ten – at least for ambulatory and primary care settings. The overall number 
comprises a combination of ‘global’ (non-specific) and specific triggers. A 
practical example is Kaafarani and colleagues’ systematic development of a 
trigger tool for detecting adverse events in ambulatory surgery. Their study 
design used the ‘gold standard’ for trigger tool development and incorporated 
literature reviews, end-user preferences and expert opinion to derive ten 
triggers, half ‘global’ and half specific (327). A further example is Singh et al’s 
experience with a trigger tool for identifying adverse drug events among older 
patients in primary care. They found nine of their 39 triggers accounted for 
approximately 95% of the adverse drug events they detected (322).  
 
7.3. Patient safety incidents (PSI) 
 
7.3.1. Incidence of PSIs 
 
A total of 216 PSIs were detected and recorded by the clinicians in this study, 
with a mean of 3.2 PSIs per SS (SD 2.0, range 0 to 9). Reviewers in the QOF study 
recorded a total of 2753 PSIs, with a mean of 3.6 PSI/SS (SD 1.5, range 0 to 5). 
The difference in means between the two studies is statistically significant 
(t=2.0, df=840, standard error of difference=0.197, 95% CI -0.8 to -0.0, p=0.042). 
The GP, nursing and GPST groups respectively recorded: 75 PSIs (mean 3.1 
PSIs/SS, SD1.8, range 0 to 5), 46 PSIs (mean 2.4 PSIs/SS, SD1.9, range 0-5) and 
85 PSIs (mean 3.9 PSIs/SS, SD2.3, range 0 to 9). The differences between the 
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means of the three groups were not statistically significant (p=0.065). Selected 
examples of PSIs detected during the study are included in Tables 7.3 to 7.6.   
 
Five of the 67 Summary Sheets did not have any PSIs recorded (7.5%).  The 
number of SS without a PSI from the GP group (1/24, 4.2%), nursing group (3/19, 
15.8%) and GPST group (1/22, 4.5%) was comparable (p=0.289).  In the QOF 
study 32/755 (4.2%) of SS did not have a single PSI recorded. A comparison of the 
difference in proportions of SS without PSIs in this and the QQOF study were not 
statistically significant (Chi-square results: difference 3.3%, 95% CI -2.0 to 12.5, 
chi-square=0.892, DF=1 and p=0.345).  
 
The majority of participants agreed that ‘finding nothing’ is a potential barrier 
to the implementation of the TRM. This will be considered in more detail in 
Chapter 9.  For now, it is important to consider two different reasons why some 
reviewers may have failed to detect a single PSI.  The first reason is that there 
were no PSIs to detect in their random sample of records. This argument is 
supported by the fact that a similar, small proportion of reviews in both studies 
failed to produce any PSIs. The other reason is that reviewers did not recognise 
or report a PSI that was in fact detectable in the record. Without external or at 
least additional reviews of the same sample of records it is not possible to 
explore this option. From a purely personal perspective it seems likely that both 
reasons can be true. 
  
It is possible to express the number of detected PSIs in this study (216) as 
estimated rates, including: one PSI per 7.7 reviewed records; one PSI per 7.7 
patients; one PSI for every 23 months of documented care; or 13.0% of the 
patients whose records were reviewed. While the estimated incidence of PSIs in 
this study may help to inform our understanding of the safety of care in general 
practice, it is important to recognise that all rates have limitations. Rates are 
highly dependent on the numerator. If ‘PSIs’ had been replaced with alternative 
numerators such as ‘adverse drug events’ or ‘incidents of avoidable harm’ the 
estimated rates in this study would have been lower. Another limitation is that 
estimated rates are normally calculated for specific patient populations, in this 
case ‘high-risk, elderly patients’. They should therefore not be generalized to 
other patient groups and are not suitable for direct comparison with the 
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estimated rates of error and harm in other studies. The potential value and 
limitations of estimated harm rates are considered in detail in Chapter 10. 
 
7.3.2. Severity of PSIs 
 
The proportions of PSIs – as rated by reviewers in this and the QOF study as being 
of severity ‘1’ through ‘4’ - are shown and compared in Table 7.3. The severity 
of the majority of PSIs in this study were rated as ‘1’, i.e. having the ‘potential 
for harm’ (n=78 PSIs, 36.1%) or ‘2’, i.e. leading to ‘mild harm’ (n=75 PSIs, 
34.7%).  The minority of PSIs were rated ‘3’ or ‘4’, i.e. judged to have caused 
‘moderate’ or ‘severe harm’ (n=63 PSIs, 29.2%). 
 
There was no significant difference in proportions of the ratings of PSI severity 
between this study and the QOF reviewers (chi-square 3.924, DF=3, p=0.2698).  
However, the severity ratings of PSIs between the three different reviewer 
groups in this study were significantly different (chi-square 21.259, DF=6, 
p=0.002). The GPST group rated fewer PSIs as having a severity of ‘1’ (potential 
for harm) and were more likely to rate PSIs as ‘3’ (moderate harm) or ‘4’ 
(substantial harm) compared with the GP and nursing groups. 
 
The key finding is therefore that the majority of detected incidents have low-to-
moderate severity or are ‘near misses’. This finding is consistent with the 
international general practice patient safety literature and independent of the 
research method (33-35). Two further practical examples are provided. The first 
example is a study of medication errors reported by family practice teams in the 
USA. A minority (16%) of errors resulted in adverse drug events. The authors 
used a 5-point scale to rate the severity of adverse events: (i) ‘did not reach the 
patient’ – 41%; (ii) ‘reached patients but did not require monitoring’ – 35%; (iii) 
‘required monitoring’ – 8%; (iv) ‘required intervention’ – 13%; and (v) ‘resulted in 
hospitalization’ – 3% (76).  
 
182 
Table 7.3. PSI (n) severity and preventability ratings recorded by reviewers 
R
a
ti
n
g
 s
c
a
le
 
Scale item description Selected examples of PSIs from study 
This study 
QOF 
study 
n (%) 
Comparison of proportions 
GP 
n (%) 
Nursing 
n (%) 
GPST 
n (%) 
All* 
n (%) 
Difference in proportion (%), 
95% CI, chi-square (p-value) 
and DF=1 
 Severity        
1 Any incident with the 
potential to cause harm 
Diagnostic read codes from hospital 
discharge (aortic stenosis, postural 
hypotension and osteoarthritis) were 
added to record, but with low priority, so 
not present on summary  
35 
(46.7) 
21 
(45.7) 
19 
(22.4) 
78 
(36.1) 
1090 
(40.4) 
4.3, -2.7 to 10.9, 1.366 
(0.243) 
2 Mild harm, inconvenience, 
further follow-up or 
investigation to ensure no 
harm occurred 
Verapamil stopped as could have been 
causing constipation, exacerbating 
underlying gastro-intestinal problems 
25 
(33.3) 
17 
(37.0) 
29 
(34.1) 
75 
(34.7) 
788 
(29.2) 
5.5, -1.1 to 12.5, 2.645 
(0.104) 
3 Moderate harm: required 
intervention or duration for 
longer than a day 
A delay in monitoring after an increased 
dosage of nephrotoxic medicine leading to 
a significant decrease in renal function 
with increased monitoring requirements 
8 
(10.7) 
1 
(2.3) 
19 
(22.4) 
31 
(14.4) 
454 
(16.8) 
2.4, -3.2 to 7.0, 0.667 
(0.414) 
4 Prolonged, substantial or 
permanent harm, including 
hospitalisation 
Delayed diagnosis of ischaemic heart 
disease led to avoidable admission 
7 
(9.3) 
7 
(15.2) 
18 
(21.2) 
32 
(14.8) 
367 
(13.6) 
1.2, -3.5 to 6.8, 0.153 
(0.696) 
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 Preventability        
1 
Not preventable and 
originated in secondary care 
77 year old with IHD and paroxysmal AF 
admitted to hospital for elective 
pacemaker insertion.  Post procedure, 
required two courses of antibiotics and 
repeated contacts with GP surgery due to 
medication side effects and slow recovery 
6 
(8.1) 
7 
(16.7) 
5 
(5.9) 
20 
(9.6) 
379 
(14.2) 
4.6, -0.4 to 8.5, 3.044 
(0.081) 
2 
Preventable and originated in 
secondary care OR not 
preventable and originated in 
primary care 
Elderly patient did not have her vitamin 
B12 injection in over 6 months. The 
receptionist contacted the patient’s 
daughter and asked her to make an 
appointment, but this was never done 
23 
(31.1) 
7 
(16.7) 
41 
(48.2) 
74 
(35.6) 
995 
(37.3) 
1.7, -5.5 to 8.5, 0.172 
(0.679) 
3 
Potentially preventable and 
originated in primary care 
Failure to initiate prophylactic treatment 
for or follow up a patient with gout 
resulted in a hospital admission 
20 
(27.0) 
15 
(35.7) 
22 
(25.9) 
59 
(28.4) 
732 
(27.4) 
1.0, -5.3 to 7.9, 0.0532 
(0.818) 
4 
Preventable and originate in 
primary care 
Patient given inappropriate dosages of 
anti-diabetic medication with resultant 
renal injury 
25 
(33.8) 
13 
(31.0) 
17 
(20.0) 
55 
(26.4) 
562 
(21.1) 
5.3, -0.8 to 12.0, 2.907 
(0.088) 
*Includes a community pharmacist 
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The second example is a mixed-method study of adverse events in general 
practice in the Netherlands. Adverse events were detected prospectively by GPs 
and through a retrospective record review. Approximately half of the events 
were not associated with any harm, which is comparable with a severity rating 
of ‘1’ in this study. Approximately a third of the detected adverse events led to 
worsening of symptoms (severity ratings ‘2’ and ‘3’) while a few resulted in 
hospital admissions (severity rating ‘4’). However, the majority of events were 
associated with the risk of harm (328).  The implication of these findings is 
therefore that improvement efforts in general practice should focus on reducing 
the risk from avoidable PSIs irrespective of the severity of harm associated with 
them.    
 
There are at least three reasons why the TRM is more likely to detect PSIs 
associated with no or mild harm rather than with moderate or severe harm in 
general practice. The most obvious reason is that there may simply be fewer 
incidents associated with moderate to severe harm to detect. The second reason 
is that trigger reviews are conducted on relatively small samples of records and 
focus on specific periods of care only. The potential windows through which PSIs 
may be detected are therefore relatively narrow. The third reason is that more 
serious incidents are less likely to go undetected. Depending on the severity of 
harm patients experience, they may re-present to the practice, attend accident 
and emergency, be admitted to hospital or make formal complaints, thereby 
alerting clinicians of a potential problem.  
 
Even in those few instances when PSIs with moderate to high severity are 
detected in general practice, they often originate in secondary care. Three 
clinical examples would be: patients presenting to their GP with urinary sepsis 
after being discharged from hospital with an indwelling catheters; patients 
presenting to their GP with phlebitis after intravenous cannulation during their 
hospital admissions; and patients with post-operative wound infections 
presenting to primary care clinicians.  This does not necessarily imply that the 
majority of hospital-related PSIs have serious consequences for patients. The 
proportions of detected PSIs associated with moderate to severe harm may be 
relatively higher in hospitals than in general practice when the results of 
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individual trigger reviews are compared. However, the majority of hospital PSIs 
is still associated with low to moderate harm. A practical example is Forster et 
al’s study to detect adverse events in an obstetric service through trigger-based 
clinical surveillance. They found serious adverse events occurred ‘infrequently’ 
and there were no instances of permanent harm or death. However, they 
commonly found ‘quality problems’ which they felt could (and should) be 
addressed (326).  
 
In other words, the perceived severity of PSIs should not (and do not) 
automatically correlate with their usefulness in relation to informing subsequent 
improvement actions. Despite the relative low impact of the majority of PSIs, 
they still provide many opportunities to tackle issues that can be addressed by 
the practice team or a clinician reviewer (326, 329). However, many participants 
associated more severe PSIs with relatively higher importance and usefulness. 
From an NPT perspective this issue has to be addressed by doing the work of 
coherence in order for clinicians to understand that the value of PSIs should be 
measured by their potential to inform subsequent improvement actions rather 
than the severity of harm associated with them. This work was performed to 
some degree through the TRM training sessions. Still, participants’ perceptions 
of the importance of the severity of PSIs strongly influenced the implementation 
of the TRM and will be discussed in more detail in chapter 9.  
 
7.3.4. Preventability of PSIs 
 
The potential preventability of detected PSIs ranging from ‘1’ through ‘4’ - as 
rated by the reviewers in this and the QOF study - are shown and compared in 
Table 7.3. The preventability of 8 (3.7%) PSIs were not rated. 114 PSIs (54.8%) 
were rated by the reviewers in this study as being preventable or potentially 
preventable, compared with 1294 PSIs (48.5%) in the QOF study. There was no 
significant difference in the proportions of preventability between the studies 
(chi-square 5.745, DF=3, p=0.125).  However, the ratings of PSI preventability of 
the three different reviewer groups in this study were significantly different 
(chi-square 16.300, DF=6, p=0.012). The GPST group were less likely to consider 
PSIs as being preventable or potentially preventable compared with the GP and 
nursing groups. The key finding from both studies is therefore that 
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approximately half of all detected PSIs may be preventable. This seems to be a 
consistent finding in the international literature in different health care settings 
(33-35).  
 
The importance of the concept of ‘preventable’ harm was previously discussed 
in Chapter 2. This is a critical and often overlooked issue in the patient safety 
literature: unfortunately but inevitably some patients will be unavoidably 
harmed as a result of their interactions with healthcare for a range of highly 
complex reasons. The key focus from the perspective of patients and clinicians 
should therefore be detecting and learning from those incidents which are 
judged to be preventable.   
 
A literature review published after this study had commenced found there is still 
insufficient empirical evidence to support a specific definition of ‘preventable 
harm’. However, the most common definition is the ‘presence of an 
identifiable, modifiable cause of harm’ (55).  The authors suggest three ordinal 
categories for the degree of preventability: ‘definite’, ‘probable’ and 
‘plausible’. These categories seem intuitively sensible and may prove to be more 
sensitive and useful compared with the two categories (‘preventable’ and 
‘potentially preventable’) that were provided in the trigger review template in 
this study. However, the intrinsic challenges of subjectivity and inter-rater 
reliability are arguably more important than the type of rating scale reviewers 
use (330).     
 
The basic preventability rating scale used in this study was specifically 
developed to assist participants in making professional judgements, e.g. whether 
identified PSIs had modifiable causes. The rating scale also encouraged them to 
consider whether it was feasible for them to address modifiable causes, hence 
the distinction between ‘originate in secondary care’ and ‘originate in primary 
care’. Consequently, PSIs rated as ‘3’ or a ‘4’ were more likely to be amenable 
to corrective actions.  
 
It is unclear whether the relatively small differences in PSI severity and 
preventability ratings between reviewer groups in this study had a discernible 
impact on their subsequent actions. The difference between the preventability 
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ratings of the GPST group and the other two clinical groups in this study is 
consistent with their severity ratings and may therefore be a consequence of 
applying the rating systems to different PSIs, rather than indicative of disparate 
interpretations of key concepts. In general, more severe PSIs (as detected and 
rated by the GPST reviewers) tend to be associated with secondary care. From a 
general practice perspective, the corresponding preventability rating of ‘2’ 
signals that, even if modifiable causes could be identified, it is unlikely for 
primary care to feasibly address them. However, the potential importance of 
reviewer characteristics, e.g. number of years of clinical experience, and 
differences in TRM training on the reliable application of the rating scales should 
also be considered and may be a focus for future research. 
 
7.3.5. Classification of PSI types 
 
The iterative development of a preliminary classification system for the 
different types of detected PSIs was described in Chapter 5. The nine types of 
PSIs are: (1) medication and medication-related activities; (2) communication 
and correspondence; (3) record keeping and coding; (4) care monitoring, access 
and continuity; (5) diagnoses; (6) medical equipment including IT; (7) 
investigations; (8) healthcare acquired infections (HAI); and (9) insufficient 
information to classify. The proportions of each of the different types of PSI are 
shown and compared in Table 7.4. There were significant differences between 
the proportions of PSIs detected by the reviewers from this and the QOF study 
for the following types: care monitoring, access and continuity (p=0.004), 
diagnoses (p<0.001) and ‘unclear’ (p<0.001). 
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Table 7.4. Preliminary classification of types of PSIs (n) 
 
PSI types Selected examples of PSIs from this study, taken verbatim from 
the submitted Trigger review summary sheets 
This study 
n (%) 
QOF 
study (2 
Boards) 
n (%) 
Comparison of 
proportions 
 Difference in proportion 
(%), 95% CI, chi-square (p-
value) and DF=1 
     
Medication Two different strengths of co-codamol prescribed for patient. [Also] 
on repeat NSAID - elderly patient with renal impairment. 
88 
(40.7) 
650 
(34.7) 
6.0, -1.0 to 13.2, 2.795 
(0.095) 
Communication Bisoprolol increased from 5mg to 10mg at admission. Medication not 
altered on repeat script. Increase NOT highlighted by secondary care 
(and CCU and Ward doctors different [doses]) 
12  
(5.6) 
108 
(5.8) 
0.2, -3.9 to 3.1, 0.0012 
(0.972) 
Record keeping and coding Same diagnosis recorded twice, discharge letter filed 3 times with 
different dates - potential for confusion regarding dates 
18 
(8.3) 
145 
(7.7) 
0.6, -3.0 to 5.3, 0.0316 
(0.859) 
Care monitoring, access and 
continuity 
Elderly lady with heart failure on ramipril. Bloods not done for 2 
years. Letters sent but not attended 
55 
(25.5) 
324 
(17.3) 
8.2, 2.3 to 14.8, 8.223 
(0.004) 
Diagnoses  Chest x-ray ‘non-specific opacity’ - repeat in two months. Patient 
presented one week later with nausea, then dysphagia. Oesophageal 
CA. Died. 
16 
(7.4) 
46 
(2.5) 
4.9, 1.7 to 9.3, 14.307 
(<0.001) 
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PSI types Selected examples of PSIs from this study, taken verbatim from 
the submitted Trigger review summary sheets 
This study 
n (%) 
QOF 
study (2 
Boards) 
n (%) 
Comparison of 
proportions 
 Difference in proportion 
(%), 95% CI, chi-square (p-
value) and DF=1 
     
Investigations Unlabelled specimen bottle sent for FBC check 6 
(2.8) 
54 
(2.9) 
0.1, -3.2 to 2.1, 0.0173 
(0.895) 
Medical equipment including IT Female patient age 88, terminal Ca. Problems with syringe driver. No 
number for district nurses. Pump alarming - unable to fix 
2 
(0.9) 
15 
(0.8) 
0.1, -0.9 to 2.5, 0.0603 
(0.806) 
Insufficient information to 
classify PSI 
Anaemic - required transfusion 17 
(7.9) 
512 
(27.4) 
19.5, 14.6 to 23.3, 37.857 
(<0.001) 
Healthcare acquired infection 83 year old developed chest infection and cellulitis after discharge 
from [hospital] post hip dislocation 
2 
(0.9) 
18 
(1.0) 
0.1, -2.3 to 1.1, 0.0495 
(0.824) 
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7.3.6. Medication-related PSIs 
 
The majority of detected PSIs were of the ‘medication’ type in both this (n=88 
PSIs, 40.7%) and the QOF study (n=650 PSIs, 34.7%). A selection of the ten most 
common types of medications implicated in PSIs and their relative frequencies 
are shown in Table 7.5. The most common medication involved in this and the 
QOF study was Warfarin and seven of the top ten medications were the same in 
both studies. The key findings of this study are consistent with the international 
literature: the most common types of PSIs in general practice are related to 
medication and medication-related processes; and a small number of 
medications are associated with the majority of medication-related adverse 
events (77, 78, 83, 87, 88). A systematic review of the international literature 
(n=19 studies) was recently conducted to study the incidence of inappropriate 
medication prescribing (IMP) to elderly patients in primary care (331). The 
authors found a median rate of IMP among the elderly of 20%. The four most 
commonly prescribed inappropriate medications were from the following groups: 
analgesia (propoxyphene, a type of NSAID); antihypertensives (doxazosin); anti-
histamines (diphenhydramine); and anti-depressants (amitriptiline). The 
availability of these drugs differs widely between countries and the findings can 
therefore not be directly generalized to Scotland. However, it is striking that six 
of the ten types of medications identified as high-risk in this study also belong to 
the analgesia and antihypertensive groups. 
 
7.4. Actions and intended actions of the reviewers and practice teams 
 
This section describes the actual and intended actions of reviewers and their 
practice teams as a result of the trigger review process. These actions can be 
divided into two distinct groups, depending on their temporal relation to the 
trigger reviews. The first group includes any action that was undertaken while 
the trigger reviews were being conducted. These types of actions do not 
necessarily require detection of PSIs. For example, a clinician reviewer may have 
updated the clinical codes for a patient while reviewing the record or clarified a 
clinical entry. The second group includes actions intended or undertaken after 
the trigger reviews were concluded.  These actions typically required detection 
of one or more PSIs. 
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Table 7.5. The 10 most common medications associated with PSIs  
Medications  Selected examples of PSIs from this study, taken verbatim from 
the submitted Trigger review summary sheets 
This study 
QOF study  
(2 Boards) 
Comparison of 
proportions 
n (%) Rank n (%) Rank 
Difference in proportion 
(%), 95% CI, chi-square 
(p-value) and DF=1 
‘Top 10’ medications, This study      
Warfarin  Patient’s INR > 5 after Warfarin dose changed. Patient unsure of what 
dose he was meant to take and didn’t know what he had been taking 
10 
(11.2) 
1 
139 
(19.5) 
1 
8.3, -0.6 to 14.8, 3.075 
(0.080) 
Calcium Channel Blockers Ankle swelling secondary to amlodipine. No allergy coded 9 
(10.1) 
2 
13 
(1.8) 
13 
8.3, 2.8 to 16.6, 17.555 
(<0.001) 
ACE / ARB Trial of ramipril 1.25mg started. Patient already on ramipril 10mg 
which had been withheld but not discontinued on repeats. Nurse at 
an appointment printed 1.25mg from ‘acutes’ and also all repeats, 
including Ramipril 10mg. Patient noticed and called for advice 
8 
(9.0) 
3 
45 
(6.3) 
7 
2.7, -2.7 to 10.9, 0.549 
(0.459) 
Diuretics Diuretics discontinued completely instead of dose reduced 7 
(7.9) 
4 
47 
(6.6) 
5 
1.3, -3.8 to 9.2, 0.0561 
(0.813) 
NSAIDs, including aspirin Chronic cardiac failure admission. Had been getting as required 
diclofenac. Apparently told that prn ok by cardiology. May have 
exacerbated underlying heart failure 
6 
(6.7) 
J5 
52 
(7.3) 
4 
0.6, -7.0 to 5.3, 0.000122 
(0.991) 
B-blockers Given atenolol 100mg by chemist instead of allopurinol 100mg. 
Already on metoprolol - felt unwell. Checked by GP stopped himself 
6 (6.7) J5 
15 
(2.1) 
12 
4.6, 0.2 to 12, 4.896 
(0.027) 
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Opiates, e.g. codeine, 
morphine, tramadol 
Injured back - was given co-codamol.  Co- codamol made her sick. 
5 (5.6) J7 
27 
(3.8) 
J8 
1.8, -2.3 to 8.9, 0.281 
(0.596) 
DMARDs including 
methotrexate 
Female patient age 76. GP discovered her medication had not been 
collected for 5 months. This was missed when patient attended for 
routine monitoring bloods. Resulted in flare up of arthritis. Pt 
stopped due to side effects which could have been easily treated 
with an additional tab. 
5 (5.6) J7 
78 
(11.0) 
2 
5.4, -1.9 to 9.9, 1.930 
(0.165) 
Antidepressants and 
antipsychotics 
Prescribed citalopram when already on sertraline. GP did not check. 
Patient did not start and phoned her usual GP 
5 (5.6) J7 
20 
(2.8) 
10 
2.8, -1.3 to 9.9, 1.233 
(0.267) 
HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors 
(statins) 
Patient with GI upset following prescription of simvastatin. Adverse 
reaction to simvastatin not coded and simvastatin restarted 18 
months later as patient’s cholesterol noted to be elevated at CHD 
annual review. 
4 (4.5) 10 9 (1.3) J15 
3.2, -0.3 to 9.9, 3.203 
(0.074) 
‘Top 10’ medications, QOF study      
Unspecified Ordering medication every month and getting 2 months' supply. Why 
has no-one noticed this, and why has the pharmacist not noticed this? 
2 (2.2) J12 
56 
(7.9) 
3 
5.7, -0.2 to 8.7, 3.015 
(0.083) 
Antibiotics Diarrhoea following antibiotic treatment for chest infection. This 
worsened haemorrhoids. Had further 2 courses in Nov & Dec. 
Referred to surgeons for haemorrhoids 
2 (2.2) J12 
46 
(6.5) 
6 
4.3, -1.6 to 7.1, 1.880 
(0.170) 
Oral anti-diabetic drugs Proteinuria as code, taking incorrect glicazide and metformin dose. 
2 (2.2) J12 
27 
(3.8) 
J8 
1.6, -4.2 to 4.2, 0.212 
(0.645) 
*Abbreviations: INR=international normalised ratio; ACE=Angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors ; ARB=Angiotensin II receptor blockers ; NSAID=Non-steroidal 
anti-inflammatory drugs ; DMARD=Disease-modifying anti-rheumatic drugs ; J=Joint. 
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7.4.1. Actions undertaken during trigger reviews 
 
Clinicians in this study indicated undertaking specific actions relating to patient 
care and practice processes in 44/63 SS (69.8%). Reviewers in the GP, GPST and 
nursing groups indicated performing one or more actions while conducting 
reviews in 21/24 (87.5%), 11/20 (55.0%) and 12/19 (63.2%) SS respectively. The 
differences are statistically significant (Chi-square statistic 13.431, DF=2, 
p=0.001). 
 
Reviewers in the QOF study recorded undertaking one or more actions during the 
trigger reviews in 654/755 (86.6%) of the SS. This is comparable to the GP group 
in this study but significantly more than the nursing and GPST groups (difference 
in proportions=16.8%, 95% CI 5.6 to 29.9%, Chi-squared 11.787, DF=1 and 
p<0.001). Essentially all reviewers in the QOF study were GPs, which is probably 
why their proportions of actions undertaken during reviews were comparable 
with those of the GP group in this study.  
 
The implication of this finding is that GP reviewers are more likely than other 
clinical groups to take some kind of action relating to patient care during trigger 
reviews. This is understandable as GPs would typically have more clinical 
autonomy and a wider range of responsibilities for care delivery compared with 
GPSTs and practice nurses. It should be recognised though that GPST and nurse 
reviewers are able to make meaningful contributions to improvement efforts as 
borne out by the fact that more than half of them reported taking some patient 
care related action while conducting their reviews. However, at the very least 
this finding raises the question of who ideally should be performing trigger 
reviews in general practice to help maximize its potential for improving care. 
This question will be considered again in Chapters 9 and 10. 
 
The actions reviewers undertake during trigger reviews can be classified into one 
of four main types, depending on whether they relate to: (i) record keeping and 
coding; (ii) medication; (iii) communication, e.g. with the patient, carers or 
other health care providers and could be telephonic, face-to-face or via 
correspondence; and (iv) providing or arranging additional care such as 
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investigations or consultations. Each of these has a number of more specific 
actions that are summarized and illustrated with selected quotes in Table 7.6. 
 
7.4.2. Actions and intended actions after trigger reviews  
 
A total of 203 specific actions were taken or intended by reviewers and their 
practice teams after the trigger reviews were completed.  These actions were 
typically prompted by the PSIs they detected. A mean of 3.1 actions or intended 
actions were taken or intended after completion of each trigger review in this 
study (SD 4.2, n=65/67, range 0 to 27).  The means for the GP, nursing and GPST 
groups were 2.7 (SD 3.1, n=24/24, range 0 to 12), 1.8 (SD 1.8, n=19/19, range 0 
to 7) and 5.2 (SD 6.0, n=20/22, range 0 to 27). The differences in group means 
were statistically significant (DF=2, sum of squares 123.2, mean squares = 61.6, 
F-ratio = 3.837 and p=0.027s) with post-hoc tests finding significant differences 
between the GPST and GP (p=0.046) and GP and nursing (0.012) groups. The 
specific types of actions undertaken after the trigger reviews are summarized 
and compared in Table 7.7.  
 
Reviewers and practice teams from the QOF study indicated taking or intending 
to take a total of 3124 actions after completing their trigger reviews, with a 
mean of 4.1 actions or intended actions per trigger review (SD 3.4, n=755/755, 
range 0 to 21). This was significantly more than in this study (difference of 
means=1.0, standard error 0.45, 95% CI 0.1 to 1.9, t-value 2.230, DF=818, 
p=0.026).  
 
However, there were no statistically significant differences when each specific 
action is compared, apart from ‘discuss with educational supervisor’, which is 
expected, given this study had a much larger proportion of GPST reviewers than 
the QOF study. The difference in reported actions between the two studies can 
be partly explained by small but potentially significant adaptations that were 
made to the SS between this study and the subsequent QOF study. The 
additional option of ‘other’ was added in ‘step two’ of the SS and the ‘discuss 
with educational supervisor’ was changed to ‘formal submission of incident’ in at 
least one Health Board. In other words, reviewers in the QOF study had more 
options to record their actions or intended actions. However, it is unclear
195 
Table 7.6. The types of actions reviewers undertook during trigger reviews  
 
Main type of action  Specific examples of actions Selected quotes from Trigger Review SS 
   
Record keeping and 
coding 
Update coding (disease registers, QOF, medical 
history of clinically important procedures and 
diagnoses) 
Low priority codes from recent discharge were upgraded to ‘active’ so they are 
present on the patient summary (GP02) 
Add code 'deteriorating renal function' to patient (with declining eGFR) record (PN01) 
Correct coding / records Duplicate code removed (GP11) 
Add a clinical entry, allergy or set a task ‘reminder’  Coded [that] ACE-inhibitor not tolerated (GP05) 
   
Actions related to 
medication  
Changes to medication items (commence new drugs, 
change or discontinue current drugs)  
A handwritten note from secondary care outpatient clinic was overlooked. Request to 
start vitamin D as adcal D3 not tolerated. Contacted pharmacy to see what 
cholecalciferol preparations are available and commenced [patient] on it (GP02) 
I changed a patient’s antidepressant and added it to his repeat script. Chemist and 
patient notified to avoid confusion (GP03) 
 Perform medication reviews Medication reviews carried out on all patients reviewed (GP08) 
Two medication reviews updated (GP04) 
Medication reviews done / medication adjustments made (GPST9) 
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Communication 
(monitoring, 
clarification, review, 
education) 
Clarify management plan and responsibilities with 
other health care workers, including secondary care 
Patient contacted about INR – district nurses requested to do [patient’s] fasting 
glucose (PN02) 
Clarify patient understanding of management plan NSAID on repeat [despite] myocardial infarction - looks like patient taking it, but not 
actually, so stopped: confirmed with phone call (GP07) 
 Provision of information / education to patients Telephoned patient about repeat blood tests, including inflammatory markers (GP02) 
 Confirming that intended actions (e.g. scheduled 
monitoring) took place 
Follow up abnormal chest x-ray (patient had been seen at respiratory clinic) (GP11) 
   
Additional care 
(Investigations and 
follow-up) 
Arrange an appointment with the reviewer or 
another practice team member  
Noted antihypertensive compliance poor. Last BP nine months ago was high. Not 
ordered calcium channel blocker for four months. Called [patient] in early for home 
blood pressure review diary and entry in case notes to query at review (GP02) 
Called patient overdue annual review (GP12) 
Refer to another health care provider  [I send a ] letter to cardiology and to a patient (GP10) 
Arrange repeat or further  investigation for a 
patient 
>14 point drop in eGFR not noted three weeks ago. Distracted by the increased glucose 
and new diagnosis of type two diabetes mellitus. [Patient] 92 [years old] with 
dementia and frail. Arranged bloods [to be] rechecked (GP02) 
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Table 7.7. Specific actions relating to patient care and practice processes that were taken or intended after completion of trigger 
reviews* 
Description of action 
This study 
QOF study 
Comparison of proportions 
Difference in proportion (%), 95% CI, 
chi-square (p-value) and DF=1 
GP Nursing GPST All$ 
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
       
Significant event analysis 10 (15.4) 3 (8.8) 12 (11.5) 25 (12.3) 372 (11.9) 0.4, -4.0 to 5.8, 000344 (0.953) 
Clinical audit 5 (7.7) 2 (5.9) 5 (4.8) 12 (5.9) 173 (5.5) 0.4, -2.5 to 4.7, 0.00692 (0.934) 
Make a specific improvement 5 (7.7) 2 (5.9) 7 (6.7) 14 (6.9) 352 (11.3) 4.4, -0.1 to 7.7, 3.325 (0.068) 
PDSA cycle 1 (1.5) 0 (0.0) 1 (1.0) 2 (1.0) 61 (2.0) 1.0, -1.6 to 2.0, 0.546 (0.460) 
Feedback to colleagues 29 (44.6) 14 (41.2) 28 (26.9) 71 (35.0) 1265 (40.5) 5.5, -1.7 to 12.3, 2.176 (0.140) 
Discuss with Educational Supervisor 0 (0.0) 3 (8.8) 27 (26.0) 30 (14.8) 2 (0.1) 14.7, 10.1 to 20.4, 402.564 (<0.001) 
Add to appraisal documentation 8 (12.3) 6 (17.7) 12 (11.5) 26 (12.8) 496 (15.9) 3.1, -2.4 to 7.6, 1.159 (0.282) 
Protocol update 7 (10.8) 4 (11.8) 12 (11.5) 23 (11.3) 297 (9.5) 1.8, -2.4 to 7.0, 0.519 (0.471) 
Other** N/A N/A N/A N/A 106 (3.4)  
*More than one option could be selected 
$Includes a community pharmacist 
**The ‘other’ option was added to the SS after this study  
198 
 
 
whether this relative increase in reported actions in the QOF study had any 
additional practical value for patients compared with this study. 
 
The most common action taken by reviewers and their practice teams in this and 
the QOF study was ‘feedback to colleagues’ and this accounted for, respectively, 
35.0% and 40.5% of all indicated actions.  They were least likely to apply the 
‘Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) method’. This may reflect a lack of knowledge of this 
specific QI method (and indeed other QI methods such as root cause analysis) 
since there is no formal training on these methods within the current GP 
curriculum, but would not explain the relatively low numbers indicating their 
intention to undertake audits and SEA which are formally taught. From a systems 
perspective of safety improvement this may indicate a training need to help link 
PSIs to particular improvement methods and tools. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter described the practical implementation of the TRM in general 
practice, the main findings from conducting trigger reviews and the actions and 
intended actions undertaken by clinician reviewers and their practice teams. 
The main results are summarized below:  
 
 A range of primary care clinicians (n=47) were recruited and trained before 
applying the TRM to review a selection of 1659 high-risk patients’ records.  
They recorded their main findings, actions and reflections on Summary Sheets 
(SS) and submitted 67 of these for analysis.  
 The mean reported time required to conduct a trigger review (25 individual 
records) and complete a SS in the study was 138.3 minutes (SD 48.3). 
 The reviewers found 1407 triggers, with a mean of 21.0/SS (SD13.7).  The 
most common trigger was ‘repeat medication item discontinued’.  
 216 PSIs were detected, with a mean of 3.2 PSIs/SS (SD 2.0). A substantial 
minority of these were considered to have led to moderate or more 
substantial harm (n=63 PSIs, 29.2%) while the majority (114 PSIs, 54.8%) were 
rated as being preventable or potentially preventable. However, a small 
minority of reviewers did not record any PSIs. 
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 The PSIs were classified by type using a preliminary classification.  The most 
common type of PSI related to ‘medication’ (n=88 PSIs, 40.7%). The most 
commonly implicated drug was Warfarin. 
 Reviewers undertook specific, patient safety-related actions during 
approximately two thirds of trigger reviews. The types of actions related to 
improving (i) record keeping and coding; (ii) medication-related processes; 
(iii) communication; and (iv) providing or arranging additional care for 
patients. 
 A mean of 3.1 actions were taken by reviewers and their practice teams after 
completing their trigger reviews. The most common action was ‘feedback to 
colleagues’ but they also conducted SEAs, performed clinical audits, designed 
protocols, added findings to their appraisal documentation or made specific 
improvements to their practices. 
  
200 
 
Chapter 8. How the TRM works 
 
This chapter describes the results that relate to the study aim of explaining 
how the TRM worked in practice, how it influenced study participants and 
helped to bring about the outcomes reported in Chapter 7. The main source of 
data for this chapter was the second round of interviews with the practice 
managers, general practitioners and practice managers. The data were 
thematically analysed. A summary of this chapter and its three sections are 
provided in Figure 8.1. 
 
The first section describes how the TRM enabled the detection of PSIs by 
providing the study participants with: (i) the necessary ‘knowledge’ to ensure 
they were ready to use the method with a patient safety ‘mindset’; (ii) 
opportunities to perform trigger reviews, and to reflect on the findings and 
implement changes; and (iii) a structure of the cognitive and practical steps 
required for effective implementation of the TRM.  
 
The terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘readiness’ are commonly used and require further 
clarification.  For the purposes of this study, knowledge is understood to 
‘encompass everything that individuals might know, be able to do and value’. 
‘Readiness’ is defined as ‘an individual’s ability to learn from what they know, 
can do [their skills] and value [their attitudes]’. In other words, different yet 
interdependent types of knowledge (knowing; doing; and valuing) determine the 
‘readiness’ of individuals to engage with, and learn from, their experiences in 
any given situation (332). 
 
When all three of these components are present (knowledge/mindset; 
opportunity; and structure) the likelihood of detecting PSIs with the TRM is 
greatly increased. The importance of detecting PSIs in this study is that it 
creates potential ‘learning moments’ (49). Learning moments are by their very 
nature emergent and temporal and their value is determined by clinicians 
consciously or unconsciously choosing to either accept ‘ownership’ of PSIs or not. 
This pivotal decision is a key determinant of the nature and degree of impact 
the PSI will have and is therefore crucial to the eventual outcomes of the TRM, 
e.g. whether it will result in reflection, learning and improvement-related   
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Figure 8.1. How the TRM works and the related chapter sections 
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actions or not. The second section of this chapter therefore explains the 
importance of ownership of PSIs in more detail as well as how this concept 
influenced clinicians and their teams. 
 
The third and final section describes the potential outcomes from detecting PSIs 
and accepting ownership for them, ranging from negative emotional and 
psychological experiences, through none or neutral to very positive effects. 
Practical examples include: clinicians and teams taking specific actions to help 
reduce similar PSIs in the future; increased vigilance and awareness of potential 
safety threats; and identifying learning needs and points. 
 
8.1. The TRM enables the detection of PSIs 
 
8.1.1. The TRM helps to create a patient safety ‘mindset’ 
 
One of the participants explained how certain tasks created a specific mindset 
for her, and presumably other health care workers. As a practical example she 
described how, when she began the daily task of signing bundles of repeat 
medication prescriptions, she unconsciously went ‘into prescriber mode’ (GP03). 
In the same way, while she was performing trigger reviews, she noticed adopting 
a ‘trigger tool mindset’. Many other participants reported a similar experience 
of (unconsciously) forming a specific ‘mindset’ during application of the TRM 
which made them more vigilant and aware of potential safety-related issues. So, 
while the patient records were the same ones they had interacted with on a 
regular basis while providing routine care, when applying the TRM to them this 
‘mindset’ made them feel and appear ‘new’. 
 
It is important to note that all reviewers who were aware of this mindset, 
irrespective of their clinical roles, reported that it developed gradually, over a 
period of time. The first time they applied the TRM the mindset developed 
relatively slowly. As they reviewed the consecutive sections in individual 
records, the ‘mindset’ started forming until: ‘you’re looking at the notes from a 
different view, from a different perspective’ (GP02). As reviewers became more 
familiar with the method, a focused, patient safety mindset developed quicker: 
‘by the time you’re on the third one [record review] it’s just happening 
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automatically’ (GP04). However, even with experience, reviewers still required 
a few minutes for the TRM mindset to form.  
 
Once this new perspective (mindset) had been established, participants felt they 
were more likely to detect PSIs compared with the beginning of the review, or 
when they were interacting with the record for other reasons during routine 
care.  This mindset was ‘built’ by reviewing sections in consecutive records in a 
systematic and focused manner, but could be lost or changed by distractions and 
interruptions. This is one of the main reasons why implementing the TRM was 
facilitated by reviewers being provided with sufficient, uninterrupted 
(protected) time to complete a trigger review as a single activity.  
 
Participants felt these ‘mindsets’ were beneficial and increased their efficiency 
as all of their attention could be focused on the tasks in hand: ‘it’s much easier 
to achieve one specific aim if you’re focused to doing it rather than trying to 
achieve a hundred different things all at the same time’ (GP11). Unfortunately, 
while focusing on completing a specific task such as signing a bundle of 
prescriptions, potential safety threats and opportunities for interventions or 
additional care probably go unrecognised in many instances. Box 8.1 provides a 
practical example of a PSI that was detected during a trigger review in this study 
and describes its impact. 
 
The clinician reviewer who reported the PSI subsequently reflected on the 
potential reasons why it may have gone undetected. She concluded that, 
because she had focused all of her available attention on certain clinical tasks, 
the unintended consequence had been that other opportunities for proactively 
offering care to the patient had been missed. She explained: ‘I had seen that 
patient and I hadn’t mentioned an ACE inhibitor at all and you also think well 
why did I never mention that? I’d have just completely excluded it, or was my 
mind thinking along the track of something else?’ (GP03) 
 
It was unclear to the participants exactly how the ‘mindset’ formed, but they 
suspected an association with repetitive and routine clinical tasks: ‘we’re so 
used to doing things I think in a certain manner’ (GP03). While this explanation 
seems plausible, an alternative or additional reason may be that participants’   
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Box 8.1. Example of a detected PSI and the importance of ‘ownership’ 
 
A GP reviewer (GP03) identified an elderly patient with established chronic 
kidney disease (CKD) stage three who had not been added to the practice 
register and had not been offered treatment with a suitable ACE/ARB. In other 
words, the PSI was suboptimal treatment of a patient with CKD.  This was 
rated as a PSI with low severity and high preventability. The reviewer was 
surprised at detecting this PSI because the patient had consulted with her on 
several previous occasions in the preceding months. Her first actions were to 
add him to the relevant chronic disease register, request a repeat eGFR blood 
test to check his renal function and arrange a review appointment to monitor 
his blood pressure and discuss potential further treatment.  She identified a 
professional learning need about the management of CKD while reflecting on 
this incident and addressed it. The incident was discussed during a practice 
meeting and the team decided to update the practice protocol for the 
management of CKD and to perform a clinical audit of the management of their 
patients with CKD.  
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‘readiness’ for the TRM - as determined by their knowledge of it - helped to 
create the mindset. The TRM knowledge of most participants would have 
increased as a result of training, increasing practical experience from conducting 
trigger reviews and evaluating their findings. From an NPT perspective, 
participants’ knowledge - and therefore readiness to learn from PSIs - increased 
through work relating to coherence and especially its ‘internalization’ 
component (‘value’ or ‘attitude’ knowledge); collective action (‘doing’ or ‘skills’ 
knowledge); and reflexive monitoring (‘knowing’ or information knowledge).  
 
8.1.2. The TRM provides opportunities for its application and reflection 
 
Many participants felt that one of the important characteristics of the TRM that 
made it useful to them was that it not only encouraged reflection and further 
action, but also provided opportunities to do so. The TRM initiative essentially 
offered general practice teams a method with potential benefits for them and 
their patients, an estimate of the time and resources that implementing it would 
require and an offer of some financial and ‘expert’ support. During the 
recruitment stage of this study, participants therefore had the opportunity to 
decide before the TRM was implemented whether it would be appropriate for 
them to be involved (or not). From an NPT perspective they had the opportunity 
to do the necessary work of: initiation, i.e. the preliminary work of deciding 
they should be involved in its implementation; internalization, i.e. 
understanding and agreeing whether the proposed intervention (the TRM) was 
compatible with their prevailing culture; and legitimisation, i.e. feeling justified 
in allocating and spending time and resources on TRM-related activities.  
 
I really did think [the TRM] was valuable, cause it really does just give you 
that time out to review patients, just review care and systems, and you know 
it’s something that we often don’t have. (GP08) 
 
Chapter 6 described how participants understood patient safety as an important 
and integral part of the care they provide, and how they perceived a 
professional responsibility for their patients’ safety. It also described how they 
were able to identify a large number of potential safety threats and contributing 
factors to PSIs and their willingness to improve their standards of care, provided 
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they had adequate resources to do so. A key element in the way the TRM works 
is therefore by providing teams with an improvement method (and supporting 
evidence of its potential value) along with some financial compensation for the 
required time for implementation. This in turn creates the opportunities (and 
legitimacy) for clinician reviewers to engage in quality improvement work. The 
implication from an NPT perspective is therefore that, for an intervention to be 
successfully implemented in general practices, it is important to ensure that the 
work of contextual integration is supported, i.e. providing teams with 
appropriate resources and adequate time. This will be considered again in 
Chapter 10. 
 
The majority of participants reportedly used the opportunities for reflection to 
some degree, although it is difficult to quantify the true extent or measure the 
quality of the reflection.  However, the descriptions of some clinicians of how 
they were able to identify learning needs or points while reflecting on detected 
PSIs provide some evidence of its usefulness. This is an important outcome of 
the TRM study and will be described in more detail in section 3 of this chapter. 
Other participants described how reflection helped them understand the latent 
risks associated with detected PSIs, how these may affect other patients, and 
how they may be able to proactively manage risk. A practical example is 
provided in Box 8.1. 
 
The importance of clinicians being able to reflect on clinical care and their own 
performances is increasingly being recognised. Reflection is considered a 
competency in its own right and is promoted as a core professional quality in 
medical education (333). It is a collective term that includes ‘those intellectual 
and affective activities in which individuals engage to explore their experiences 
in order to lead to a new understanding and appreciation’ (334). It should be 
recognised that, while the TRM strongly promoted and provided opportunities for 
reflection, it cannot make people reflect or more reflective per se. This issue 
will be considered in more detail in chapter 9.  The implication of this finding 
from an NPT perspective is therefore the importance of identifying and 
recruiting those clinicians who are naturally more reflective to perform trigger 
reviews, e.g. effectively performing the work of skill set-workability. 
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Another way in which the general practice TRM approach created opportunities 
for learning and reflection in this study was by encouraging clinicians to consider 
all PSIs as potentially important, irrespective of whether they considered them 
‘acts of omission’ or ‘acts of commission’. This is a key difference compared 
with the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s secondary and ambulatory 
Global Trigger Tools (GTT) that only record and measure ‘acts of commission’. 
However, the authors of a recent systematic review of the GTT challenged this 
approach, and recommended inclusion of ‘acts of omission’ in all settings (242).  
 
The decision to purposefully exclude acts of omission may be justified and 
considered reasonable for many study designs, as it reduces the subjectivity of 
the external reviewers’ findings, improves inter-rater reliability and therefore 
also improves the reliability of harm estimates. This is less of an issue when 
reviews are conducted by internal reviewers where the intention is to improve 
their own care standard, rather than simply measure clinical performance.  This 
issue, and the other potential strengths and limitations of the TRM will be 
considered in detail in Chapter 10. 
 
In this study, a relatively large proportion of detected PSIs could be attributable 
to omissions of care. A practical example would be the suboptimal treatment of 
a patient with confirmed chronic kidney disease (CKD) who was not prescribed 
an ACE/ARB even though this is recommended by current evidence-based 
guidelines (see Box 8.1). The implication is that there are potentially many 
minor safety threats or quality issues detectable in general practices that either 
go unrecognised or are recognised but not prioritised or acted on while 
delivering routine care.  If so, it is likely the result of significant time constraints 
and the need to prioritise more urgent medical concerns and the patient’s 
agenda during consultations that are typically scheduled for a maximum of ten 
minutes. One clinician explained that ‘unless it’s something glaringly dangerous 
[we] might just sort of gloss over it and move on cause you don’t have time’ 
(GP02). A practical example would be an elderly patient presenting with 
symptoms and signs of an acute and significant respiratory tract infection. In a 
typical ten-minute consultation agreeing and implementing a suitable 
management plan is prioritised over medication reconciliation or coding. In 
effect, the clinician is making an ETTO – which was described in Chapter 6. 
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Unfortunately, these minor issues remain as latent risks in practice systems and 
could manifest later, potentially as serious incidents (1).   
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, many of the detected patient safety incidents in 
this study were the result of latent safety risks or ‘hazards’ in  the wider 
practice systems that were already known to many of the reviewers or their 
teams, but had not been addressed before because of lack of opportunity or 
perceived urgency. This may also be one of the reasons why the vast majority of 
study participants indicated they were willing to consider, search for and report 
PSIs (Chapter 6). In this context, the TRM simply provided the final or necessary 
impetus (by providing practical examples through detected PSIs of breaches of 
system defences) for reviewers and teams to implement improvement actions 
and a little protected time and opportunity to do so.  Conceptually, how the 
TRM worked during its implementation and subsequent application can be 
likened to a catalyst: it enabled and accelerated existing processes.  
 
8.1.3. The TRM provides structure to the review and improvement efforts 
 
Chapter 3 described the three consecutive steps of the TRM In detail, which are: 
planning; reviewing records; and action and reflection. Each step has a number 
of clear and specific recommended tasks which reviewers should perform or 
consider. The TRM therefore provides a structure for reviewers to follow and 
apply when reviewing their patient records and taking or considering subsequent 
improvement actions. Some participants described how the structure and steps 
of the TRM helped to focus their attention and efforts and they felt this 
increased their likelihood of recognising PSIs in the records they may otherwise 
have overlooked, or may have overlooked while providing routine care: e.g. ’the 
same patient I’d seen regularly, well I didn’t make that jump at all [to detect a 
PSI] until I applied the structure to it [the record]’ (GP03). Another clinician 
agreed that ‘the structure helps [reviewers] to process it [PSIs] if you like, and 
make it a bit more tangible’ (GP12). This finding is consistent with international 
evidence that unstructured reviews are inefficient, inaccurate and highly 
variable compared with structured approaches (233, 335). 
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The vast majority of reviewers indicated that they preferred the structured 
approach of the TRM over the alternative, which would have been to simply 
conduct an unguided review of the same sample of records: ‘I think for people 
just looking through records, they often don’t know what to look for and I think 
the trigger tool at least gives you a kind of core information’ (GP08). The 
structure of the TRM also required clinicians to focus on performing tasks 
consecutively. One participant understood the value of the TRM in the following 
way: ‘I think the benefit of doing it as a bundle if you like or as a as a trigger 
tool exercise is that you’re much more likely to be focussed on looking for it 
[triggers]’ (GP12). The structure and focus of the TRM helped a few of the 
participants who recognised that they were easily ‘side tracked’ or ‘bogged 
down’ when reviewing clinical information such as, for example, correspondence 
and investigation results.  This is why one participant recommended the TRM to 
her colleagues and advised them: ‘well, that’s why you might find the structure 
of this [the TRM] more helpful than just randomly going through it all’ (GP10).  
 
These study findings illustrate the work of at least four different NPT 
components: ‘differentiation’ – the participants performed work to increase 
their understanding of how the TRM is different from alternative clinical record 
review approaches; ‘interactional workability’ – they had to enact and interact 
with the method to produce results; ‘relational integration’ – the work they did 
to build trust and confidence in the method and in their ability to apply it 
correctly; and ‘individual and communal specification’ – the work they did to 
increase their understanding through practical experience of how to apply the 
method more effectively, thereby increasing their perceptions of its feasibility 
and acceptability.  
 
On the other hand, some reviewers detected PSIs that were not directly 
associated with triggers. These PSIs were still detected in the proximity of 
triggers, or while searching for triggers in specific sections of records. A 
practical example would be the detection of the PSI of an elderly patient who 
suffered a preventable adverse drug reaction after being prescribed different 
opiate analgesia concurrently. The reviewer detected the PSI while searching 
the medication section for the presence of the trigger ‘medication 
discontinued’. One of the participants explained the value of the TRM’s 
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structured approach in the following way: ‘even if there isn’t a problem in the 
crux area, ‘cause you’ve looked at that area there might be something 
juxtaposed to that that you see because you’ve actually taken the time to look 
at it [a specific part of the record] more carefully’ (GP06). 
 
8.2. The importance of ‘ownership’ of PSIs 
 
A crucial difference between the IHI trigger tool method and the TRM approach 
in this study is ‘ownership’ of PSIs. In secondary care, external reviewers 
conduct trigger reviews on samples of records from patients who are unknown to 
them with very little or no chance of clinician and patient ever meeting in the 
future. The main findings are estimated harm rates and these are typically 
‘owned’ by researchers and managers. Even when findings are shared with 
clinical teams they tend to be in aggregated data and chart format. In contrast, 
primary care clinicians in this study performed trigger reviews on records of 
patients that, in most instances, were very well known to them. They had 
usually provided at least some of the care during the periods of review and there 
was a very high probability that they would continue to do so in the future. 
Consequently, participants from all clinical groups felt they ‘owned’ the PSIs 
they detected. 
 
However, the difference in ownership should not be considered a proxy of 
reviewer motivation, ability and thoroughness. External reviewers are typically 
highly-experienced clinicians with additional training in the trigger review 
methodology.  Many of them may also have a personal interest in patient safety 
and could be expected to do the best job they can. Conversely, some internal 
reviewers may lack the necessary experience, training or attitude to effectively 
apply the TRM. Notwithstanding potential differences in reviewer 
characteristics, ownership of PSIs (or not) was an important determinant of the 
outcomes in this study as will be explained below, with the implication that it 
may also be an important factor to consider in other trigger review studies.  
 
How the TRM seemed to work in general practice was that, once potential safety 
threats became apparent in the practice through the detection of PSIs, the 
personal relationships with and knowledge of the patients made them difficult to 
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ignore. In other words, the PSIs detected in general practice seemed to evoke a 
powerful moral, professional and personal imperative to take further remedial 
actions that were reportedly felt by the vast majority of participants. The 
importance, emotional dimension and impact of PSI ownership was graphically 
described by a participant who thought implementing the TRM had ‘certainly 
started the hares running’ in his practice. He explained this was because 
detecting PSIs had felt like ‘you’ve been pricked’ (GP04).  
 
The initial actions and intended actions were therefore typically, and 
unsurprisingly, targeted at individual patients and problems. Once the first few, 
small actions were taken, this sometimes led to larger and more significant 
changes or at the very least increased the probability of further improvements 
to other systems or reducing latent safety threats at practice level. In this way a 
single incident affecting one patient potentially became the starting point and 
spark for further assessment and actions at the wider patient population or 
practice levels. A practical example is provided in Box 8.1 in order to further 
illustrate the key findings of how the TRM works. The example describes the 
responses of the reviewer and her practice team to the detection of a single PSI.  
 
In this example, applying the TRM had had the benefit of improving the 
management of patients with CKD of the practice because of four different sets 
of actions: (i) immediate actions during the trigger review relating to the 
specific patient with the PSI; (ii) the team performed a clinical audit to measure 
their current CKD management performance and to assess the likelihood of a 
similar incident occurring in the future; (iii) the reviewer undertook self-
directed learning about the management of CKD as part of her continuous 
professional development; and (iv) the team updated the practice’s CKD 
management protocol.  
 
This example helps to illustrate key findings from chapter 7, namely that the 
degree of severity and preventability of PSIs are not associated with their 
usefulness. It also illustrates a key finding from this chapter, which is that 
reviewer characteristics are important determinants of the TRM’s outcomes. In 
this instance the ability and willingness of the clinician to reflect on her findings 
determined the outcome and value of the TRM.  
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From an NPT perspective, this example illustrates the work of ‘enrolment’ and 
‘activation’ – the reviewer had to recruit and engage additional team members 
(enrolment) to help her implement the desired actions, including the audit and 
updating the CKD protocol (activation). It also demonstrates the work of 
reflexive monitoring, and more specifically ‘individual and communal appraisal’ 
– the reviewer and practice team had to evaluate the importance of the findings 
and the potential value (or not) of taking subsequent actions.  
 
Another way ownership of PSIs (and therefore the TRM) works is by generating 
findings that have personal importance and relevance to the clinicians and 
teams who apply the method because ‘no one else is in the same boat’ (GP04). 
The value of the TRM is therefore not necessarily only in finding undetected or 
new types of PSIs but simply the fact that a PSI – or PSIs – was uncovered in the 
practice at all, and that it occurred to a patient known to them. Once PSIs are 
detected, the TRM essentially becomes open-ended in the sense that the type 
and degree of learning and whether and what type of improvement actions are 
undertaken are left completely to the discretion of the individual clinician 
reviewer. GP reviewers in particular valued this approach: ‘looking for the 
problem and sorting it myself I felt a degree of empowerment’ (GP06). The 
same participant went on to explain his understanding of the TRM and its 
potential value (e.g. the NPT work of coherence) as: ‘allowing you to take some 
control and ownership over stuff again and make a difference.’  
 
Some of the key differences between the TRM and many other quality 
improvement methods are, therefore, that it provides participants with highly 
personal, practical and patient-specific information and can enhance clinician 
autonomy.  
 
Up until now, the discussion about ownership was from the perspective of a 
professional relationship between patients and clinicians or patients and other 
general practice staff.  There is a second form of ownership of PSIs that were 
recognised by many participants, but especially the GP group and practice 
managers. This type of ownership is inferred from the general practice business 
model and relates to the responsibility of an organisation and organisational 
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leadership to assure patient safety and compliance with clinical governance 
obligations. The (abridged) narrative of PM11 in Box 8.2 provides a 
representative example of the perceived importance of ownership.  
 
The ubiquitous business model of general practice in Scotland is a contractual 
agreement between the NHS and independent contractors to provide defined 
health care services on their behalf. GPs and some non-GP partners typically 
own the business concern and, in many instances, the care facilities. 
Participants understood the implication, namely that business partners had 
overall responsibility for the practice, the care it delivered and the 
repercussions from actions – whether positive (e.g. profit sharing, accumulating 
assets) or potentially negative (e.g. patient complaints, PSIs). Consequently, 
many GPs and some PMs were strongly motivated not only from a personal and 
professional, but also from a business perspective to provide high-quality, safe 
care. One of the participants explained: ‘I sit here in this practice and think, 
what’s happening in this practice? Because the buck stops with me, or with [GP 
partner x] or with [GP partner Y]’ (GP04).  
 
This is a key difference between general practice and NHS acute care settings, 
as clinicians working in hospitals arguably have less of a vested financial interest 
in preventing PSIs. Even when hospital clinicians and staff are directly 
responsible for managing department budgets, their decisions rarely if ever 
directly affect their own personal incomes in the way it does general practice.  
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Box 8.2. Example of the perceived importance of ‘ownership’ to participants 
  
I’ve been here seventeen years. I’ve been a partner for seven or eight of those 
now and basically I run the business of the practice...I manage everything from 
buying the envelopes to [pause] to agreeing the contract with the health board. 
Ehm well at the end of the day if anything goes wrong it’s the partners that are 
going to to [pause] take the can for it... I never felt outside the partnership 
anyway. I was very taken aback to be offered partnership. It’d never even 
crossed my mind. I think it crosses more people’s minds nowadays, but then it 
didn’t ehm and it was very flattering. I think the only thing that’s changed for 
me is [deep breath] you definitely do feel a much bigger weight of 
responsibility... I took a year to accept... because I wasn’t sure it was really 
what I wanted, and I was giving up all my employment rights and that was scary, 
and I was becoming self employed, which was scary. I mean it’s my practice, but 
then I probably felt that way as a manager as well (PM11). 
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8.3. Outcomes from PSI ‘ownership’ 
 
There are three main types of outcomes from detecting and assuming ownership 
of PSIs (Figure 8.1). They are: (i) no impact or change; (ii) positive; and (iii) 
negative outcomes. Examples of positive outcomes include the different actions 
and intended actions undertaken by clinician reviewers and theirs teams during 
and after the trigger reviews as a result of the PSIs they detected and were 
described in detail in chapter 7. In addition, a practical example illustrating 
some of the potential and different positive effects of ownership of a single PSI 
was provided in this chapter (Box 8.1).  
 
This section describes three further potential outcomes from PSI ownership: 
increased vigilance and awareness of patient-safety related issues; identifying 
learning needs and points; and their emotional impact on clinicians and their 
teams.  
 
8.3.1. Increased patient safety awareness 
 
Many participants thought that applying the TRM had increased their awareness 
of safety-critical processes at the time and a minority felt that this effect was 
sustained for at least several months after each trigger review. One GP said: 
‘having done the trigger reviews [we are] more aware of looking for things’ 
(GP02). Some clinicians also reported that their confidence in their wider 
practice systems and the standards of the quality of care they delivered had 
increased after conducting the reviews. From an NPT perspective, this reflects 
the work of relational integration (increased confidence) but also reflexive 
monitoring (evaluating their levels of safety) being performed successfully. 
 
It is unclear exactly why the TRM increased awareness of patient-safety related 
issues and why this occurred to varying degrees for different reviewers. 
However, a similar effect has been reported in the international literature as far 
back as 1991, when Wu et al found many junior doctors’ vigilance increased as a 
result of their (known) mistakes (336).  Some of this study’s participants thought 
there was an association between the TRM’s structured approach, specific 
triggers and ongoing safety awareness. This perception is supported by the fact 
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that a few months after the trigger reviews had been completed, a minority of 
reviewers reported still approaching patient records section-by-section and 
screening for triggers in a structured manner even during their routine 
consultations. This was particularly true for the group of PN reviewers, who 
were initially less confident than the GP group about using the TRM, but found 
the structured approach and predefined triggers particularly useful. A nurse 
practitioner explained: ‘personally, the trigger review of patient notes did 
change my mind-set and I look for certain triggers now as part of my practice. 
You tend to memorise certain triggers and look out for them with all patients -
it tends to become imbedded into practice' (PN0X).  
 
8.3.2. Learning needs and points 
 
The majority of participants thought that the TRM was useful, because it helped 
them to identify new learning needs and points. Learning needs were identified 
at the individual and practice team levels: ‘there are always things to learn if 
you’re keen to learn’ (PN12). Some reviewers also described how they met or 
planned to meet these learning needs. At the individual practitioner level, 
learning needs often related to management of patients with chronic disease. An 
example would be updating knowledge on the management of atrial fibrillation.  
 
There are three ways general practices and organisations can respond to and 
learn from PSIs. The first is ‘doing the quick fix’. This is the most common and 
superficially attractive response. The second is ‘going into a black hole’, e.g. 
clinicians report a PSI, but 'nothing' seems to change. The third is ‘closing off the 
Swiss-cheese holes’, when sustainable changes are made to systems in order to 
prevent recurrences (175). Options one and three are appropriate. The challenge 
is determining when to use which. 
 
At the practice level, reviewers frequently identified the need for: improving 
communication between primary and secondary care, consistent coding of 
clinical conditions and ‘protocols’ for the management of specific high risk 
medication, e.g. monitoring of nephrotoxic drugs. Further examples with 
selected quotes are provided in Table 8.1.  
 
217 
 
Table 8.1. Educational value of the TRM: selected examples of individual and practice teams’ learning needs and points 
 
Educational 
value of the TRM 
Examples recorded on the Trigger review SS  
Individual (clinician) level Practice team level 
   
Identifying 
learning needs 
 ‘I need to review CKD 3 management as I could not 
remember specific contraindications for ACE inhibitors’ 
 ‘Several patients overdue annual reviews - should we check notes and call 
patients via telephone rather than just letters?’ 
 [I need to] update my diabetic knowledge - online 
module’ 
 ‘Liaise with colleagues who do bloods to ensure the correct tests are carried out 
and to reduce the need for the patient to return unnecessarily’ 
  [What is the] target heart rate for AF? Read editorial 
from NEJM  
 ‘Should discuss and agree how to prioritise read codes. In DOCMAN we should 
probably advise the staff what priority we want given to codes. Confusing for staff 
as lots of options.’  
  ‘[Find out] how to liaise with social services about 
respite [care]’  
 ‘Protocol for monitoring potential nephrotoxic [and hepatotoxic] drugs’  
   
Identifying 
learning points 
 ‘Awareness of need to ensure warfarin is stopped pre-
operative where appropriate’ 
 ‘That, whilst as a practice we are fallible, we do have reasonable processes in 
place. The missed increase in bisoprolol was a concatenation of events between 
primary and secondary care at the discharge interface. This is a fraught area.’ 
  ‘Be aware and proactive if investigation results do not 
fit with clinical picture’ 
‘Positive learning that disease monitoring systems work well (COPD) [in this 
practice]’    
 ‘[I] need to give more attention to out of hours 
summary sheets’    
 As a team we need to be more aware of encourage those patients with chronic 
disease to attend for review 
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Whether and to what extent learning from PSIs occurs is determined by many 
factors (337) and will be considered in more detail below.  
 
8.3.3. Emotional impact of PSIs 
 
The potential adverse impact of PSIs on clinicians is increasingly being 
recognised and studied (186, 338-341). In fact, a study to determine the factors 
that influence how students and residents learn from medical errors found even 
imagining themselves committing errors caused the participants ‘significant 
stress’ (299). Twenty-five years ago Christensen et al likened their experience of 
conducting in-depth interviews with community physicians (n=11) about the 
impact of their perceived mistakes on them as ‘equivalent to a descent into the 
underworld of medicine. It is a journey into a place of shame, fear and 
isolation’ (298). The authors described the wide range of negative emotions 
(‘dysphoric feelings’) the clinicians experienced and how, in many instances, 
these feelings of frustration, guilt, fear, anger, self-doubt, anxiety, humiliation, 
shame and embarrassment remained unresolved for months and years. These 
findings have since been replicated in larger studies, different clinician groups 
and settings (186, 339, 340, 342). 
 
The different coping strategies clinicians reported using – if indeed they even 
consciously committed to deal with the effects of PSIs on them – typically 
belonged in one of two groups, depending on whether the focus of the strategy 
was on the ‘emotion’ or 'problem' (298). This is in some ways analogous to the 
two different tasks clinicians face in response to a PSI or medical error: ‘How do 
I deal with this?’ And 'How do I learn from this?' (338) Examples of helpful 
‘emotion-focused’ strategies include disclosing errors to peers, patients and 
family; and re-establishing and re-affirming their professional identities (e.g. 
self-forgiveness). On the other hand, participants with a ‘problem-focused’ 
approach attempts to analyse the event, learn from it and take remedial 
actions. Consequently, there is hope in the ‘heart of darkness’ for ‘this 
landscape of fallibility contains the spirit of wisdom that can guide the 
rebuilding’ (298). All but one of the participants in Christensen et al’s study 
reported learning from their mistakes and had subsequently taken specific 
actions to improve their clinical performance in some way.  
219 
 
In some ways little has changed in the quarter century since this study was 
published: patients still suffer avoidable, iatrogenic harm; and clinicians still err 
despite their best and ongoing efforts to provide safe care. As a result, we 
should acknowledge that the emotional cost of PSIs can be high (338). This is 
why clinicians involved in serious PSIs have been referred to as ‘second victims’ 
(185).  
 
One thing that has changed dramatically in health care, and especially in general 
practice, is the disclosure rates of medical errors. In the study by Christensen et 
al, only a tiny minority of physicians admitted to disclosing their mistakes, and 
those that did only confided in close relatives (298). In contrast, all of the 
participants in this study unanimously agreed that disclosing errors was not only 
appropriate but that they felt able to do so, and were confident of the support 
of their colleagues, should this be required. While it is possible that this may be 
the unique perception of this study group, consider that significant event 
analysis (SEA) is ubiquitous in UK general practice, the prevailing safety culture 
tends to be ‘open’ and positive in this setting (Chapter 6) and patient safety 
research is now encouraged in many modern health care systems. This may also 
be the reason why there were no reported or known instances of detected PSIs 
having significant or enduring negative emotional impact on participants in this 
study. 
 
There is some evidence that patients also prefer disclosure of medical errors 
(343). A questionnaire study of German GPs’ management of serious medical 
errors and subsequent outcomes found most errors had been disclosed to 
patients. The majority of patients continued to trust their GPs despite them 
disclosing serious errors, especially if the GP had discovered the problem and 
disclosed it themselves, or if other health care providers also contributed to the 
PSI (344). The implication is therefore that the TRM recommendations to discuss 
PSIs within the practice team and disclose errors early are acceptable to 
clinicians and patients alike.  
 
A common perception is that clinicians learn ‘better’ from their own mistakes, 
from those errors they accept responsibility for and from PSIs that result in 
severe harm (299, 337). The findings from this study that participants consider 
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PSIs with higher severity ratings as more important seem to support this 
perception, and were described in Chapter 7. However, if there is indeed a link 
between severity of PSIs and subsequent learning, it has not yet conclusively 
been shown. In fact, current evidence seems to suggest that clinician 
characteristics are equally or more important determinants of whether and to 
what degree learning occur (187, 339). Two other factors that are strongly 
associated with learning from PSIs are: creating opportunities for critical 
reflection on incidents; and formal discussions of incidents and providing 
constructive feedback (49, 337, 342). These findings support the emphasis of the 
TRM in this study on clinician reflection and the recommendation of formal 
meetings to discuss trigger review findings in a structured manner within teams.  
 
A recent systematic review (n=24 studies) of the effects of medical errors on 
clinicians found consistent and widespread evidence of negative psychological 
and emotional effects on them (186). However, a ‘disproportionate’ amount of 
this research was conducted in the hospital setting and the authors admit it 
remains unclear how error outcomes vary between setting and clinical groups. 
There is, for example, emerging evidence that PSIs have an emotional impact on 
all general practice staff, and not only clinicians (7, 187). For now, it remains 
unclear what the implications of this finding may be. Of interest though, is that 
the review also found some evidence of positive outcomes from medical error. 
Examples include: increased assertiveness and confidence; improved 
relationships with colleagues; and corrective and improvement actions taken 
from the individual patient through to the organisational levels (186). 
Constructive feedback and effective learning in the aftermath of a serious PSI or 
error seems to make the difference between clinicians ‘thriving’ rather than 
simply ‘surviving’ (185). This deceptively simple yet powerful observation 
resonates strongly with the findings of this study. A key priority for future 
research is therefore to examine the longer-term impact of PSIs and increase our 
understanding of how to maximize the positive and reduce their negative 
effects.  
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Conclusion   
 
This chapter explained how the TRM worked. In essence, trained clinicians 
performed structured trigger reviews of samples of patient records with a 
patient safety ‘mindset’, ideally as a single uninterrupted activity during 
protected time allocated specifically for this purpose. In combination, these 
three factors (structure; mindset; and opportunity) greatly increased the 
likelihood of detecting PSIs compared with unstructured reviews of clinical 
records or opportunistically identifying them during routine care.  
 
The detected PSIs in this study had personal and professional relevance for the 
clinicians and the practice teams involved, because they affected or may have 
affected patients known to them. Many PSIs also provided specific, 
uncontroversial information about the standards of delivered care.   
 
Consequently, many participants were willing, and felt a responsibility, to 
accept ownership of the PSIs they detected, thereby seizing the metaphorical 
‘learning moments’ and extracting value from them in the form of subsequent 
reflection, learning and further action. The different and important positive 
outcomes from detecting and taking ownership of PSIs in this study were 
therefore discussed in more detail. In particular, the different types of learning 
needs and points that participants identified were listed and the increase in 
some participants’ awareness of safety-related issues were described. Although 
negative outcomes from PSIs were not an issue in this study, they are potentially 
important and were also discussed.  
 
The key study findings are therefore that the TRM worked because of specific 
factors (mindset; structure; opportunity; and ownership of PSIs) and that these 
factors helped to determine the TRM’s positive outcomes (detecting PSIs; 
increased safety awareness; identifying learning needs and points; taking 
specific improvement-related actions).  
 
The findings may seem simple or self-evident, but they have potential important 
implications for other quality and safety improvement efforts. Each factor is 
related to a more generic and essential requirement for successfully 
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implementing complex health care interventions. They are, in no particular 
order: 
 ‘Mindset’ - frontline staff must have the necessary knowledge to 
implement the intervention; 
 ‘Opportunity’ - participants require adequate and appropriate resources 
and time to implement interventions; 
 ‘Structure’ - the aims, applications and potential benefits of interventions 
have to be clearly understood by participants; 
 ‘Ownership’ –interventions and implementation require ongoing clinician 
engagement.   
 
From an NPT perspective, each of these factors is associated with work relating 
to specific constructs and components of the framework. The likelihood of an 
intervention being successfully implemented and eventually becoming 
normalised is dependent on how much of this necessary work is effectively 
performed in practice. For example, the work of identifying and agreeing the 
resource requirements, and which team members have the necessary knowledge 
to implement the intervention, is described by the ‘skill-set workability’ 
component of the NPT framework. The work of providing the resources, 
recruiting the staff and keeping them engaged are described by the ‘contextual 
integration’, ‘enrolment’ and ‘activation’ components respectively. Similarly, 
each of the other factors described in this chapter can be described by applying 
the NPT framework.  
 
The next chapter will describe these factors in more detail and consider whether 
they facilitated or hindered the implementation of the TRM. The additional 
factors that were identified as important facilitators or barriers in this study 
through application of an NPT framework will also be discussed.  
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Chapter 9. Factors that facilitated or hindered the implementation of the 
TRM 
 
This chapter describes the results that relate to the study aim of identifying 
and describing the main factors that facilitated or hindered the implementation 
of the TRM in general practice. The main source of data for this chapter was 
the second round of interviews with practice managers, general practitioners 
and practice nurses. The data were coded and analysed according to the 
Normalisation Process Theory (NPT) framework.  
 
The chapter sections correspond to the four main constructs of the NPT 
framework, which are: coherence; collective action; cognitive participation; and 
reflexive monitoring.  Each of the four sections describes the factors relating to 
that specific construct, and how they are associated with the other elements of 
the NPT framework. The fifth and final section considers the main study findings 
and the potential implications of the identified barriers and facilitators, 
comparing and contrasting them where relevant with the international 
literature.  
 
9.1. Coherence - The sense-making work individuals and teams did to 
understand the TRM   
 
The main findings are summarised in Table 9.1 and illustrated with selected 
quotes: 
 Implementation was facilitated when participants understood that the 
TRM was a new QI method, but intended to be complementary to existing 
methods such as SEA;  
 Participants were concerned that they would have insufficient time and 
resources to implement the TRM.  However, the vast majority found the 
method was feasible; 
 The vast majority of participants perceived the TRM as acceptable and 
compatible with the prevailing safety culture in general practice. 
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Table 9.1. A description of the four components of the ‘Coherence’ construct with selected quotes 
 
NPT component, with a description 
relating it to the TRM 
Success factors and their effect (facilitating or 
hindering) on implementation of the TRM  
Selected quotes 
   
Differentiation: The work of understanding 
the differences and similarities between the 
TRM and existing practices (informal record 
review) and QI methods (SEA, clinical audit).  
 Implementation was facilitated when participants 
understood the TRM as a new QI approach, but 
complementary to existing methods such as SEA and 
clinical audit.  
I mean essentially what [the TRM] does is a kind of retrospective 
audit of a cohort of patients looking for any potential areas of 
harm (GP08) 
[The TRM] is essentially looking to pick up an SEA I suppose. 
That’s the way that you could look at it - if you need an SEA 
that’s a good way to find one (GP07) 
Communal specification: Understanding the 
intention and potential benefits of the TRM. 
When participants understood the TRM’s intended 
aims, potential benefits and limitations they were 
more likely to use it, use it as intended and report 
positive outcomes. 
I think it’s useful as a learning tool to learn about your own 
systems and a way of trying to improve those systems and a way 
of learning as a team with the results (GP05) 
Individual specification: Understanding the 
required effort and tasks of individual team 
members to implement the TRM, e.g. is the 
TRM considered to be feasible and a priority? 
All participants were concerned that the available 
time and resources would be insufficient to implement 
any new intervention, including the TRM.  However, 
the vast majority found the TRM to be feasible, which 
then facilitated its further use. 
I think the first time doing the first couple of patients was a bit 
slow and because it’s different and you’re not quite sure where 
you’re at. So it took a wee while, a couple of patients really to 
get into the swing of it. I did it again just last week and found it 
very quick and very easy to go through (GP02) 
Internalization: the work individuals and 
teams have to do to understand how the 
TRM ‘fits in’ with the prevailing culture and 
processes in the practice, e.g. whether it is 
acceptable. 
The vast majority of participants perceived the TRM as 
acceptable and compatible with the prevailing safety 
culture in general practice. The closer the TRM fits 
with the practice culture and the team’s existing 
tasks, the easier its implementation.   
You have to have systems in place that make a safe journey for 
the patient. So I guess that’s why we think we should be doing 
[the TRM], whether it’s a project or an incentive or not, because 
that’s what we’re all about really, bottom line (PM08) 
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In the UK, general practices have been incentivised for years to apply QI 
methods such as SEA and clinical audit (chapter 3) at regular intervals. As a 
result, most primary care clinicians will have at least some experience with 
these tools. All primary care clinicians and many non-clinical staff also regularly 
interact with patients’ medical records. Examples of informal and opportunistic 
interactions may include checking and comparing investigation results and 
clinical entries while more formal reviews are required to prepare medical 
reports. The TRM includes references to known and normalised QI methods and 
its design was based on existing, formal and informal review processes which 
were adapted to provide a structured approach and a specific purpose, i.e. to 
detect PSIs. In fact, the structure of the TRM was identified as one of reasons 
why it was effective, as was described in Chapter 8.  
 
Consequently, the TRM was recognizable to all of the participants, and many of 
them explained their understanding of the TRM by comparing it with QI methods 
that were already known to them, such as clinical audit and SEA. Furthermore, 
they understood the TRM as being complementary to existing QI methods.  For 
example, detecting PSIs with the TRM often required subsequent application of 
other methods, such as SEA or audit, to better understand or quantify the extent 
of the problem. Being able to interpret the ‘new intervention’ in terms of 
existing approaches and methods helped to facilitate its implementation overall.  
 
On the other hand, when the TRM was perceived as being too similar to existing 
practices or other interventions, it potentially created confusion and 
paradoxically decreased the motivation of a tiny minority of participants to 
implement it. Implementation was therefore further facilitated by participants 
being able, despite similarities between the TRM and other QI methods, to also 
recognise important characteristics that differentiated it as being ‘new’. The 
main difference for them was that the TRM aimed to proactively detect and 
prevent PSIs, whereas the aforementioned QI methods were typically reactive in 
nature. One GP explained how ‘mistakes usually are only picked up when 
they’ve blown up rather than going looking for them’ which is why he thought 
the TRM was ‘better because actually I was fishing for things’ (GP06). 
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In terms of NPT, the work of differentiation is an important facilitator of 
implementation because it helps participants to think through how they define, 
categorize and divide the tasks associated with implementing the TRM 
appropriately – which is complementary to the work of ‘skill-set workability’ and 
essential for effective ‘enrolment’. It also helps participants understand how 
changing aspects of the TRM may affect its outcomes. In NPT terms, it helps to 
inform the work of ‘reconfiguration’ of the TRM. For example, selecting 
different patient populations will affect the type and numbers of PSIs that are 
detected, e.g. high-risk groups are predisposed to PSIs so their selection will 
increase the estimated PSI rates. In addition, if new interventions are 
‘recognizable’ to participants it facilitates their work of coherence (sense-
making). Participants are able to use their existing skills and previous experience 
and potentially gain early confidence when using the method effectively.  From 
an NPT perspective, this would be described as ‘relational integration’.  
 
Most participants initially expressed concerns that implementing the TRM would 
increase their workload and require substantial additional resources and time. 
This perception was moderated as their understanding of the TRM increased 
through practical experiences with it, so that the vast majority of clinicians 
conceded that the actual workload and time requirements were lower than they 
initially expected. For example, GP11 described getting ‘bogged down’ during 
the first trigger review, learning from his experience and applying the method 
more effectively the second time. However, while reviewers typically 
experienced their second trigger reviews as being quicker and easier than the 
first, their findings were not necessarily more important or helpful.   
 
The finding that the perceived feasibility of the TRM changed during the study 
period is the result of the work of ‘individual specification’, e.g. reviewers 
changed their perceptions of the TRM so that they came to understand it as 
being quicker and easier than they thought at first. This was informed by the 
work of interacting with and experiencing the TRM (e.g. interactional 
workability) and evaluating its outcomes (e.g. individual appraisal). The 
implementation of the TRM was facilitated by practice teams understanding the 
necessary steps to implement the intervention and perceiving the requirements 
as being feasible. From their perspective, feasibility meant that the TRM 
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required minimum additional resources, time or increase in workload. The 
implication is that the degree of perceived or actual ‘effort’ required to 
implement an intervention is a powerful determinant of its eventual success 
(less effort, increased feasibility) or failure (more effort, decreased feasibility).  
Implementation can be facilitated further if the intervention can be assimilated 
into existing procedures and practices and participants expect it to reduce their 
workload. 
 
Implementation of the TRM was also facilitated because its intended users 
clearly understood its aims, potential benefits and limitations. Initially, their 
understanding varied widely, but after the training sessions the vast majority 
understood that the main objectives were to search samples of medical records 
for previously undetected PSIs and implement improvement actions. For some, 
their understanding of its benefits expanded during the study period as they 
identified additional applications, such as using the TRM during one-to-one 
training sessions with GPSTs.  
 
All participants thought the TRM was compatible with the prevailing culture in 
general practice and understood how it could be incorporated into their existing 
safety systems and procedures. This perception facilitated the implementation 
of the TRM as the participating practice teams reported having a strong, positive 
safety culture which in large part motivated them to participate in this study in 
the first place. The implication from this study finding is therefore that the more 
compatible an intervention is with the prevailing culture and existing work 
practices of a team or organisation, the more likely that its implementation will 
be successful and that it will become normalised over time.   
 
The degree to which interventions are perceived as being acceptable and 
feasible to their intended users largely determine whether they will be 
implemented successfully in the first instance and subsequently become 
integrated into routine work. The acceptability and feasibility of interventions 
are in turn determined by the product of the different types of ‘coherence’ 
work. The vast majority of participants perceived the TRM as acceptable and 
feasible and could: (i) clearly differentiate it from other QI methods; (ii) 
understand how to apply it; (iii) discern what potential benefits it would have 
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for them and their patients; and (iv) understood how it ‘fit’ within the prevailing 
cultures in their teams.  
 
9.2. Collective action - The operational work of enacting the TRM and 
integrating it with existing practices and contexts 
 
The main findings are summarised in Table 9.2 and illustrated with selected 
quotes: 
 Implementation of the TRM was facilitated when PSIs were detected 
quickly and the PSIs were unambiguous, serious, preventable and 
originated in primary care; 
 Implementation was facilitated by allocating adequate resources and 
time; 
 Inclusion of the TRM in the QOF was an important facilitating factor. 
 
The majority of reviewers conducted the trigger reviews as a single activity by 
themselves. However, in a small minority of practices the reviewers worked in 
pairs – at least initially – and felt this helped to improve their confidence in the 
method and their own ability to apply it. A small minority of practices decided 
to divide the trigger reviews among several clinicians, so that each reviewed 
only five or six records from the sample, but this strategy was perceived as 
ineffective. Similarly, when clinicians interrupted their trigger reviews by only 
searching a few medical records opportunistically during the day or days, they 
also reported less benefit compared with those that performed reviews as a 
single activity. One of the reasons for these findings was discussed in Chapter 8, 
namely that the TRM works by creating a patient safety ‘mindset’ which 
required time to form. 
 
Many reviewers considered the PSIs with greater severity to be more deserving 
of and amenable to improvement actions compared with those that had resulted 
in little or no patient harm. The small minority of reviewers that were unable to 
detect a single PSI or only detect a few PSIs of low severity therefore typically 
perceived this as an important barrier to the TRM’s use. This is understandable, 
as the main value of the TRM in general practice is derived from detecting PSIs 
and taking ownership for them (Chapter 8). However, some reviewers    
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Table 9.2. A description of the four components of the ‘collective action’ construct with selected quotes  
NPT component, with a description relating it to the TRM 
Success factors and their effect (facilitating or 
hindering) on implementation of the TRM  
Selected quotes 
   
Interactional workability: the work of applying the TRM in 
practice, the results (e.g. whether and what type of PSIs 
they detected and what improvement actions they took) 
and the time and effort this required (as opposed to what 
they perceived it would be). What effect did implementing 
the TRM have on their routine work? 
Implementation of the TRM was facilitated when PSIs 
were detected quickly and the PSIs were 
unambiguous, serious, preventable and originated in 
primary care. A small minority of reviewers found no 
PSIs, which was a major barrier to future 
implementation. 
There’s safe and there’s safe. I mean there’s 
life threatening and there’s a slight error on 
certain things (PM03) 
Relational integration: The work of building confidence in 
the TRM, their own and their colleagues’ abilities to 
effectively apply it and that the findings are valid and 
useful. To be effective, this work requires formal and 
informal sharing of trigger review findings. 
Practice teams in general accepted that the TRM 
findings were valid. However, none interpreted the 
results as reflecting unsafe or poor overall quality 
care. Implementation was hindered by the concerns 
of a minority of reviewers about the validity of the 
results from other practices or that their findings may 
be inappropriately interpreted and used at regional 
and national levels. 
You can do it properly or you can have a quick 
scamper through it and not find anything 
(GP04) 
If we get information back and you see 
practices where they’ve identified a range of 
issues, that’s good - they’ve identified them. 
But what else is going on in that practice? 
(GP08) 
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Skill-set workability: the work of dividing TRM 
implementation tasks. To be effective, this work requires 
the practice leadership to consider each team member’s 
current role, their experience, skills and attitude and the 
available resources and then appropriately match staff with 
the required work.  If necessary, additional resources or 
training may have to be procured. 
Implementation is facilitated by the allocation of 
adequate and appropriate resources, balancing 
competing demands on team members’ available time 
and considering reviewer characteristics when 
assigning new tasks. The TRM implementation was 
hindered in those practices that didn’t allocate 
adequate resources and time, or when time was 
allocated but not protected.  The vast majority of 
clinician reviewers had the necessary skills and 
experience to perform trigger reviews, but not all of 
them participated through choice. 
Time’s the biggest killer. I think every 
practice could open twenty four hours a day 
and still not have time. Every single thing 
that comes out: ‘we’ll get the practice nurse 
to do it’ but just how thin do you get spread? 
(PN08) 
Coming in in my own time was much better 
because there was no chance of being 
interrupted and more time to take. I didn’t 
feel pressure to look at my Docman or look to 
see what other things were going on in the 
surgery. So I think probably doing that [the 
trigger review] complete and everything’s 
closed and you know you’re up to date with 
everything is actually more useful (GP02) 
Contextual integration: The work of integrating the TRM 
within the context of general practice, in particular GPST, 
appraisal and revalidation.  CI work requires the provision 
of adequate and appropriate resources; visible support from 
senior leadership and restructuring existing policies or 
infrastructure to include and support the TRM. 
Formal inclusion of the TRM in existing, recognised GP 
contexts such as QOF, appraisal and GPST is an 
extremely powerful facilitator. However, some 
participants felt that including the TRM in QOF may 
paradoxically decrease its impact, as it may simply 
become ‘another tick box’ exercise for some 
practices. 
Will I be putting [the TRM] in my appraisal? Of 
course (GP01) 
  What we were going to do was get the GP 
trainee involved… I plan personally to use it 
with our trainees now (GP12) 
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had an alternative interpretation of ‘finding nothing’, which is that it provided 
them with ‘evidence’ that the care they provide was safe and of a high 
standard. Implementation of the TRM was facilitated when the participants or 
practice leadership accurately assessed the resources and time that would be 
required for each phase of the implementation process and ensured that these 
needs were met. They also had to decide who would do which tasks. In NPT 
terms, the work involved in this is described by the ‘skill set-workability’ 
component. They also had to critically evaluate the knowledge and ‘readiness’ 
(as defined in Chapter 8, page 200) of the clinician reviewers and whether these 
were sufficient to enable them to successfully implement the TRM.  
 
Further work was then required to recruit additional team members and keep 
them actively engaged in the TRM process (enrolment) and to allocate and 
provide the necessary resources (contextual integration) to enact the trigger 
review findings. The potential types of resources included: protected time to 
implement the intervention; access to external ‘expert’ support; availability of 
training; senior leadership support; restructuring current policies and 
infrastructure to include, promote and support the TRM; and discretionary 
budgets. The work of ‘contextual integration’ should be the responsibility of the 
host organisation, which in this study included the general practices. However, 
the local health authorities, NHS Health Boards and even the national 
government also had important contributions to make.  
 
Providing adequate and appropriate resources was one of the most important 
facilitating factors for the successful implementation of the TRM. While, the 
participants valued the TRM training, educational material and support from 
external ‘experts’, according to them the crucial resource was sufficient, 
uninterrupted time to allow a trigger review to be completed as a single 
activity.  
 
While most practices allocated at least some protected time for TRM work, it 
was seldom adequate or uninterrupted. One GP described the intensity of the 
workload in her practice as a ‘rollercoaster’ and how she had to ‘physically 
hide’ (GP02) to perform trigger reviews. As a result some clinicians performed 
the reviews in their own time, in-between other tasks or divided the sample of 
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records between several clinicians, which as stated earlier reportedly decreased 
its effectiveness. Some reviewers reported being interrupted by team members 
or by other, more urgent clinical tasks. A minority of participants were also 
distracted by the constant feeling of other work ‘piling up’ and a compulsion to 
keep checking how their workload was increasing while they were performing 
trigger reviews. For these reviewers, the TRM was perceived as just one more 
task competing for their limited time.  
 
The personal and professional characteristics of reviewers strongly influenced 
the implementation of the TRM. Experienced, enthusiastic clinicians who were 
motivated to use the TRM and able to critically reflect on their findings and the 
implications for their patients and the practice derived the most value from the 
method. On the other hand, adopting a strict ‘tick box’ approach reduced the 
effectiveness of the TRM. The study participants thought that a substantial 
minority of the overall general practice workforce would adopt this approach 
with any intervention including the TRM, and especially those interventions 
associated with the QOF. From their perspective, the TRM may therefore be less 
useful when implemented more widely.  
 
This is an important concern given the TRM was incorporated into the QOF 
shortly after this study commenced and subsequently implemented across 
Scotland by hundreds of general practice teams. However, a comparison 
between this study and the larger QOF study did not find any significant 
differences in the main findings. The perception that some practices simply ‘tick 
boxes’ may therefore be incorrect or, alternatively, occur in only a small 
number of practices.  
 
Most participants thought that including the TRM in QOF was the most important 
facilitating factor for its implementation. A practice manager explained how 
‘being part of the contract it [the TRM] just becomes something that has to be 
done’ (PM03).  But for a minority of reviewers it paradoxically decreased their 
interest in the TRM.  This is because they perceived QOF targets as being 
achievable without discernible improvements in patient outcomes and concerns 
that targets become harder to achieve year after year. One GP felt that ‘it’s 
quite easy to pay, if I’m honest, lip service to some of those changes for the 
233 
 
paperwork that is required [by QOF]’ (GP06). In NPT terms the work of including 
the TRM in the QOF is described by the ‘contextual integration’ component. 
Consequently, participants were able to ‘legitimise’ their involvement with the 
TRM and this facilitated its implementation. However, including the TRM in QOF 
paradoxically also hindered its implementation. Some participants struggled to 
do the work of ‘relational integration’ because, as described above, they 
struggled to build trust in the ability of other practices to effectively apply the 
method.   
 
Apart from the QOF, the implementation of the TRM was also facilitated by its 
integration in other general practice contexts, including GP specialty training 
(GPST) and appraisal. A few participants felt the TRM had potential value in 
medical education: I actually used it [the TRM] as a teaching tool’ (GP11). They 
introduced the method to the GPSTs in their practices, encouraged them to 
apply it and subsequently discussed their findings in order to identify learning 
needs and points. Most GP reviewers also indicated that they included or 
planned to include the TRM as supporting evidence of QI for appraisal purposes. 
However, these contexts were much less important for the implementation of 
the TRM compared with the QOF and were not significant facilitating factors.  
 
The vast majority of participants’ confidence in the TRM and their own ability to 
correctly apply it increased with experience and time. However, some 
participants described a lack of trust in the validity of the findings of reviewers 
in their own or other practices and a substantial minority of practice nurses 
doubted their own ability to apply the method correctly (at least initially), e.g.:  
‘I was just lacking confidence of what I was doing; I think that’s what it was. I 
kept thinking I should go back and I did... I just had to convince myself I wasn’t 
missing anything. I was annoyed with myself for feeling like that cause I felt I 
shouldn’t. I’m experienced enough and it was just something different (PN10). 
 
Despite this, the vast majority of practice nurses were able to detect PSIs. 
However, they were less likely than the GP group to formally share their findings 
with the rest of the team or implement improvements at the practice level. This 
was at least partly because the majority of nurses were not provided with formal 
opportunities to report their findings during practice meetings, where limited 
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time meant competing agenda items were given priority, or meetings were 
scheduled on days when the nurses were not scheduled to work. Even when the 
practice nurses were able to attend team meetings, they typically did not set or 
influence the agenda.  
 
‘The nurse will do it [trigger reviews] because that’s what she’s been asked to do, 
but I’m not sure that it’ll then go anywhere, or make anything happen unless 
someone else is involved with that, and it’s brought up... it’s going to be quite 
difficult for me to share those findings with other people, because I’m hardly ever 
at the practice meeting, because they have it on a day I don’t work here, and at 
the other practice I work in I’m never at their practice meetings, so I’m in an oddly 
peripheral place, you know, and that can be very difficult. I like to feel involved 
and like I can, you know, influence things and help a practice to work better, but 
I’m not in that position’ (PN02)  
 
The majority of participants felt confident that the findings of their own trigger 
reviews were valid and that they had applied the method correctly. They 
acknowledged that some of the detected PSIs may indicate opportunities to 
improve specific aspects of future care but no one thought it implied that their 
overall standards of care were unsafe or of unacceptable quality. The majority 
of participants informally shared the findings from the trigger reviews with at 
least some team members. The potential impact and value of the TRM was 
increased by sharing the findings, particularly when this helped team members 
to identify and agree on the contributing factors of PSIs and collectively take 
further action to improve practice systems and processes. However, only a 
minority shared the results with the whole practice team during dedicated 
meetings. 
 
A substantial minority of participants had concerns about how trigger review 
findings would be interpreted and used at a national level. For this group, their 
concerns, and a general mistrust of more senior NHS management, were a 
potential barrier to effective implementation of the TRM. One GP felt ‘we talk 
about a no blame culture in NHS [Board X]’ yet ‘the first thing everyone does is 
‘right, who’s to blame for this’ and too often the result is that ‘we’ll hang 
someone out to dry in a non-judgemental way’ (GP04). 
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9.3. Cognitive participation - The relational work of engaging participants and 
establishing a community of practice around the TRM   
 
The main findings are summarised in Table 9.3 and illustrated with selected 
quotes: 
 Providing flexible training facilitated implementation of the TRM; 
 The TRM was facilitated through voluntary participation; 
 The TRM was facilitated when reviewers had sufficient autonomy and 
opportunities to enact change. 
 
The period prior to and during the initial implementation of an intervention is 
crucial, as it helps to determine whether the intended users will accept 
ownership and continue using it. During this period the work of ‘initiation’ is an 
essential part of determining participation, but also influences the degree of 
‘coherence’ (understanding) participants develop about the intervention. 
Factors that were particularly strong facilitators early in the implementation of 
the TRM were: (i) identifying and recruiting practices and clinicians with an 
expressed interest in improving care quality; (ii) providing flexible training 
sessions; (iii) easy access to ‘expert’ support and advice; and (iv) detecting PSIs 
early during the trigger reviews, which helped to increase participants’ 
confidence in the method and their own abilities to apply it. Of these factors, 
participants considered TRM training as the most important.  
 
Training typically required a minimum of one hour and only rarely exceeded two 
hours. Characteristics of the training that facilitated implementation were 
flexibility in delivery and timing, using a range of teaching methods and tailoring 
the delivery to participants’ learning needs. In particular, participants valued 
the chance to practice the method on simulated records and the educational 
resources they were provided with were useful reminders during the actual 
trigger reviews. However, whether clinicians received training or not was a more 
important factor in determining their success in implementing the TRM than the 
type of training. 
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Table 9.3. A description of the four components of the ‘Cognitive participation’ construct with selected quotes  
NPT component, with a description relating it to the 
TRM 
Success factors and their effect (facilitating or 
hindering) on implementation of the TRM  
Selected quotes 
   
Initiation: The work of preparing for the 
implementation of the TRM, e.g. ensuring that 
implementers are willing and able to start using it. 
Training, formal and informal promotion of the 
intervention (raising awareness) and access to expert 
support all facilitated implementation.  However, 
training had to be flexible and use suitable delivery 
methods. 
I’ve been trying to start the ground level 
approach of saying ‘this is how it should be 
used’, you know, used formatively and using it to 
look at your systems as well, and things like that 
(GP05) 
Enrolment:  the work of identifying and recruiting the 
necessary people that are required to implement the 
TRM at the appropriate times. It also involves 
identifying others who chose to participate and 
evaluating the contributions of all participants. 
Initial recruitment of volunteers facilitated 
implementation by ensuring clinician engagement. The 
TRM was facilitated by the vast majority of GPs 
participating voluntary.  However, the majority of 
practice nurses and administrators were assigned to 
the TRM which, in some cases, reduced their 
motivation. 
Sometimes you know that, although they’re 
asking you [pause] it’s going to come your way 
anyway (PN09) 
We decided because I’d already done this last 
year that one of the other GPs would do the 
trigger tools this year (GP11) 
Activation: The work of supporting and sustaining the 
TRM individually and as a team. This work required 
TRM findings to be disseminated and that clinician 
reviewers had opportunities and sufficient influence to 
enact the findings. 
The TRM was facilitated when findings were 
disseminated and reviewers had sufficient autonomy 
and opportunity to enact change. 
[The TRM is] easy until you get the ‘what am I 
going to do about this’ stage (GP04) 
I held a practice meeting afterwards to highlight 
that perhaps we aren’t always that good (GP06) 
I wasn’t involved at all (PM10) 
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Legitimation: The work individuals and teams do to 
justify implementing and being involved with the TRM. 
This component also includes the legitimising work 
other parties do who are not directly involved in the 
practical implementation of the TRM. 
Implementation of the TRM was facilitated when 
individuals and practice teams were able to justify 
investing time and resources in its application. Formal 
inclusion, endorsement and external validation of the 
TRM by professional and regulatory bodies were 
particularly powerful facilitators. 
I’m not sure if I’d have gone back to [the TRM] if 
it had disappeared off the horizon. If it was out 
of QOF, but part of what we do, or it’s made an 
RCGP approved tool or it was something that 
trainees do, then I could see why people would 
become lured to the idea that it is a good 
thing... cause it gives it fruits -  there are fruits 
for your labour. Well, you have to justify the 
time in order to make it happen (GP06) 
I feel I always have to justify every single 
working minute I have in here and I don’t take 
tea breaks because it’s just constant (PN10) 
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Implementation of the TRM typically began with a GP volunteering to participate 
in the study or apply the method. These ‘early adopter’ or local ‘champion’ GPs 
described personal and professional reasons for wanting to participate: curiosity, 
awareness of patient safety as a practice and political priority, and being 
proactive in this regard. These GPs then enrolled other team members to assist 
with the work of implementing the TRM in one of three ways.  The first was 
formally assigning specific responsibilities to team members with little or no 
opportunity to decline the role. This is the way in which the vast majority of 
practice nurses, managers and administrators were recruited. The second way 
was to recruit team members opportunistically or wait for them to volunteer 
their engagement. This is the way the vast majority of other GPs were enrolled. 
The third and least common enrolment method was formal invitations at 
practice meetings and GPST training sessions. A few GPs also enrolled non-
practice participants, including IT staff, pharmacy colleagues and secondary 
care clinicians. Perhaps unsurprisingly GPs were - at least initially - more 
motivated to apply the TRM than PNs. However, the manner of enrolment and 
initial levels of motivation did not seem to be associated with the relative 
success (or not) of applying the TRM.  
 
The autonomy (or alternatively ‘power’ or ‘influence’) of the reviewers was 
identified as an essential factor in the TRM’s implementation – without it, the 
potential for improvement was greatly reduced. However, clinicians with little 
autonomy could still detect PSIs, endeavour to make some improvements at the 
individual patient level and learn from the trigger review process. Conversely, 
greater levels of autonomy meant trigger review findings were shared with the 
rest of the practice team and therefore increased the educational and 
improvement value of the TRM to the practice and even regional. In NPT terms, 
the work of ‘activating’ the TRM required participants to remain ‘engaged’ with 
the intervention. This was facilitated when they were provided with sufficient 
opportunities to enact the intervention and perceived their involvement to be 
appropriate, e.g. through the complementary work of ‘legitimisation’ and 
‘relational integration’.  
 
Implementation was therefore also facilitated when the TRM was perceived as a 
legitimate activity and participants could justify investing their time and 
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resources in it. Legitimation of the TRM occurred through three main 
mechanisms.  These are, in descending order of their perceived importance: (i) 
contextual integration with, for example, QOF; (ii) endorsement and practical 
demonstration by a peer, e.g. a clinician in the practice performing a trigger 
review; and (iii) verbal or written promotion by health care and professional 
organisations, e.g. the RCGP and NES. The vast majority of participants were 
also aware that improving patient safety in primary care had been declared a 
priority by the Scottish Government.  
 
However, just because an intervention is perceived as ‘legitimate’ does not 
necessarily imply that it is useful or acceptable. Alternatively, an intervention 
may be very effective and its users may have confidence in it, but it may still 
not be legitimate. Therefore, the ‘confidence’ of health care workers in a 
method, tool or intervention does not only depend on its legitimacy, but also on 
its perceived value to them and others, i.e. the work of reflexive monitoring, 
which is discussed next.  
 
9.4. Reflexive monitoring - The appraisal work of adapting and evaluating the 
TRM    
 
The main findings are summarised in Table 9.4 and illustrated with selected 
quotes: 
 The Trigger Review Summary Sheets facilitated implementation; 
 The vast majority of participants perceived the TRM as potentially useful 
in their practice, and also in the wider general practice setting. 
 A few clinicians adapted the TRM to better suit their own aims 
 
The TRM was intentionally designed to be flexible. Training sessions introduced 
generic principles and suggested high-yield strategies, but reviewers were 
actively encouraged to make minor adaptations if they considered this necessary 
in relation to their own individual circumstances. Examples of how the TRM was 
customized included: the type of patient population selected for review; what 
period of time to review in each record; whether to add extra ‘triggers’; and the 
order in which record sections were screened for the presence of PSIs. Clinicians 
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then used their own discretion whether to record a detected PSI or not, and 
whether and how they address it.  
 
The TRM’s relative flexibility was identified as an important facilitating factor 
for its implementation.  However, despite the potential to adapt the TRM, only a 
small minority of reviewers actually did so. For example, in 57/67 (85.1%) trigger 
reviews the sample of patient records were selected from the recommended 
‘high risk’ patient group, e.g. patients aged >75 years and with confirmed 
cardiovascular disease. Another example is that only a tiny minority of reviewers 
recorded optional triggers and even then there was no evidence that they were 
useful to detect additional PSIs.  
 
The Trigger Review SS was intentionally designed as a one page (double-sided) 
data collection template with a series of tick boxes and adjustable text boxes to 
encourage a structured approach to recording the detection of PSIs, 
improvement actions and reflection and learning. Clinicians generally found the 
SS quick and straightforward to use. However, a minority of reviewers were at 
first unable to complete the electronic version because of incompatible IT 
systems – a problem which was resolved – and a small minority of reviewers  
indicated that they had struggled to rate the severity and preventability of the 
PSIs they detected, despite referring to the rating scales on the SS. A small 
minority of reviewers also suggested minor changes to further improve the 
usefulness of the SS. Two examples of suggested edits that were subsequently 
made were: adding a section to record whether findings were shared at a 
practice meeting and removing the ‘priority’ ratings of PSIs.  Overall, in NPT 
terms, the work of ‘systematization’, e.g. collecting, analysing and sharing data 
with the SS facilitated implementation of the TRM. 
 
The vast majority of participants perceived the TRM as a useful approach to 
improve the safety of the care they provide. They also recognised its potential 
for identifying learning needs and points, encouraging reflection and raising 
awareness of potential safety threats. Overall, they thought the TRM had at 
least as much value as their existing QI methods. While the TRM’s perceived 
usefulness was identified as an important facilitator of its implementation, 
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Table 9.4. A description of the four components of the ‘reflexive monitoring’ construct with selected quotes  
NPT component, with a description 
relating it to the TRM 
Success factors and their effect (facilitating or hindering) 
on implementation of the TRM  
Selected quotes 
   
Systematisation: the work of 
collecting and analysing information 
about the TRM, e.g. data about its 
application, findings and outcomes. 
The simple, one-page data collection template facilitated 
implementation by providing a clear, electronic and 
structured format.  However, some clinicians struggled to 
rate the characteristics of detected PSIs.   
The form’s [TRSS] helpful although it’s perhaps a reporting 
tool. It forces you down the route of making you think 
(GP04) 
To be honest people will make a judgement for 
themselves about how important something is and 
subconsciously will probably use the preventability and 
the severity in their own head without having to have it 
written down (GP05) 
Reconfiguration: The work of 
adapting the TRM according to local 
requirements. 
The TRM was intentionally designed to be flexible which 
facilitated its implementation, with evidence that clinicians 
modified minor aspects. However, increased flexibility 
reduces the reliability and validity of inter-practice data 
comparison. 
We used the same list but I don’t think we used the same 
patient’s records (GP02) 
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Individual appraisal: The work of 
evaluating the usefulness of the TRM 
for the individual clinician 
implementing it, her/his practice 
team and patients. 
The vast majority of participants perceived the TRM as a 
useful approach to help improve the safety of the care they 
deliver.  They also recognised its potential for identifying 
learning needs and points and encouraging reflection. 
I did find it useful… I quite liked it… I thought helpful, 
clinically helpful… I thought it was worthwhile (GP02) 
[We] got some really good outcomes from it: a couple of 
SEAs and an audit... There’s learning for the system in 
there, so worthwhile, definitely worthwhile (GP04) 
I like this [the TRM] as a kind of start. Here’s something 
we can do regularly that can actually show us how good 
we are or how bad we are or areas that we need to work 
at or where we need to go (PM03) 
Communal appraisal:  The work of 
evaluating the usefulness of the TRM 
for other practices and their patients. 
The vast majority of participants perceived the TRM as a 
useful approach to improve the safety of care in the wider 
general practice setting. 
I think it’s more valuable than QOF QP to be honest... You 
will probably find things that will then benefit more than 
that one patient in the practice, because you might be 
able to then look at wider practices within your own GP 
practice and then beyond (GP08) 
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participants were clear that evidence of its usefulness would not be sufficient to 
ensure its normalisation. Participants also (implicitly) experienced the 
usefulness of the TRM for others as less important than the perceived value it 
had for them. The main facilitating value of ‘collective appraisal’ work 
therefore seems to be at the regional and national levels. An example of this is 
the decision to include the TRM in QOF, which was at least partly informed by 
evidence of its potential usefulness in previous pilot studies (40, 41).   
 
From an NPT perspective, the perceived usefulness of the TRM was mainly 
determined through the work of ‘reflexive monitoring’.  Its implementation was 
facilitated because the vast majority of participants considered the method as 
flexible, found it easy to collect the necessary performance data and perceived 
the TRM as being useful for individual clinicians, practice teams, patients as well 
as the wider general practice community. 
 
9.5. Discussion of the main study findings in Chapter 9 
 
9.5.1. The relationships between NPT constructs and components 
 
Throughout sections 9.1 to 9.4 of this chapter, the relationships between 
different factors, constructs and components were highlighted. In reality, these 
effects were emergent, temporal and fluctuated over the course of the study 
period. While many examples were provided, any of the constructs and 
components can reciprocally affect all of the others. This is an important point 
to consider, as the mechanisms, links and associations between the different 
factors, constructs and components of NPT have not, to the best of my 
knowledge, been formally considered before. In particular, how and why do the 
associations between factors change over time? Which of the links, associations 
and mechanisms are particularly important for normalisation? Do they vary 
between settings, contexts and with different interventions and implementers?  
 
In terms of the TRM, the following two examples may help to demonstrate the 
relative importance of associations, links and relationships between NPT 
constructs and components. The first example is the highly correlated work of 
relational integration and legitimation. In both cases, the work seems strongly 
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dependent on confidence – confidence in the method, the reviewers’ ability to 
correctly apply the method, having the support of the rest of the team and 
confidence that external agencies support the TRM and will not use the results 
as an indication of substandard care in their practices. However, the work is also 
different, because relational integration requires actively involving others and 
legitimisation work requires justification to become and stay involved with the 
TRM, which is possible to do even when confidence in the intervention may be 
low. 
 
The second example of highly-correlated work is that of coherence and reflexive 
monitoring. Being able to evaluate the potential worth of an intervention 
(individual and communal appraisal) implicitly implies the need of understanding 
beforehand what its intended aims and potential value are (the work of 
individual and communal specification). The work of ‘communal specification’ 
therefore began prior to the implementation of the TRM as individuals and teams 
worked to understand its potential worth for them and others. Their initial 
perceptions then changed as a result of the work of appraisal. The reviewers 
then (consciously or unconsciously) searched for practical confirmation of their 
new understanding as they conducted further trigger reviews. In this way, 
reflexive monitoring and coherence reciprocally influence and shape each other 
over time.  
 
9.5.2. Comparison with the literature 
 
A systematic literature review (n=47 studies) in 2010 of the influence of context 
on quality improvement in healthcare identified the most important factors that 
determined ‘success’ and normalisation of interventions. They were (are): senior 
leadership; organisational culture; information systems; previous experience of 
quality improvement; clinician engagement and resources (345).  
 
A subsequent, narrative review of the Health Foundation’s improvement 
programmes (n=5) by Dixon-Woods et al in 2012 identified ten common 
challenges when any attempts are made to improve the quality and safety of 
health care. The ten challenges were related to three broad themes: design and 
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planning of improvement interventions; organisational and institutional 
contexts; and challenges related to specific professional groups (346).  
 
More recently, a systematic review (n=57 studies) by Braithwaite et al identified 
eight common factors associated with successful efforts to improve standards of 
care: preparing for change; capacity for implementation - setting; capacity for 
implementation – people; types of implementation; resources; leverage; 
sustainability; and desirable implementation enabling features (45).  
 
The main findings from the two most recent reviews are summarised and 
compared in Table 9.5. In addition, the findings from the reviews are ‘mapped’ 
to the NPT constructs and components that best describe them. There are three 
important inferences that can be made from Table 9.5. The first is that a 
discrete number of factors determine whether complex health care interventions 
are successfully implemented and eventually become normalised.  
 
Second, the same core set of factors seem to determine whether 
implementation and normalisation are successful (or not), and these factors can 
be detected irrespective of the differences in terminology, taxonomies and 
methodologies of researchers.  
 
The third and final inference is that application of a theoretical framework can 
facilitate meaningful comparisons of data. More specifically, applying the NPT 
framework in this study and to the related, international literature, clearly 
identified the similarities between the key factors that were perceived to 
strongly influence implementation and normalisation processes. Consequently, it 
can confidently be asserted that the main study findings reported in this chapter 
are comparable with the international literature.  
 
Consider, as a practical example, the relative importance of providing adequate 
resources during implementation. The ‘resources’ factor is a fairly ubiquitous 
finding in the international literature, and seems to be independent of 
geographical location; medical specialty; type of intervention; or scale of 
improvement initiative (270, 276, 347). In fact, one of the key findings from the 
review by Braithwaite et al is that ‘resources’ were the most frequently  
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Table 9.5. Implementation success factors, quality improvement challenges and the NPT framework 
 
Implementation success factors (n=8) identified by 
Braithwaite et al (45) 
Challenges in quality improvement (n=10) identified 
by Dixon-Woods et al (346)  
Equivalent NPT framework constructs  
(components) 
1 Preparing for change: the organisation, team and 
individuals have planned for the intervention 
  Cognitive participation (initiation, activation) 
  1-3 Design and planning: Convince people there is a 
problem and a solution; match goals and ambitions 
to what is feasible 
Coherence (differentiation; individual and 
communal specification) 
2 Capacity for implementation – setting: contextual 
factors 
4 Organisational contexts, culture and capacities Collective action (skill-set workability, 
contextual integration) 
3 Capacity for implementation – people: There are 
enough people with the necessary skills, knowledge 
and willingness to implement the intervention  
5 Leadership Cognitive participation (enrolment); Collective 
action (skill-set workability) 
4 Types of implementation: the intervention meets the 
needs of the organisation 
  Coherence (communal specification) 
5 Resources: adequate and appropriate resources are 
available, including discretionary budgets, managerial 
support, Infrastructure, technology, time and staff 
  Collective action (skill-set workability) 
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6 Leverage: there is support and momentum throughout 
the implementation process; clinical champions 
  Legitimation 
7 Sustainability: this requires planning and ongoing 
effort 
6-7 Securing sustainability and remaining vigilant for 
unwanted consequences 
Sustainability is the product if the work of all 
four constructs are done effectively 
8 Desirable implementation enabling features:     
  Communication and collaboration    Collective action (Relational integration) 
  Clear implementation strategy   Coherence (individual specification) 
  Teamwork  8 Tribalism and staff engagement Collective action (Relational integration, skill-
set workability) 
  Monitoring, evaluation and feedback 9 Establish data collection and monitoring systems Reflexive monitoring (systematization, 
individual and communal appraisal) 
  Incentives 10 Incentivise participation Cognitive participation (legitimation) 
  Flexibility, tailoring implementations to the local 
context 
  Reflexive monitoring (reconfiguration); 
Coherence (internalization) 
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identified factor that were considered to be a determinant of successful 
implementation (45). Similarly, in this study, the vast majority of participants 
also identified adequate resources as the single most important factor 
determining whether an intervention will become normalised (or not).  
 
Three additional examples will be provided next to further support the critical 
inferences from Table 9.5, and the assertion that the main findings from this 
study are comparable with the international literature. The study designs of all 
three were informed by NPT, but they were also selected because they are 
exemplars of: (i) implementing an intervention in the UK, but in a non-GP health 
care setting (270); (ii) implementing multiple interventions at scale (347); and 
(iii) implementing an intervention in general practice, but in a non-UK country 
(276). 
  
The first example is Bamford et al who used NPT and qualitative methods to 
determine the barriers and facilitators of nutrition guideline implementation in 
UK residential care homes. They report that ‘improving nutrition only appeared 
to be a priority if it could be achieved within existing resources’ (270). They 
also found further significant barriers, including: lack of leadership and 
managerial support and staff perceiving the implementation as threats to their 
autonomy and expertise (e.g. the work of cognitive participation 
malfunctioning); lack of feedback from clients to cooks, or feedback mediated 
by care staff with biased view (e.g. no reflexive monitoring work was or could be 
done); scepticism over the value of the guidelines which were perceived to be 
incompatible with existing practices (e.g. much coherence work was required); 
and the lack of nutritional knowledge or engagement of the cooks (e.g. the work 
of collective action could not properly be done). Unsurprisingly, the 
implementation of nutrition guidelines was ‘challenging’, although some changes 
did become embedded in routine practice. 
 
The second example is the Delivering Assisted Living Lifestyles at Scale (DALLAS) 
programme. This was an ambitious programme attempting change at a much 
larger scale than this study or previous studies underpinned by NPT. DALLAS was 
a national, pan-UK programme aiming to promote health and well-being through 
the delivery of a broad range of digital services and products and was evaluated 
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using a rigorous, mixed methods and NPT approach (347). Some of the key 
challenges to normalisation in the DALLAS evaluation are therefore less relevant 
to this study, such as ‘branding and marketing issues’ or establishing and 
maintaining ‘multi-agency partnerships’. However, other factors such as the 
‘need for resilience’ and ‘information governance’ are instantly recognizable 
and equally applicable.     
  
The third example is Franx et al’s introduction and evaluation of a stepped-care 
model for managing depression in primary care in the Netherlands (276). The 
model had three components: patient differentiation (reliable identification of 
patients suitable for treatment); stepped-care treatment (being aware of and 
accessing a range of available treatments); and monitoring patient outcomes. 
The main facilitating factors were the model itself, which was understood and 
accepted (the work of coherence), regular structured team meetings (the work 
of cognitive participation) and positive feedback from patients (the work of 
reflexive monitoring). However, implementation was hindered by a lack of 
resources, underdeveloped IT systems and different perceptions of depression in 
the wider multidisciplinary team (the work of skill-set workability, relational and 
contextual integration). Consequently, the authors found evidence of ‘strides 
towards utilizing’ the model but not normalisation during the study period. The 
fact that some improvements were made should be acknowledged and 
celebrated as 'it seems unlikely that the changes reported by the clinicians 
would have occurred by itself within the primary care teams' (e.g. without 
external intervention).  
 
Conclusion 
 
This Chapter described a large number of factors that were perceived as 
facilitating or hindering the implementation of the TRM in general practice.  Of 
these, four main factors were identified by the vast majority of participants as 
being essential for the successful implementation of the TRM. The first and most 
important factor is provision of adequate resources, and in particular allocating 
sufficient, protected time to perform trigger reviews. The second factor is 
legitimising the intervention through incentives and endorsements by the 
government or a professional body. An example would be the RCGP approving 
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the TRM for specialty training, appraisal and revalidation purposes. Financially 
incentivizing the TRM by including it in the pay-for-performance QOF greatly 
facilitated both these factors (‘resources’ and ‘legitimising’).  The third factor is 
the characteristics of the participating clinicians, e.g. their degree of 
engagement, autonomy and pre-existing knowledge and skills. The fourth factor 
is the perceptions of the general practice teams about the TRM’s utility.   
 
Normalising innovations and interventions in health care require multiple 
approaches, which may sometimes appear contradictory: strong leadership is 
essential, but within a participatory culture; initiatives should have clear aims, 
but also be flexible and respond to local needs and contexts; performance 
should be monitored with regular critical feedback, yet without attaching 
blame; properly designing and planning an intervention is important, yet 
momentum and pace have to be maintained; clinician engagement is essential, 
yet some changes will of necessity go against the grain of existing professional 
cultures and customs. A key message from this study, and also from the 
international literature, is therefore that ‘there is no magic bullet in improving 
quality in health care’ (346, 348). However, while it is true that implementing 
change is time consuming and normalisation depends on many, complex factors 
potentially hindering and facilitating at multiple levels, it is also true that 
improvement is possible! The final Chapter will therefore consider the likelihood 
of the TRM being normalised, but also whether the TRM should be normalised. 
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Chapter 10. Discussion  
 
Chapters 6 to 9 described the main study findings, compared them with the 
international patient safety literature, and identified some of the important 
practical implications. This chapter begins by summarising the aims and the 
main findings of this study in Table 10.1. Next, four specific questions are raised 
in relation to this study, and the most likely answers are provided.  The four 
questions are:  
 
1. Should the TRM be normalised in general practice? This is arguably the most 
important issue to consider from the perspective of this study, which aimed to 
determine the usefulness of the TRM. The short answer is ‘yes’, and three 
reasons will be provided in justification.  
  
2. What is the likelihood of the TRM being normalised in general practice? This 
question relates to the study aim of determining the barriers and facilitators 
to the implementation of the TRM.  The study findings and international 
literature suggest that normalisation of the TRM would be very likely if all 
four of the following factors could be guaranteed: practice teams and 
clinicians have the necessary knowledge to apply the TRM effectively; there is 
senior leadership support for the TRM; adequate resources (including time) 
are provided; and it is formally integrated into existing general practice 
contexts such as GP specialty training (GPST) and appraisal and revalidation. 
However, given that there are currently no financial incentives or mandatory 
requirements for practices and individual GPs to use the TRM, normalisation 
seems unlikely.  
 
3. What are the strengths and limitations of this study? This question will be 
answered by considering the strengths and limitations of the study in general, 
with additional subsections to consider the strengths and limitations of NPT 
and the TRM. 
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Table 10.1. Summary of the aims and main findings of this study 
 
Aims Chapter Findings 
   
To describe the patient 
safety perceptions of 
general practice 
clinicians and staff  
6  Participants perceived patient safety as 
important, integral to care and amenable to 
improvement.  
 Medication and medication-related processes 
and elderly, housebound patients were 
considered to be particularly at risk for PSIs.  
 All of the practice teams were already using a 
range of improvement methods. They strongly 
indicated that additional resources were critical 
prerequisites for their future participation in 
improvement initiatives.  
   
To determine the 
usefulness of the TRM 
by describing the 
outcomes from its 
implementation 
7  47 Primary care clinicians performed trigger 
reviews of 1659 electronic medical records and 
detected 216 PSIs.  
 A substantial minority of PSIs (29.2%) were 
associated with moderate or more substantial 
harm, the majority (54.8%) were rated as 
preventable or potentially preventable, and the 
most common type of PSI related to 
‘medication’ (40.7%).  
 Reviewers undertook specific patient safety-
related actions during and after approximately 
two thirds of trigger reviews.  
   
To explain how the TRM 
works 
8  The TRM enabled the detection of PSIs through 
a combination of three factors: structure; 
mindset (knowledge); and opportunities. 
 Detecting PSIs created potential learning 
moments and the option to accept ownership of 
the findings.  
 Ownership of PSIs facilitated subsequent 
reflection, learning and improvement actions. 
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To identify and describe 
the main factors that 
facilitated or hindered 
the implementation of 
the TRM in general 
practice 
9 Implementation of the TRM was facilitated when: 
 Participants understood that it was compatible 
with their existing work, and perceived it as 
feasible and acceptable.  
 Clinicians had the necessary knowledge to 
conduct effective trigger reviews 
 PSIs were detected quickly, and the PSIs were 
unambiguous, serious, preventable and 
originated in primary care; 
 Adequate resources and time were allocated; 
 It was included in GP contexts such as QOF, 
appraisal and GPST 
 Reviewers had senior leadership support and 
opportunities to enact change 
 Participants perceived it as useful for them and 
others 
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4. Can recommendations be made as a result of the study? The answer is ‘yes’. 
Recommendations can be made about implementation processes and 
improvement interventions in health care settings, in relation to the TRM as 
well as about current and future research priorities. 
 
10.1. Should the TRM be normalised? 
 
This section provides three reasons why the TRM should be normalised. They are:  
(i) this study contributes further evidence that the TRM is in the main 
useful, acceptable and feasible as an approach to improve patient 
safety in UK general practice;  
(ii) For the overall safety of care to improve in health care, a range of 
complementary methods will be required; and  
(iii) The TRM provides clinicians and researchers with a unique perspective 
of patient safety incidents (PSI) and how they may be reduced. 
 
10.1.1. The TRM is in the main a useful, acceptable and feasible approach 
to improve patient safety in UK general practice  
 
All the clinician reviewers in this study were able to perform trigger reviews and 
submitted Summary Sheets. The vast majority of reviewers detected PSIs and 
the majority took or intended to take subsequent actions to improve care 
standards. They also reported learning points and some felt they were more 
vigilant for potential safety threats. It is highly unlikely that these positive 
outcomes would have occurred if the TRM had not been implemented. However, 
it is unclear whether the positive effects had a subsequent, measurable impact 
on clinical outcomes, and the cost-effectiveness of the method was not 
estimated. In addition, the safety ‘mindset’ of some reviewers was temporary 
and eroded over time because of the need to refocus their attention and efforts 
on other, competing priorities for their time.  
 
The personal accounts provided by some of the study participants demonstrate 
how some PSIs can provoke a more powerful learning experience than others. 
Typically, the more memorable PSIs were the ones that had resulted in serious 
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harm and were clearly preventable. Given that most of the PSIs detected in this 
study were of low to moderate severity and only about half were considered 
preventable, it may help to explain why the increased vigilance for safety 
threats was transient. However, as was described in Chapter 9, some 
participants described minor incidents that had caused them significant 
emotional distress and continued to exert a powerful influence on their clinical 
practice years later. The recommendation is therefore that clinicians perform 
trigger reviews regularly to help refresh their safety awareness. By the same 
reasoning, this recommendation would also apply to other improvement 
methods. The reviewers in this study felt two trigger reviews a year would be 
feasible, allow them time to disseminate and act on the findings and be frequent 
enough to retain the required knowledge to apply it effectively.  
 
10.1.2. The overall safety of care can be improved, and this will require a 
range of complementary methods. 
 
This study contributes to the growing evidence about the potential value of the 
TRM as an approach to improve patient safety in general practice (40, 41, 48, 
349). Most Scottish general practices have now undertaken at least two trigger 
reviews, detected PSIs and implemented or considered a range of improvement 
actions. However, even in the unlikely scenario that every reported 
improvement action had been successful, the reality is that there will still be 
latent risks within all general practices, and as a result preventable PSIs will still 
occur in the future.  
 
The lack of reliable measures of improvement is not unique to the TRM. Despite 
more than a decade of sustained attention and considerable investment and 
research in patient safety, there is still little reliable evidence of widespread 
reductions in harm rates in any health care setting (226, 350-352).  Why is this? 
One answer that has been proposed is that, compared to traditional biomedical 
research and initiatives, fewer people have been working in this area for a 
relatively shorter period of time with only modest resources and without the 
advantage of many decades of previous evidence. In other words, ‘we get what 
we pay for’ (226).  
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Another potential reason, which is particularly relevant to this study, is that 
there are few interventions available that can reliable reduce PSIs. A systematic 
review by Lorincz et al in 2011 found no credible evidence of effective strategies 
to improve patient safety in primary care (35). The authors concluded that 
‘there are no magic bullets’. It therefore seems obvious that the priority should 
be to develop new safety improvement methods, or at least further develop and 
test existing ones. But the question remains - which ones? Evidence-based 
interventions that target specific complications of care, or more general 
strategies like the TRM, with the potential to reduce a range of PSIs? Both 
approaches seem to have merit, but for now it is impossible to objectively 
recommend one over the other. All of the improvement methods and strategies 
for the general practice setting that were described in Chapter 3 have specific 
strengths, but also limitations. Two examples are provided to further illustrate 
this important issue.  
 
The first example is the study by Tam et al who compared the strengths and 
weaknesses of chart review, patient surveys and voluntary reporting in detecting 
medication misadventures in general practice in Hong Kong (83). They found 
chart reviews uncovered significantly more preventable adverse drug events 
than incident reporting, but noted the ‘pivotal’ role voluntary reporting had for 
drawing attention to sentinel events. The second example is a study comparing 
clinical record review with four reporting systems in the Netherlands. These 
were: informal reporting by patients; formal complaints by patients; medico-
legal claims; and voluntary incidents reported by healthcare professionals (353). 
They found only 18/498 (3.6%) of PSIs uncovered through record review were 
also detected by the reporting systems.  
 
The two main findings and implications from these examples are consistent with 
the patient safety literature (84, 85, 237, 335, 349). The first finding is that 
clinical record review detects more PSIs than any other method. Based on this 
finding alone, the implication seems to be to select it in preference of the other 
methods.  However, the second finding, that there is very little overlap between 
the PSIs detected with the different methods, negates this implication. For 
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example, litigation and complaints are predominantly about communication 
breakdown and missed diagnostic opportunities, while the majority of PSIs 
detected through the TRM relate to medication-processes.  This strongly 
supports the view that a mixed methods approach is required to improve patient 
safety. 
 
It is now widely accepted that ‘a single measure of safety is a fantasy’ (354). 
Rather, the different methods are complementary to each other. The 
implication is that, if the overall safety of general practice is to be understood 
and improved, the best approach would be to combine the different methods 
(349, 355-358). Such an approach would also help to mitigate the potential risk 
of using a single improvement method or measure, which is that, ‘given one 
measure of success, almost any group can be successful in the short term by 
optimizing that measure at the expense of other important measures’ (359). 
This approach is already being taken in the UK through, for example, the 
introduction of the RCGP Patient Safety Toolkit (179, 180). The Toolkit contains 
a range of improvement methods for the general practice setting, including the 
TRM, thus offering a choice of methods to clinicians and practice teams.  
 
10.1.3. The TRM provides a unique perspective of PSIs  
 
Patient safety has been compared to an elephant in the well-known Indian fable 
of the blind men (296, 360). Just as each of the blind men ‘saw’ only a part of 
the elephant, specific improvement methods only produce evidence about 
certain aspects of patient safety. The moral of the fable is that, while each 
individual perspective may provide useful and unique insights, they are also 
limited and incomplete. Accordingly, the TRM is valuable because it increases 
our understanding about the prevalence and characteristics of PSIs, which are 
important components of the overall safety of care. 
 
The types of PSIs uncovered by the TRM will most likely be familiar to primary 
care clinicians and are well known and described in the international patient 
safety literature. The important issue is that they had remained undetected 
until the TRM review was undertaken. Or, more likely, they may have been 
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incidentally and opportunistically identified but were not shared or addressed 
because of a lack of time. As was described in Chapter 8, the TRM worked by 
creating opportunities and a ‘mindset’ for detecting and acting on PSIs.  
 
A key finding from this study was that many participants associated the severity 
and preventability of PSIs with their usefulness (chapter 7). In other words, the 
outcomes of incidents, rather than the contributing factors to them, seem to 
influence the subsequent actions and learning of many individuals, teams and 
organisations. In reality, there can be as much or even more potential for 
learning and change in some near miss events (326), but this concept is 
challenging to convey to clinicians and staff. One way to address this issue may 
be through the culture of the organisation and will be considered on page 264. 
 
Another implication is that a single approach or method should not be promoted 
as the definitive ‘solution’ to substandard care. Nor can any method be 
expected to detect all PSIs or create perfect patient safety. That is not to say 
that all methods are equally useful – they are not. For example, the TRM detects 
more PSIs than any other available metric. In this small study, PSIs were 
detected and reported at a rate of one incident for approximately every eight 
records that were reviewed, or approximately one incident for every two years 
of recorded care. While the precision of this rate is uncertain, it provides an 
estimate of the prevalence of PSIs in general practice that is comparable with 
larger studies (48). It also raises important questions. Are the estimated rates of 
PSIs ‘high’ or ‘low’ and do they justify further interventions?  
 
These questions will be considered in more detail in subsequent sections. For 
now, normalisation of the TRM can be justified in part by the value of the 
evidence it produces. As our understanding of the nature and frequency of PSIs 
increase, important questions about the future of health care and the equitable 
and effective allocation of resources can be more objectively framed and 
considered. 
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10.2. Will the TRM be normalised?  
 
The previous section considered the question whether the TRM should be 
normalised in general practice. The short answer was ‘yes’, because it is useful. 
However, while the ‘usefulness’ of an intervention is an important factor in 
determining whether it is normalised or not, there are other factors that are 
equally or even more important. This section therefore describes four additional 
requirements which, if met, will make normalisation of the TRM very likely. At 
the time of writing, only some of these requirements have been met. My 
prediction is therefore that normalisation of the TRM in UK general practice will 
either be a gradual and piecemeal process or may not happen at all.  
 
10.2.1. Clinicians require sufficient knowledge to apply the TRM effectively  
 
The success of improvement methods, including the TRM, is contingent on the 
critical assumption that clinicians possess the requisite knowledge - as defined in 
Chapter 8, page 200 - to effectively use them. Moreover, that they are able to 
apply the technique correctly, produce robust data, analyse and evaluate their 
findings and then plan and implement meaningful and sustainable 
improvements. A further assumption is that in those instances where this 
knowledge is lacking, health and educational authorities are able to up-skill the 
workforce on the scale necessary to support proposed initiatives. But how 
realistic are these assumptions? The TRM and this study provide a practical 
example in helping to answer this question.  
 
Successful implementation of improvement interventions requires clinicians to 
have knowledge of three specific processes (361). In relation to the TRM, the 
knowledge is: (i) how to detect PSIs in order to identify a ‘problem’ or 
deficiency in care and then define it clearly and correctly; (ii) be able to analyse 
the problem and correctly identify the main contributing causes and decide 
whether they are sufficiently important to justify further action, e.g. rate the 
preventability and severity of PSIs; and (iii) be aware of, select and implement 
the most appropriate remedial action and evaluate its effectiveness. These 
processes are consecutive and interdependent, e.g. a process can only be 
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undertaken if the previous one had been successfully completed. Performing a 
proper analysis is difficult though, and a skill that often requires training and 
practice (361). Even when clinicians are able to detect PSIs and identify 
contributing factors that may be amenable to action, they still need to choose or 
design and implement a feasible solution, evaluate the degree to which this 
addresses the perceived problem and mitigate any unintended consequences.  
 
Many study participants were able to demonstrate knowledge of all these steps. 
However, as was described in Chapter 7, a small minority were unable to 
complete the first step of detecting PSIs, while a few more participants 
struggled with the third process, i.e. taking action to improve care. The 
assumption that all clinicians possess the necessary knowledge to successfully 
implement the TRM – and by extension other quality improvement interventions - 
therefore seem overly optimistic.  
 
On the other hand, the findings from this study indicate that overall, enough of 
the participating clinician reviewers had adequate knowledge after training to 
ensure normalisation of the TRM in general practice. Admittedly, normalisation 
would be more rapid if the knowledge of a minority of clinicians could be 
improved further. ‘Knowledge’ – or lack thereof – is also only one of the factors 
that determine the normalisation of an intervention. Even so, when safety 
improvement initiatives are evaluated, the knowledge of participants should 
routinely be considered as an important contributing factor to the observed 
outcomes (362).  
 
Given the importance of knowledge, and the fact that some experienced 
clinicians already have many of the required core safety skills for improvement 
initiatives (363), should certain clinicians or professional groups be preferentially 
recruited and trained to use methods such as the TRM? While it is true that in 
this study the nursing group found fewer triggers and PSIs and were also less 
likely to document improvement actions or learning points compared with the 
medical groups, individual nurse reviewers did demonstrate the ability and 
knowledge to effectively implement the TRM. There was also one GP reviewer 
who did not detect PSIs. The implication is therefore that practices should select 
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reviewers with the necessary knowledge to conduct TRM, as this is a more 
desirable characteristic than their professional roles, e.g. GP partner, salaried 
GP, GPST, practice nurse or nurse practitioner. 
 
Providing suitable training for participants was identified as one of the 
facilitating factors of the implementation of the TRM in this study (Chapter 9). 
Training is therefore important and one of the recommendations that are made 
in relation to the TRM and future implementation initiatives in section 10.4, 
page 279. However, it is not necessarily synonymous with knowledge. A 
systematic review (n=39 studies) to determine the effectiveness of teaching 
quality improvement theory and methods to clinicians found that their self-
reported knowledge and confidence improved, but there were little or no 
evidence that the training had any clinical benefits (364). One interpretation of 
these findings would be that for training to be truly effective, it needs to occur 
in conjunction with adequate resources, protected time and opportunities for 
reflection (365). In fact, it has been suggested that one of the best ways to 
improve patient safety in primary care may simply be for GPs ‘to set aside time 
and space to be allowed to conduct the required, appropriate reflection 
effectively’ (52).  
 
10.2.2. Senior organisational and practice leadership support  
 
The support of the practice leadership for the TRM was a key determinant of its 
successful implementation. In fact, this study would not have been possible 
without it. It was the practice manager or a senior GP in each practice who 
agreed to participate, who decided when and how much time and resources to 
allocate and who recruited additional team members. Furthermore, the practice 
leadership helped determine through which forums trigger review findings were 
disseminated and whether proposed improvement actions were implemented at 
the practice level. The implication is therefore that the practice leadership 
strongly influence not only whether an intervention is implemented, but also 
how and to what degree subsequent improvement and learning occur at a local 
level.  
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The powerful facilitating effect of leadership on the implementation and 
normalisation of interventions became even more apparent at regional and 
national levels (362, 366). Policymakers and senior healthcare executives design 
the financial (and other) incentives that are linked to the specific performance 
objectives they set. They also have the authority to mandate a wide range of 
activities deemed desirable. Individual practices and clinicians retain their 
clinical autonomy and freedom of choice, but only within predefined 
parameters. The visible and strong support of senior leadership for an 
intervention is therefore a key factor in determining whether it becomes 
normalised or not. This is why Buist and Middleton strongly recommend that 
clinicians ‘in positions of responsibility, need to take ownership of the quality 
and safety agenda’ and ‘claim the agenda’ (367). 
 
The participants in this study were aware of the importance of leadership within 
their practices but also at higher levels. A GP partner explained the common 
perception that ‘its decision makers actually who normalise things to a certain 
extent because they mainstream them and they bring them in and support 
them’ (GP08). This perception seems to be widely shared amongst health care 
professionals. For example, a qualitative study of chronic disease management 
in UK primary care found participants thought Telecare would only be 
normalised if it was made mandatory through a formal policy (268). 
 
An important implication of these findings is that it is the practice leadership 
who ultimately creates the workplace culture (350, 368).  Establishing a 'just' 
culture that enables the whole team to support and advance patient safety is, 
therefore, only possible with strong leaders. It is for the practice leadership - 
GPs, management and senior nursing staff - to facilitate and build a culture of 
trust that encourages effective team-working, collective learning from patient 
safety incidents and strong communication across the clinical disciplines and 
administrative staff. They have both the responsibility and the authority to 
ensure that there is a continued focus on improving the safety of patient care - 
in essence, to establish safety as a cultural 'value' as well as a practice 'priority' 
(350). 
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All participants in this study described the prevailing culture in their own teams 
and also in Scottish general practice as overall positive, strong and safety-
orientated (Chapter 6). While it may be tempting to speculate whether or not 
the perceptions of safety culture reflect reality, it is actually the degree of 
variation between the different staff groups that is of more importance. A 
consistent finding of safety culture research - irrespective of industry or 
geographical setting – has been that the larger the variation in the perceptions 
of different staff groups is, the more likely PSIs become (311). The implication 
of the homogeneity of the safety culture perceptions in this study therefore 
suggest some measure of a protective effect against PSIs in general practice.  
 
10.2.3. Normalisation requires adequate resources  
 
A key finding from this study and from the comparable international literature is 
that normalisation of an intervention requires the provision of adequate 
resources, including time (347, 366, 369, 370). While this may seem self-evident, 
in practice many improvement interventions receive funding only for the 
implementation stage, and even then the initial investments are not always 
adequate. This study is no exception, as the professional fee offered to 
participating practices for implementing the TRM were not commensurate with 
the amount of time that they were expected to allocate for trigger reviews. It is 
therefore unsurprising than many interventions fail to become normalised 
despite evidence of their usefulness. On the other hand, interventions may 
become normalised if there are sufficient incentives to continue using them 
even when there is little or no evidence of their effectiveness. 
 
The most common business model of general practice in the UK is that of 
independent contractors to the NHS. In order for practices to be viable business 
concerns, the partners and managers have to continually balance workload with 
available resources. They are able to adjust their workloads and increase 
resources to a degree, but patients and policy makers also exert significant 
influences – both positive and negative. The inherent challenges in this process 
can be conceptualised with an analogy of balancing a seesaw (Figure 10.1.). 
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The ‘seesaw’ analogy will be illustrated further with two practical examples 
from this study. The first example was provided by one of the practice managers 
(PM08). She explained that the practice team understood the importance of 
correct clinical coding and considered this a priority. There was agreement that 
the task should ideally be performed by a clinician, but the practice was unable 
to afford this option. Even if they could have afforded the additional clinical 
time, there was an even greater need for more consultations. The leaders 
therefore decided to assign the role of ‘coder’ to an administrative team 
member and provided the appointee with additional training and support. They 
acknowledged there may have been (and will likely be) some instances of 
incorrect coding, and that this may contribute to PSIs, but they perceived this as 
the only feasible option for them. Using the analogy of the see-saw, they 
reached a compromise between risk reduction and resource allocation.  
 
The second example is the TRM and the Scottish QOF. Chapters 1, 2 and 9 
described how financially incentivising the TRM through the QOF greatly 
facilitated its implementation. For practice teams, the relative increase in 
workload from implementing the TRM was ‘balanced’ by an increase in their 
resources, hence their willingness to implement it. When the QOF was 
discontinued in 2016, the ‘resources’ for the TRM were also removed (e.g. one 
end of the seesaw became unbalanced). The most likely response of most 
practices in Scotland will be to restore balance by reducing the workload, e.g. 
stop using the TRM. The main implication is therefore that the TRM will not be 
normalised. However, it is possible that the relative importance of the other 
facilitating factors, such as senior leadership support and contextual integration, 
may increase in their relative importance and be sufficient to still ensure 
normalisation. Nevertheless, even if this happens, normalisation will still require 
a much longer period of time and will likely occur in a piecemeal manner. 
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Figure 10.1. The association between ‘workload’ and ‘resources’ in general practice 
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The two examples help to demonstrate the challenges clinicians and staff 
struggle with in modern health care systems to effectively balance opposing 
priorities. The importance of resource allocation in these instances cannot be 
overstated. The stark reality is that practice teams and individual clinicians are 
deciding - whether consciously or unconsciously – how much patient safety they 
can afford. If we accept that resources are finite, at least two important 
questions should be asked (371). The first question is how much safety can we 
afford in our current health care systems? The second question, strongly related 
to the first, is who should have the responsibility to make this decision?  
 
These questions are challenging, emotive and currently shrouded in uncertainty 
(372). Very few patient safety studies evaluate cost-benefit/utility because it 
requires considerable resources, expertise and often data that are unavailable 
(373). A recent systematic review of those studies that did perform comparative 
economic analyses of patient safety improvement strategies in acute care 
settings found only four were ‘economically attractive’: pharmacist-led 
medication reconciliation; ICU intervention for central line-associated 
bloodstream infections; chlorhexidine for vascular catheter site care; and 
surgical sponge counts (374). When the same questions are asked about the 
primary care setting or in relation to this study there are simply no reliable 
answers. How much effort would be required to reduce the estimated rate of 
PSIs that were detected in this study? What is an achievable target? What are the 
opportunity costs to patients, practices and the NHS if practices decided to 
allocate time to this problem, rather than some other priority?  
 
The different perspectives of why PSIs occur were described in Chapter 6. The 
main implication was that in socio-technical systems – such as general practice – 
the number and severity of PSIs may be reduced but can never be completely 
eliminated, irrespective of how much effort and resources are invested. In fact, 
‘efforts to reduce uncertainty towards zero result in increasing marginal costs 
with diminishing marginal returns for patient safety’ (371). Vincent and 
Amalberti caution that ‘primary care practitioners cannot (and emphatically 
should not) try to minimise all possible risk’ as this would be ‘completely 
unaffordable’ (366). Only once this fact is publicly acknowledged and accepted, 
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will it be possible to have meaningful discussions of what feasible targets for 
patient safety should be. Until then, a succession of improvement initiatives may 
be decried as ineffective, incomplete or inadequate if they are evaluated 
against unrealistic targets and expectations.  
 
Unfortunately, the notion that patient safety is imperfect is unpalatable, and for 
a minority inconceivable. So is acknowledging that resources are finite. For now 
the easiest, and ironically also the safest course of action for many policy 
makers and senior leadership in the NHS seems to be leaving the ‘seesaw’ for 
frontline staff to balance (366). Then, when the inevitable imbalance results in a 
‘fall’ it is all too often individual clinicians who are held to account. In the 
longer term, the only sustainable solution will be for patients/society and policy 
makers to accept responsibility for their part in the ‘seesaw’ problem and 
actively contribute alongside clinicians to achieve the degree of balance that is 
acceptable to everyone (375). It is possible to improve the standards and safety 
of care, but it will require perseverance, ingenuity and realistic expectations 
from everyone (376) and solutions that can ‘only be achieved at a national level’ 
(366).  
 
10.2.4. Normalisation is facilitated by contextual integration 
 
One of the first tasks for researchers in implementation science is to describe 
the contexts within which they intend to implement an intervention, and 
consider how contextual factors may influence their proposed interventions 
(243). Chapter 9 described how implementation of the TRM was facilitated 
through the work of ‘legitimisation’ and its ‘contextual integration’ into existing 
general practice processes. In this section the potential influence of two 
particular contexts on further integrating, embedding and eventually normalising 
the TRM will be considered: GP specialty training (GPST) and medical appraisal 
and revalidation.   
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10.2.4.1. GP Specialty Training  
 
UK GP Specialty Trainees are required to spend 18 months in a GP setting as part 
of a 3 year programme. The teaching required is governed by the Royal College 
of General Practitioners (RCGP) curriculum, and one area that is increasingly 
being highlighted is patient safety (240). Specific learning objectives are also 
defined which require the trainee to demonstrate a whole range of problem-
solving skills aimed at improving the management of clinical risk and enhancing 
the patient experience of care. In response, medical educators have integrated 
patient safety-related topics and issues into undergraduate education and 
specialist training programmes.  
 
As was described in chapter 7, the vast majority of trainees in this study were 
able to use the TRM to detect preventable PSIs directly related to issues within 
the practice, particularly in high risk elderly patient group (329). All participants 
were able to demonstrate some element of reflection, document potential 
learning needs and develop improvement action plans.  The detected PSIs were 
directly related to issues within the practice which enabled focused discussion 
with educational supervisors and other colleagues, potentially facilitating rapid 
implementation of learning and remedial actions. The implications are that using 
the TRM during training may facilitate both formative and workplace case-based 
discussions and assessments. The TRM may therefore have a role to play in 
specialty training to help prepare GP trainees for the contractual and regulatory 
demands of independent clinical practice and future safety improvement 
expectations. However, in order for the TRM’s potential value as an educational 
to be realised, further research would be required to explore and validate this 
application and educational supervisors would require additional training and 
support. 
 
10.2.4.2. GP appraisal and revalidation 
 
In terms of regulatory and educational policy in the United Kingdom, ‘safety and 
quality’ is one of four professional domains describing the expected duties and 
standards of every doctor registered with the General Medical Council (GMC) 
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(238). All registered doctors are expected to participate in systems of quality 
assurance and improvement, perform regular reviews of and reflect on their 
performance and take action to improve the quality and safety of care they 
deliver if necessary. The TRM is well aligned with this expectation and, given the 
evidence presented here, can play an important role in helping to achieve this 
standard. In NPT terms the TRM is also legitimised through its formal inclusion in 
the RCGP Patient Safety Toolkit for general practice (180). 
 
The study findings also demonstrate the complementary nature of the TRM in 
relation to established improvement methods in general practice. PSIs that are 
detected by trigger reviews can serve as topics for SEA and criterion audit. This 
is particularly helpful given that appraisal and revalidation requires GPs to 
analyse two significant events per year, with the GMC encouraging these events 
to be PSIs rather than broader quality of care issues.  Identification and analysis 
of previously undetected PSIs is therefore particularly pertinent to improving the 
opportunity cost of SEA topics.   
 
10.3. Strengths and limitations of the study 
 
This section begins by considering the strengths and limitations of this study. 
The specific strengths and limitations associated with the NPT and the TRM in 
the context of implementation science and patient safety research are then 
described.  
 
10.3.1. Study limitations  
 
This study has at least five limitations. In addition, a number of specific 
limitations in relation to NPT and the TRM were identified (Sections 10.3.3 and 
10.3.4)  
 
The perceptions patients have of health care and their participation in research 
and improvement initiatives are widely recognised as important (377-380). The 
first limitation is therefore that patients could not be actively involved in this 
research, despite careful consideration of this option. However, all study 
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participants recognised and supported the crucial roles and responsibility of 
patients in relation to the safety of their own care (Chapter 6).  
 
The second limitation is that the sampling strategy was a pragmatic choice 
informed by time constraints, available resources and ready access to GPSTs and 
general practice teams through their association with NES. The study findings 
are therefore derived from the experiences and perceptions of participants who 
have previously demonstrated an interest in research and improvement 
initiatives. The sample may therefore not be representative of general practice 
or GPSTs in Scotland or, indeed, other countries in the UK or internationally. 
This potential limitation was mitigated to some degree by ensuring the sample 
included training and non-training practices, practice size varied from small (a 
single GP) to large (>10 GPs) and were spread across urban and semi-rural areas. 
The subsequent QOF data which were presented in Chapter 6 were aggregated 
from essentially all practices in the two NHS Boards from which the study sample 
was derived, and did not reveal significant differences compared with the study 
sample. 
  
From a quantitative perspective, the size of the sample of records that were 
reviewed was determined beforehand by resource considerations. Applying the 
formula proposed by de Wet et al for determining the minimum number of 
records that have to be reviewed in order to ensure the detected PSI rate is 
reliable, suggests that the sample of records in this study was adequate to 
determine PSI rates with acceptable levels of precision, but would not have been 
adequately powered to detect a significant change over the study period (201).  
 
The third limitation is in relation to the GPST component of the study. It is 
unknown why five of the trainees who attended training workshops were unable 
to undertake trigger reviews and submit completed summary sheets. Knowing 
‘why’ may have provided us with greater insights into the overall utility of this 
method and associated implementation issues. However, it seems likely that the 
reason may have been timing, as the submission date for trigger reviews 
coincided with the final two weeks of their training programme.     
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The fourth limitation is that all study data were reported, and therefore 
subjective. Consequently, it is unclear whether all the improvement actions 
clinicians indicated they considered were in fact undertaken. A related issue 
which will be discussed on page 278 is that inter-rater reliability was not 
measured. It is therefore possible – even likely – that if clinicians all reviewed 
the same samples of records, they may have detected different PSIs, provided 
higher or lower PSI ratings and considered or undertaken other improvement 
actions. However, while the IRR may affect the quantitative outcomes of this 
study to a degree, e.g. by over or underestimating the incidence of PSIs, it does 
not meaningfully affect the qualitative data or the main findings. While it must 
therefore be recognised that direct observation is the ‘gold standard’ of socio-
technical studies, it is seldom feasible to do so. Instead, researchers ‘do the 
best we could’, and accept that, in many instances, ‘interviews were the only 
window into events that happened far from the researcher’s gaze’ (271). 
 
The fifth limitation is in relation to the analysis of the qualitative data. Despite 
a concerted effort to minimise researcher bias through the strategies that were 
described in Chapter 5, analysis of qualitative data is inevitably influenced by 
the previous experiences and other characteristics of the researchers. The 
findings must therefore retain some measure of subjectivity. However, the risk 
of incorrect assumptions and conclusions were reduced through a combination of 
reflection, rigorous application of a clearly described and acceptable analysis 
process and by evaluating the veracity of the results against the international 
literature. It could also be argued that the subjectivity of analyses is not only a 
limitation but, if accounted for, has the potential to enrich the data and make 
the findings more accessible to others. 
 
The potential limitation of bias should not only be considered in relation to the 
methods of this study, but also to patient safety incidents in a more general 
manner. Patient safety narratives are ‘constructed and re-constructed’ by 
individuals and health care organisations and in the process their meaning 
change (381). The narratives of PSIs evolve through each process, starting with 
their detection, the way in which they are recorded and shared, whether and 
how further analyses are conducted, in the dissemination of identified learning 
272 
 
 
 
points and needs and finally whether they help to inform subsequent 
improvement actions. Waring described how the narratives of PSIs change 
through ‘washing’ of the original experiences of the patients and clinicians until 
– often unintentionally and unconsciously - their very 'form, meaning and 
content' have been 'standardised' in a way that is recognisable to organisations 
(381).  It is unclear to what extent the same constructing and re-constructing of 
PSI narratives currently happen within practices and also in the wider primary 
care context. While the benefits and potential losses associated with this 
process are currently unknown, the intuitive implication seems to be that there 
is a need for a shared understanding of PSIs amongst all health care staff groups. 
In NPT terms, the recommendation is therefore to increase the work of 
coherence.  
 
10.3.2. Strengths 
 
In 2013, Schildmeijer et al’s focus group study was the first known attempt to 
explore the strengths and limitations of clinicians working with the Global 
Trigger Tool (GTT) in secondary care settings (382). A unique strength of this 
study is that it is the first known attempt to investigate how the TRM is 
experienced and implemented in primary care by exploring the perceptions of 
clinicians and their general practice teams. 
 
A second strength of this study is that it is informed by a validated theoretical 
framework, which is recommended for research in the discipline of 
implementation science (251). As was previously described in Chapter 4, NPT 
provides a conceptual framework and a socio-technical lens through which 
factors that hinder or facilitate normalisation of an intervention can be 
identified, described and understood.  
 
A third strength is the study design, which is longitudinal, incorporated a mix of 
methods and collected qualitative data at two critical time points. The mixed-
methods study design was selected because this approach is considered to be 
particularly useful for researching implementation processes and complex health 
care interventions and helped to enhance the reliability of the main findings.  
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A fourth strength of this study is that the perceptions and experiences of the 
three different staff groups that were critical to the successful implementation 
of the TRM were considered. In order to reflect the reality of modern general 
practice, which is that it is delivered by teams, the qualitative data included 
'matched' interviews within each practice, e.g. a practice nurse, GP and practice 
manager were interviewed, where available, using the same schedules. A further 
benefit of this approach is that it allowed the work of implementing the TRM to 
be investigated and understood at the levels of individuals and the practice 
teams (272). In addition, the interviewer had in-depth knowledge of the TRM 
and had good working relationships with the study participants. The interviews 
were candid, detailed and in-depth and it is evident from the transcripts that 
participants felt no obligation to report ‘successes’ with the TRM or the 
implementation process.  
 
From a qualitative data analysis perspective, a key strength of the study is that 
the analysis were conducted using recognised methods in order to ensure 
robustness and transparency of the process (283, 285, 288). For example, the 
reflexivity, rigour and reliability of the findings were increased through data 
clinics and constant comparison (383). The perceptions of the vast majority of 
participants were highly congruent and independent of clinical, non-clinical, 
management or non-management stratification. The observed homogeneity is 
arguably a success factor in its own right, as it reflects high levels of coherence, 
which in turn increase the ability of teams to effectively enact interventions. In 
NPT terms, practice teams were able to successfully perform the necessary work 
of interactional workability.  
 
The potential limitations of the sampling strategy have already been discussed. 
By comparison, and in terms of qualitative research, the sample is fairly large, 
thematic saturation was achieved and more interviews would not have 
materially strengthened the main findings.  
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10.3.3. The strengths and limitations of Normalisation Process Theory 
 
Given the proliferation of available theories, each with a unique focus and 
intent, researchers are strongly advised to explicate their rationale for selecting 
a specific model, framework or theory (245).  In the case of this study, the 
intervention - e.g. the TRM – had already been developed and tested 
beforehand.  However, NPT was consciously selected to inform the 
implementation and evaluation of the TRM and incorporated into the study 
during the planning stage.  
 
The rationale for choosing NPT was provided in Chapter 3, but there were two 
additional, more personal motivating factors that supported the decision, even if 
they did not determine the choice. The first factor is that one of my supervisors 
(COD) had extensive experience of NPT and was therefore able to provide 
‘expert’ support throughout the study period. The second factor is that NPT 
appealed to me because of its emphasis on ‘work’ and its focus on the usefulness 
of interventions. On reflection, it now becomes clear that I was unconsciously 
performing the work of ‘coherence’ while deciding on a theory to support the 
study, asking questions like: how is NPT different to other theories 
(differentiation); what is the potential value of NPT (communal specification); 
and how does NPT fit with my previous research and clinical experience 
(internalization)? 
 
Some researchers have reported struggling to apply the NPT framework because 
of difficulties in differentiating between its constructs and components (245, 
275-277). Initially, differentiation was also challenging in this study, especially 
during the preliminary coding and before all the exemplar quotes for the 
framework had been selected. However, coding data to the framework became 
progressively quicker and easier with experience. My personal experience of 
using the NPT framework was similar to that of Macfarlane and O’Reilly-de Brun 
who studies the implementation of a language interpreting service in Irish 
general practice (384). NPT offers ‘an organizing principle to think with’ data 
and ‘orienting principles and concepts’. 
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A recent systematic review of the use of NPT found that the meanings 
researchers attributed to the constructs had high face validity (with a few 
exceptions) in terms of the reported analyses, interpretations and specific 
settings (245). But what are the implications if some researchers were to 
misunderstand the conceptual meanings of the constructs? The review found NPT 
frameworks were beneficial and helped to identify important issues irrespective 
of subjective judgements about which construct ‘fitted best’ to the data. The 
implication is that, while researchers should always aim to perform rigorous 
analyses of their data, the veracity of their findings is ultimately determined by 
its practical value (e.g. whether it has explanatory and predictive power). 
 
The other concerns about the application of theoretical frameworks are that 
researchers may be constrained by theory, miss important findings or 
alternatively ‘shoe horn’ data into existing themes (384). NPT is no exception. It 
focuses on the ‘work’ study participants do rather than their attitudes or 
emotional experiences of interventions (245, 273). The concern whether 
important findings may have been missed in this study is at least partially 
addressed by having explicitly searched for data outside the framework and 
describing it. There is also evidence from the international literature that very 
little data fall outside the NPT framework, and the data that do are typically too 
generic, diffuse or vague to be meaningful or strictly technical and attitudinal in 
nature (385). In this study, the vast majority of data relevant to the factors that 
hindered or facilitated the implementation of the TRM fitted well within the NPT 
framework. However, the data about participants’ perceptions of patient safety 
did not. NPT, like any other middle range theory, cannot and does not claim to 
be a ‘theory of everything’. It is a heuristic device and not a ‘conceptual 
straitjacket’ (245). Data that were outside the NPT framework were therefore 
analysed thematically.  
 
The close associations between some of the NPT constructs and components 
were described in Chapter 9. The associations have been conceptualized as a 
recursive loop by Bamford et al (270). They described how, when an intervention 
(in this instance, nutritional guidelines) failed to make sense (coherence) or 
engage staff (cognitive participation), some of them ‘acted out’ their resistance 
276 
 
 
 
(collective action). As a result, the intervention did not produce results, which 
confirmed their opinion that it had no value (the work of reflexive monitoring).  
 
Recursive loops were also evident in this study. Those clinicians who were 
concerned about latent safety risks in their systems (the work of coherence) 
were willing to apply the TRM and share their findings (cognitive participation). 
When the TRM was applied effectively, PSIs were detected which then, in many 
instances, led to learning and subsequent improvement actions (the work of 
collective action). As a result, there was evidence that the TRM was useful, and 
reviewers were therefore willing to continue using it (the work of reflexive 
monitoring). 
 
10.3.4. Strengths and limitations of the Trigger Review Method 
 
This study helps to demonstrate three key strengths of the TRM. The first 
strength of the TRM is the willingness of clinicians to disclose PSIs. This is a 
crucial finding, as it indicates at least some degree of clinician engagement. It 
also indicates that the vast majority of clinicians considered the possibility of 
medical errors and latent risks in their practice systems and proactively 
searched for them. Only a generation ago, the voluntary participation of 
clinicians in this kind of study, or a national patient safety programme would 
have been almost inconceivable. Now that the precedent has been established, 
i.e. that clinicians are willing to search for and report PSIs in general practice, 
the next systems issue is whether GPs are prepared to report PSIs originating in 
secondary care. It is known that some GP’s will deal with such interface issues if 
they identify a significant event but this is neither compulsory nor adequately 
formalized.  
 
The second strength of the TRM is its flexibility. It was identified as a facilitating 
factor of its implementation in this study, as was described in Chapter 9. The 
fact that the trigger review method can be customized for specific environments 
is one of the important reasons why it is considered valuable by researchers in 
the international patient safety community (85, 233, 236, 237, 242, 382).  
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The third strength of the TRM is that clinicians actively identify their own 
improvement priorities and decide whether and how to enact them. In this way, 
the TRM works to encourage ‘ownership’ of PSIs, which was discussed in Chapter 
8. The importance of clinical ownership is well-known from the international 
literature. An example is the study by Sharek et al, who found that clinicians 
conducting ‘internal’ reviews in their own hospitals were significantly more 
likely to detect PSIs compared with a team of experienced external reviewers 
(386).  
 
The best evidence we currently have suggest that improvement initiatives that 
are characterised by clinician and patient engagement and ‘ownership’ are more 
likely to be successful and become normalised compared with those that are 
reliant on ‘top down’ approaches (205). That does not mean that health care 
managers and leaders do not have important roles in improvement. Strong, 
visible support by leaders for improvement initiatives are an essential 
facilitating factor, as was explained on page 261. The most successful initiatives 
are those that synergistically blend clinician engagement and senior leadership.  
 
In this study, all of the medical records were reviewed manually. The alternative 
option would have been to automate some or all of the clinical review 
processes. Whether this decision is considered a strength or limitation depends 
on the aims of the study and purpose of the researcher. We know from the 
patient safety literature that automation will detect many more triggers in a 
much shorter period of time than the manual process and often for a fraction of 
the cost (387, 388). However, while the results from automated reviews can be 
insightful, especially when investigating harm rates in larger organisations, they 
arguably do not confer the unique, personal and specific information about PSIs 
which prompted the majority of clinicians in this study to take further 
improvement actions. The findings from this study strongly suggest that it is the 
very act of searching for triggers in a systematic manner that creates the 
appropriate ‘mindset’ required by clinicians to detect PSIs (Chapter 8, page 
202).  
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One of the main limitations of any clinical record review method, including the 
TRM, is the inherent subjectivity of the reported findings, which is a product of 
the degree of variation in reviewer characteristics (85, 241, 335, 389, 390). The 
trigger review findings that were submitted by the participating clinicians in this 
study were not independently verified. The inter-rater reliability (IRR) between 
reviewers was also not investigated. Consequently, the reliability of the findings 
cannot be quantified by, for example, Cohen’s kappa statistic (391). The 
decision not to undertake formal testing of IRR was based on four 
considerations.  
 
First, work conducted in the hospital setting shows that the IRR was variable 
despite using more than one reviewer (392, 393). For example, Forster et al 
estimated that reliable detection and categorisation of PSIs (e.g. a 95% chance 
that the PSI actually occurred) requires the agreement of at least three 
reviewers (394). The second reason for not conducting IRR testing is therefore 
that the available resources for this study were insufficient to do so. 
 
Third, the current TRM process has been adapted over the course of several 
years to be as simple and easy to use as possible (Chapters 1and 3). The original, 
2007 version of the TRM had seven steps (40). This version was not perceived as 
feasible or acceptable beyond the pilot stage, even to the initial group of 
clinicians that were strongly motivated to use it. In comparison, the perceptions 
of the vast majority of participants in this study, namely that the TRM is 
acceptability and feasible, facilitated its implementation and therefore help to 
justify the omission of IRR testing.  
 
The fourth and final reason is that the study aimed to explore the potential of 
the TRM as an approach to improve the safety of care in general practice. For 
this purpose, a measure of the reliability of the numerical data is less important 
than whether clinicians considered and undertook improvement actions.  
 
Finally, variation can extend beyond the main results of a study to involve the 
practical aspects of the review process itself.  For example, the reported time 
reviewers required to complete a trigger review varied considerably in this study 
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(Chapter 7, page 174). Whether it was because of a lack of training, the 
complexities of the cases being reviewed, or some other factors remain unclear.  
 
10.4. Recommendations 
 
10.4.1. Implementation and improvement initiatives 
 
In this sub-section, three recommendations about implementation and 
improvement initiatives are made.  They are: 
I. Researchers and policy makers should pro-actively identify and address 
the main factors that are known to facilitate or hinder the 
implementation of improvement initiatives;  
II. The existing knowledge and ‘engagement’ of clinicians should be 
recognised and harnessed; and 
III. The lessons learnt from PSIs should be widely disseminated.  
 
10.4.1.1. Identify and address the barriers and facilitators to improvement 
initiatives  
 
The evidence from this study and the wider implementation science literature 
suggest that a small number of specific factors are instrumental in facilitating or 
hindering the implementation of most, if not all, complex healthcare 
interventions. These factors can be identified, described and understood and are 
amenable to intervention. Researchers should actively consider them from the 
earliest planning stages, through the implementation and evaluation process and 
on in an ongoing manner until normalisation eventually occur.  
 
Devlin et al recently identified three key areas for researchers and policy makers 
to pro-actively consider and address in order to ensure future, large-scale 
initiatives are successfully implemented and normalised (347). They are: (i) 
time; (ii) what the authors refer to as ‘readiness’, which is the product of 
resources and clinician engagement; and (iii) issues related to information 
technology (IT).   Although this study was smaller and had a shorter timeline, the 
equivalent of these three factors (four if the components of ‘readiness’ are 
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counted separately) were also identified as the most important determinants of 
the successful implementation of the TRM. 
 
The first factor is time. To be successful, implementation initially requires 
adequate time for planning and the necessary work of coherence and activation. 
Once the project is underway, time remains a critical factor and should be 
allocated to do the necessary work of implementation. If the aim is to normalise 
the intervention, then a minimum time of five years, ideally ten, should be 
commissioned.  
 
The second factor is ‘readiness’. The findings from this study add to the large 
body of evidence (366, 369) of the essential role provision of adequate resources 
have as a facilitator of improvement interventions. This issue was also described 
in Chapter 9 and section 10.2.3, page 263. The other component of ‘readiness’ is 
clinician engagement. For an improvement intervention to be successfully 
implemented, it is recommended that researchers and policy makers ensure 
local staff and clinicians understand and are prepared for the proposed 
change(s). In NPT terms, there is need for the work of coherence and cognitive 
participation, e.g. the intended users of the intervention need to understand 
what is required of them and be willing and able to do this.  
 
This recommendation is strongly supported by evidence that coherence is an 
essential precursor to successful implementation (268, 376). Franx et al 
recommended, based on their research about the management of depression in 
primary care, that the problems of general practice teams should be addressed 
first and ‘sensitising strategies’ should be considered at local levels before any 
attempts are made to implement further improvement initiatives (276). Bamford 
et al and, more recently, Jeffries et al made a similar recommendation, namely 
that researchers and policy makers should ensure all potential stakeholders and 
users understand the rationale for and benefits of an intervention before 
attempting to implement it (270, 395). This study provides a further, practical 
example of the need for initial coherence work by researchers, policymakers, 
clinicians and staff.  
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The third factor is information technology (IT), which includes the related issues 
of information governance and the interoperability of systems. In NPT terms the 
work of reflexive monitoring, e.g. evaluating the effectiveness of an 
intervention, typically requires IT support and systems. It also requires the 
researchers and participants to agree outcome measures and processes for 
collecting the necessary data to evaluate the intervention. In this study, the 
implementation of the TRM was facilitated by the fact that practice teams 
already had adequate IT systems and were therefore able to quickly generate 
random patient lists for sampling. Because clinicians worked in the practice they 
were able to access electronic medical records without additional concerns 
which have to be addressed when external reviewers are involved. However, 
despite all patient identifiers intentionally being removed, a small minority of 
clinicians were still concerned how the findings may be used at regional or 
national levels (Chapter 9). Finally, implementation was facilitated because 
reviewers were able to enter data into simple trigger review Summary Sheets 
that were compatible with their existing software.  
 
10.4.1.2. Harness existing knowledge and clinician engagement 
 
The practice teams in this study participated voluntarily. They were able to 
provide many examples of improvement work they were already doing and 
demonstrated knowledge of a range of improvement methods. In addition, many 
participants clearly identified priority areas for interventions and described what 
they would require to undertake this work (Chapter 6). These findings seem at 
odds with the common perception that clinician engagement is challenging 
(346). The implication may be that the sentiment about clinician engagement 
should be further qualified, e.g. clinician engagement is challenging when they 
are expected to contribute to initiatives that do not seem to have value for 
them or their patients and they are not adequately supported to perform the 
work.  
 
The second recommendation in relation to improvement initiatives is therefore 
to harness the existing knowledge of clinicians and staff and support and enable 
them to implement the changes they perceive as priorities by allowing some 
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flexibility at local levels. From a regional and national perspective it is desirable 
– and necessary - to standardise processes and agree overarching objectives and 
outcomes. However, these requirements should not necessarily preclude 
frontline staff and clinicians to also plan,  prioritise, design and test their own 
potential solutions (366).  
 
This approach (local flexibility) is in stark contrast to the three common 
approaches taken by some initiatives. The first approach is to raise awareness of 
a problem, with the expectation that this will lead to improvement. A practical 
example would be to inform general practices that some investigation results of 
their patients are not appropriately managed, and as a result PSIs occurred.  The 
second approach is to raise awareness of a problem and propose a solution. In 
the example of investigation management, a potential solution might be for 
practices to keep a log of all investigation requests and reports and regularly 
audit their performance. The third approach is to raise awareness of a problem, 
propose a solution and partly incentivise or mandate its application. In the 
investigation management example, a Health Board may offer a local enhanced 
service to help practices implement an investigation management system, with 
the expectation that the practice will absorb the recurrent costs and increase in 
workload.  
 
While this example is simplistic, it helps to explain why some initiatives are not 
normalised. In many instances clinicians are already aware of problems but, for 
one reason or the other are unable to implement a solution. Alternatively, 
clinicians may be aware of solutions, but lack the resources or influence to 
implement them. The challenge is therefore to select the ‘right’ approach in 
each instance, in order to appropriately harness existing knowledge and ensure 
clinician engagement. In this context ‘right’ may mean raising awareness of 
problems, proposing potential solutions, offering additional resources or a 
combination of all three approaches.  
 
10.4.1.3. The lessons learnt from PSIs should be shared  
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The importance of learning from mistakes has been recognised for many years. 
Almost 30 years ago now Wu et al considered whether house officers learn from 
their mistakes (336). They concluded that doctors do learn from mistakes, and 
categorised the subsequent changes that clinicians make as a result of their 
learning in two main groups: constructive (‘increased information seeking’ and 
‘increased vigilance’) and defensive (‘keeping mistakes to self’ and ‘avoid 
similar patients’). These findings have been replicated many times since, 
including in this study. Chapter 8 summarised the wide range of learning needs 
and learning points reported by participants in this study as a result of 
conducting trigger reviews. It also described the great potential PSIs have for 
individual clinicians to learn and reflect on their own professional practice. 
 
The answer to the question of whether (some) clinicians can learn from PSIs is 
therefore an indisputable ‘yes’. However, a more appropriate question may be 
who should learn from PSIs, and more specifically, whether health care 
organisations learn from them (396)? Influential reports such as ‘An organisation 
with a memory’ (27) clearly described the organisational imperative to learn 
from PSIs. The rationale is that when organisations fail to learn from mistakes, 
patients inevitably suffer the same preventable harm. However, detecting, 
reporting and even analysing PSIs do not automatically generate collective 
learning within practice teams or organisations. Only if the learning points from 
analyses are effectively shared, stored and can be retrieved as required, can the 
behaviour of teams and organisations change (337, 397). The implication is 
therefore that the findings from improvement initiatives should be disseminated 
to all relevant stakeholders, from the individual practice through to the national 
level to enable and maximize collective learning (21).  
 
10.4.2. Recommendations relating to the TRM 
 
This sub-section describes five specific recommendations in relation to the TRM. 
They are contingent on the assumption that eventual normalisation of the TRM is 
desirable. Many of the issues the recommendations relate to have been 
discussed already. However, it is worthwhile to consider them again, as they 
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helped determine the successful implementation of the TRM and may be equally 
applicable to other improvement methods.  
 
10.4.2.1. Incorporate the TRM into existing general practice contexts  
 
This issue was previously discussed (Chapters 9 and Chapter 10). The main points 
are that the TRM will continue to feature in GP specialty training and as quality 
improvement method for appraisal and revalidation on a voluntary basis, but it 
needs to be incentivised locally or nationally for wider sustained implementation 
coverage. At deanery level in Scotland, the next steps will be to further refine 
TRM as a tool together with the associated training process and educational 
supporting materials.  Exploring the potential need for e-learning and other 
interactive technology will also be necessary. 
 
10.4.2.2. Provide training to clinicians before they apply the TRM 
 
Training is an essential factor for successful implementation as, without it, 
participants are much less likely to have the necessary understanding and 
knowledge to complete trigger reviews. This finding is consistent with the 
international literature (398),  which considers training to be of ‘vital 
importance’ for QI initiatives (227).  
 
TRM training needs to be clear about the intended aims, benefits and practical 
application of the method.  Specifically, the importance of the TRM as an 
approach to improve the safety of care needs to be emphasized. Reviewers need 
to understand that searching for triggers, detecting PSIs and ‘ticking boxes’ are 
intermediate outcomes to support the main purpose of the TRM, which is 
ultimately to improve the safety of care. The training should explicitly 
acknowledge that a small proportion of reviews may not detect PSIs and the 
potential reasons for this.  Finally, training should emphasize the importance of 
identifying preventable system-causes of PSIs rather than a preoccupation with 
the perceived severity of PSIs or how many are detected. 
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The group teaching format was judged acceptable by GP trainees in this study, 
which increases the potential feasibility of delivering teaching to larger numbers 
of clinicians in comparison to one-to-one teaching (by another clinician) for 
specific aspects of the training curriculum. This is in keeping with other QI 
techniques such as criterion audit and SEA which can be taught by both clinicians 
and non-clinicians in large group settings but applied at the individual and 
practice-based levels.   
 
10.4.2.3. Select reviewers with the knowledge and influence to enact change 
 
The TRM should be applied by trained clinicians who have sufficient influence to 
ensure the findings are shared with their practice teams and who are capable to 
improve care for patients as well as at systems-level.  
 
10.4.2.4. Allocate adequate resources and time to the TRM 
 
This issue has previously been discussed. Of particular relevance to the TRM, is 
that reviewers should be allocated sufficient and protected time to allow them 
to conduct their trigger reviews, which include the completion of a trigger 
review summary sheet, in one session. 
 
10.4.2.5. Disseminate the trigger review findings and learning points 
 
The findings from trigger reviews should be disseminated to all relevant 
stakeholders, from the practice through to the national level to enable 
collective learning. This recommendation was justified and discussed in more 
detail on page 283.  
 
10.4.3. Recommendations about future research and research priorities 
 
This sub-section includes four recommendations in relation to future patient 
safety research, and potential research priorities in this discipline: 
I. Patient safety research has practical value and should remain a priority 
area in general practice; 
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II. One of the main research priorities is to develop and validate a range of 
effective and cost-effective improvement methods; 
III. Research is necessary to understand how a strong and positive safety 
culture can be built in diverse health care settings; 
IV. If the value of ‘hidden contributions’ to patient safety are to be 
harnessed, more research will be necessary;  
 
10.4.3.1. Patient safety research is a priority with practical value for general 
practice 
 
The first, general recommendation is that patient safety should remain a priority 
research area (399, 400). There are many potential benefits, ranging from the 
philosophical pursuit of knowledge through to the practical aspects of helping to 
ameliorate or prevent patient harm. Three benefits in particular help to support 
this recommendation (47). The first benefit is that patient safety research 
increases our understanding of the nature and scale of PSIs as well as the 
associated safety threats. Being able to present reliable evidence of significant 
and systemic shortfalls in delivered care provides justification for policy makers 
and managers to allocate additional resources to help address deficiencies and 
allow them to distribute the resources in the most efficient manner.  
 
The second benefit of patient safety research is that it helps to bridge the gap 
between ‘what might work’ which is based on intuition and expectation and 
what actually works in complex, dynamic and unique health care settings. 
Research methods are imminently suitable for developing, testing and rigorously 
evaluating complex health care interventions. Importantly, ineffective, 
unacceptable and unfeasible interventions can be identified before they are 
widely implemented.  
 
The third benefit is the potential to measure health care performance. Reliable 
measures help staff set specific improvement targets, monitor their progress and 
identify when their aims have been achieved. Research can also help to identify 
and understand the factors that hinder or facilitate improvement processes. 
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10.4.3.2. Develop and validate a range of effective and cost-effective 
improvement methods 
 
A systematic review and meta-analysis in 2006 found no evidence for the 
effectiveness of any intervention to reduce preventable drug-related PSIs and 
admissions, with the possible exception of pharmacist-led medication reviews 
(91). The need for a range of complementary methods to reliably improve care 
standards have previously been described on page 255. This recommendation is 
also supported by the wider patient safety research community (399, 401). 
 
10.4.3.3. Understand how to build a strong and positive safety culture in 
health care  
 
Different aspects of safety culture were considered in Chapters 2, 6 and 9. From 
a practical perspective though, the most important implication is that the 
prevailing safety culture (or conversely the lack of a safety culture) influences 
clinicians and staff to choose behaviours that enhance - or compromise - safety 
practices and thinking (171). This poses an important question: can a primary 
care organisation build a strong and positive safety culture that is capable of 
both predicting and avoiding patient safety incidents? The answer is a cautious 
and provisional ‘yes’, but will likely require many steps, considerable effort and 
research.  
 
The very basic first steps and key requirements are to actually become aware of, 
measure and discuss the concept of a ‘practice safety culture’. Perhaps more 
importantly, even if safety culture can be adequately measured, can we 
associate these metrics to clinical and organisational outcomes such as 
reductions in healthcare errors and avoidable patient harm, or improvements in 
the safety attitudes, knowledge and behaviours of the primary care workforce?  
The answers at this stage are unknown, but largely because the necessary depth 
of research and evaluation has yet to take place, hence the recommendation to 
prioritise safety culture as a research priority (350, 367, 402). 
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10.4.3.4. Harness the value of ‘hidden contributions’ to patient safety  
 
Chapter 2 described a number of large-scale patient safety improvement 
programmes and initiatives. All of the programmes were endorsed by 
government or health care institutions, had clearly defined aims and 
interventions and were evaluated to some extent. However, there are many 
other patient safety-related activities in health care apart from these 
programmes. They often are unrecognised, unreported and unappreciated 
despite their considerable value.  
 
One of the main mechanisms through which ‘hidden contributions’ are made to 
patient safety is through mitigation. Mitigating factors are defined as actions or 
circumstances that prevent or moderate the progression of an incident towards 
harming a patient (3). It has been estimated that mitigation may help to prevent 
from 8% (2) to as much as a quarter of health care errors in primary care (403). 
Practice staff are the most common mitigators, but patients and their families 
and other health care professionals such as pharmacists also make important 
contributions (404). Two exemplars are the recent ethnographic studies by 
Swinglehurst et al and Grant et al who found receptionists and administrative 
staff made important “hidden” and informal contributions to the safety of 
repeat prescribing in UK general practice (309, 369). Such hidden contributions 
warrant better identification and, potentially, utilisation in everyday practice. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the last few decades there have been extraordinary advances in medical 
research and technology that have enabled clinicians to better diagnose, 
investigate and treat an ever-expanding list of pathological conditions, thereby 
further improving the overall health of individual patients and populations. At 
the same time, there has also been a growing acknowledgement that patient 
safety incidents (PSIs) commonly occur and that a substantial minority result in 
preventable, iatrogenic harm to patients.  
 
This study is the first known attempt to investigate how the TRM is implemented 
and perceived in primary care from the perspective of general practice clinicians 
and staff. All of the study aims were achieved: 
 The perceptions and understanding of general practice clinicians and staff 
of ‘patient safety’ were described in Chapter 6.  
 The usefulness of the TRM was evaluated and the main outcomes from its 
implementation were described in Chapter 7.  
 An explanation of how the TRM worked was provided in Chapter 8. 
 The main factors that facilitated or hindered the implementation of the 
TRM in general practice were identified and described in Chapter 9.  
 
In addition, four specific questions in relation to this study were considered in 
Chapter 10, and the potential answers as well as their implications for patient 
safety, implementation and improvement initiatives were described.  
 
The findings from this study reaffirm the potential of the TRM to identify 
avoidable PSIs with potential educational and improvement value, particularly 
when it is applied to high risk groups of patients. In addition, most participants 
experienced the method as acceptable and feasible and perceived it as 
potentially useful. It is clear that the TRM is uncovering important patient safety 
concerns and also driving improvements in related care systems and processed at 
the individual practice level. The implication is that this is making a significant 
and demonstrable difference to patient care while impacting positively on local 
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safety culture. On the evidence presented, normalisation of the TRM in general 
practice can therefore be recommended.   
 
However, while the usefulness of an intervention is an important factor in 
determining whether it is normalised or not, the study findings also clearly 
indicate – consistent with the international literature – that there are other 
factors that are at least equally important. They are: that clinicians have the 
prerequisite knowledge to apply the method; practice and senior organisational 
leadership support; contextual integration; and allocation of adequate 
resources. At the time of writing, some of these requirements have been met. 
The vast majority of clinicians seem to have adequate knowledge to apply the 
TRM, and it has been included in the RCGP Patient Safety Toolkit. However, 
there is currently no formal mandate or financial incentives for general practice 
teams to perform regular trigger reviews. It therefore seems likely that the 
normalisation of the TRM in UK general practice will be gradual and piecemeal, 
if it happens at all. Nevertheless, the lessons learnt from this study can be 
incorporated in the ongoing efforts to further improve the safety of care in 
general medical practice. 
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Appendix 3. Invitation letter to GP Specialist Trainees 
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Appendix 4. Consent form for general practices 
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Appendix 5. Consent form for individual study participants 
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Appendix 6. Schedule for interview one: general practitioners, practice 
managers and practice nurses 
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Appendix 7. Schedule for interview two: general practitioners, practice 
managers and practice nurses 
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Appendix 8.  Trigger Review Summary Sheet 
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Appendix 9. The NPT Framework and exemplar TRM quotes from this study 
NPT constructs 
and components  
Exemplar quotes 
   
Coherence: The work participants have to do to understand the TRM  
 
Differentiation  Mistakes usually are only picked up when they’ve blown up, 
rather than going looking for them... This [the TRM] was better 
because actually I was fishing for things (GP06) 
Communal 
specification  
I think it’s useful as a learning tool to learn about your own 
systems and a way of trying to improve those systems and a way 
of learning as a team with the results (GP05) 
Individual 
specification  
I was able, I felt empowered by looking at it, that I could look at 
the system, pick out errors that we hadn’t really seen, bring it to 
somewhere to discuss, reflect on my own practice, and make 
some changes within that (GP06) 
Internalization  I like nothing more than going back over notes, and reviewing and 
researching what we have or haven’t done (GP06) 
  
Cognitive participation: The work of building a TRM ‘community of practice’ 
 
Initiation  I’ve been trying to start the ground level approach of saying ‘this 
is how it should be used’, you know, used formatively and using it 
to look at your systems as well, and things like that (GP05)  
Enrolment  One of my partners has said to me: ‘Do you mind if I do the next 
trigger tools? Cause I’m looking for something to do for an audit 
(GP05) 
Activation  That made us then do that as an SEA which made us decide ‘well, 
ok, we all need whatever we do, we all need to do the 
same’...and it also made us do a search really for anyone with an 
HbA1c of over 6.5 who didn’t have a diagnosis of diabetes (GP05) 
Legitimation  I’m not sure if I’d have gone back to [the TRM] if it had 
disappeared off the horizon. If it was out of QOF, but part of what 
we do, or it’s made an RCGP approved tool or it was something 
that trainees do, then I could see why people would become lured 
to the idea that it is a good thing and it would’ve developed... 
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cause it gives it fruits. There are fruits for your labour. Well, you 
have to justify the time in order to make it happen (GP06) 
  
Collective action: Enactment of the TRM, e.g. how the work gets done 
 
Interactional 
workability  
I did it electronically from the outset because that’s just much 
easier to store and save it (GP06) 
Relational 
integration 
GPs hopefully see it as a tool to help them - and the second thing 
that’ll help with that, is what’s done with the results that come 
from it at trust level. And I think that needs to be made clear to 
GPs at the beginning [pause] so they don’t feel that this is going 
to be something to punish them and just another tick box exercise 
but see it as something positive (GP05) 
Skill-set 
workability 
I would hope, I would have to say I would think, most GPs would 
be able to do that’ [reflect on TRM findings] (GP05) 
Contextual 
integration  
So even having the lunchtime meeting, when we went over the 
trigger tool, that’s done slightly on a squash and a squeeze -  it’s 
not easily done. Protected learning time helps for that kind of 
process...if you’re trying to make it part of the structure (GP06) 
  
Reflexive monitoring: The work of appraising the TRM 
 
Systematisation  That paper copy I don’t think can be found at this time, which is a 
bit disappointing cause I have seen it, it was done and we thought 
we’d sent it, or she’d sent it, but it hasn’t transpired, I gather 
(GP06) 
Individual 
appraisal  
I think it’s been very useful for us...generates plenty of SEAs, has 
helped us refine some of our protocols and like for the diabetes 
thing we changed that. I think it does pick up [pause] incidents 
directly related to one patient (GP05) 
Communal 
appraisal  
I think it can be a fantastic tool for appraisal (GP05) 
Reconfiguration  I’m just trying to think if this would take away from it in any way, 
but is there a way to identify the triggers using some computer 
based template and then come up with x number of patients to 
review? (GP05) 
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Appendix 11. Presentations related to this study  
 
Date Event or 
Organisation 
Venue Delegates Presentation 
26/10/17 GP17 – RACGP 
Annual Conference 
Sydney N/A ‘The Big Buzz’: How 
safe care is perceived, 
understood and 
improved in GP 
11/04/17 Communication Hour 
Symposium 
Griffith 
University 
Medical students 
(years 3 and 4) 
Normalisation  Process 
Theory 
15/09/16 ‘Subject Matter 
Experts’ workshop 
Gold Coast 
University 
Hospital; 
Australia 
Managers and 
clinicians from 
the Specialist 
Outpatient 
Services (±20) 
The value of NPT in 
planning and 
implementing change 
05/08/15 Lunch-time lecture Medical School; 
Durban; South 
Africa 
Students, faculty 
(±20) 
Perspectives of 
contributing factors to 
PSIs  
01/08/15 Annual conference 
of the South African 
Academy of Family 
Physicians 
Empangeni 
Hotel; Durban; 
South Africa 
Family 
practitioners; 
medical 
superintendents; 
academic staff 
(±200) 
The KM Seedat 
lecture: Perspectives 
of the contributing 
factors to PSIs  
31/10/14 Workshop to plan 
the ‘Harm in New 
Zealand general 
practice’ study 
Dunedin; New 
Zealand 
Academic staff 
(±15) 
TRM and general 
practice  
13/06/14 SPSP-PC national 
Learning Event  
Training centre; 
Glasgow; 
Scotland  
Programme leads 
and participants 
(±90) 
The TRM and QOF:  
Findings and 
recommendations 
21/05/14 The Patient Safety 
Congress 
Conference 
Centre; 
Liverpool; 
England  
National and 
international 
delegates with an 
interest in safety 
Improving patient 
safety in primary care 
in Scotland 
09/05/14 SPSP-PC national Crowne Plaza; Programme leads Qualitative findings 
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Learning Event Glasgow; 
Scotland  
and participants 
(±90) 
from this study 
26/03/14 Quality Improvement 
workshop for GPSTs 
NES office; 
Edinburgh  
GPST (±40) The potential of the 
NPT framework for QI 
projects 
31/10/13 NES GP Educational 
Supervisor 
conference 
Grand Central 
Hotel; Glasgow; 
Scotland 
GP educational 
supervisors (±150) 
Interactive workshops: 
the potential of TRM 
for GPST 
16/10/14 ISQUA conference Conference 
Centre; 
Edinburgh; 
Scotland  
Delegates (±50) The TRM and GPST 
11/09/13 NES GP Appraiser 
conference 
Grand Central 
Hotel; Glasgow; 
Scotland 
GP appraisers 
(±150) 
How to successfully 
incorporate the TRM 
in GP appraisal 
28/08/13 AMEE Prague; Czech 
republic 
 Workshop: The TRM 
and self-directed 
learning 
Presentation: 
Potential of TRM for 
teaching and 
improving safety in GP 
19/06/13 NHS Lanarkshire PLT 
event 
Hamilton Race 
Course; 
Scotland 
All Lanarkshire 
GPs and staff 
The Trigger Review 
Method 
12/06/13 NHS Dumfries and 
Galloway 
educational event 
Dumfries; 
Scotland 
GPs, PMs, PNs  
(±180) 
Patient safety and the 
TRM 
22/05/13 Patient Safety 
Conference  
Conference 
Centre; 
Birmingham; 
England 
Delegates Two posters: Monte 
Carlo simulation and 
the potential of the 
TRM for GPST 
30/04/13 SPSP-PC Learning 
Event 
AA football 
club; Scotland 
A range of GP 
staff and 
clinicians (±250) 
The TRM 
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15/03/13 
 
SPSP-PC  
National Launch 
 
Herriot Watt; 
Edinburgh; 
Scotland 
 
A range of GP 
staff and 
clinicians (±250) 
 
The TRM: 
Presentations, 
workshops 
25/01/13 NADEGS conference Stirling; 
Scotland 
Staff from 
Scottish Medical 
schools  
‘There is safe and 
then there is safe’: A 
qualitative 
exploration of patient 
safety in GP using NPT 
24/09/12 Lothian Local 
Enhanced  Patient 
safety workshop 
Murrayfield; 
Edinburgh; 
Scotland 
A range of GP 
staff and 
clinicians (±200) 
The TRM 
27/06/12 GGC Local Enhanced  
Patient safety 
Service workshop 
Glasgow; 
Scotland 
A range of GP 
staff and 
clinicians (±100) 
Patient safety and 
general practice 
31/05/12 The Scottish Practice 
Management 
Development 
Conference 
Crieff Hydro; 
Scotland 
GP Practice 
Managers 
The Trigger Review 
Method, safety culture 
and patient safety 
29/03/12 SIPC national 
learning event 
Glasgow; 
Scotland 
SIPC participants 
and board 
support staff 
The Trigger Review 
Method 
28/03/12 Lanarkshire PLT 
event 
Lanark; 
Scotland 
A range of GP 
staff and 
clinicians (±150) 
The Trigger Review 
Method, safety culture 
and patient safety 
01/03/12 MDDUS conference Fairmont hotel; 
Scotland 
A range of GP 
staff and 
clinicians 
The Trigger Review 
Method, safety 
culture, never events 
and patient safety 
20/01/12 NADEGS conference Dundee; 
Scotland 
Staff from 
Scottish Medical 
schools 
The Trigger Review 
Method 
05/2011 Patient safety 
congress 
Birmingham; 
England 
Conference 
delegates 
Poster presentation of 
the TRM 
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